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Abstract
Improving the capabilities of NHS organisations to use
evidence: a qualitative study of redesign projects in Clinical
Commissioning Groups
Jacqueline Swan,1* Emmanouil Gkeredakis,1 Rachel M Manning,1
Davide Nicolini,1 David Sharp2 and John Powell3,4
1Warwick Business School, University of Warwick, Coventry, UK
2Optum Healthcare, London, UK
3Nuffield Department of Primary Care Health Sciences, Medical Sciences Division, University of
Oxford, Oxford, UK
4National Institute for Health and Care Excellence, London, UK
*Corresponding author jacky.swan@wbs.ac.uk
Background: Innovation driven by authoritative evidence is critical to the survival of England’s NHS.
Clinical Commissioning Groups (CCGs) are central in NHS efforts to do more with less. Although decisions
should be based on the ‘best available evidence’, this is often problematic, with frequent mismatches
between the evidence ‘pushed’ by producers and that used in management work. Our concern, then,
is to understand practices and conditions (which we term ‘capabilities’) that enable evidence use in
commissioning work. We consider how research gets into CCGs (‘push’), how CCGs use evidence (‘pull’)
and how this can be supported (toolkit development). We aim to contribute to evidence-based NHS
innovation, and, more generally, to improved health-care service provision.
Method: Supported by the National Institute for Health Research (NIHR), we conducted semistructured
ethnographic interviews in eight CCGs. We also conducted observations of redesign meetings in two of
the CCGs. We used inductive and deductive coding to identify evidence used and capabilities for use from
the qualitative data. We then compared across cases to understand variations in outcomes as a function
of capabilities. To help improvements in commissioning, we collated our findings into a toolkit for use by
stakeholders. We also conducted a small-scale case study of the production of evidence-based guidance to
understand evidence ‘push’.
Results: Fieldwork indicated that different evidences inform CCG decision-making, which we categorise as
‘universal’, ‘local’, ‘expertise-based’ and ‘trans-local’. Fieldwork also indicated that certain practices and
conditions (‘capabilities’) enable evidence use, including ‘sourcing and evaluating evidence’, ‘engaging
experts’, ‘effective framing’, ‘managing roles and expectations’ and ‘managing expert collaboration’.
Importantly, cases in which fewer capabilities were recorded tended to report more problems, relative
to cases in which needed capabilities were applied. These latter cases were more likely to effectively
use evidence, achieve objectives and maintain stakeholder satisfaction. We also found that various
understandings of end-users are inscribed into products by evidence producers, which seems to reflect the
evolving landscape of the production of authoritative evidence.
Conclusions: This was exploratory research on evidence use capabilities in commissioning decisions.
The findings suggest that commissioning stakeholders need support to identify, understand and apply
evidence. Support to develop capabilities for evidence may be one means of ensuring effective,
evidence-based innovations in commissioning. Our work with evidence producers also shows variation in
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their perceptions of end users, which may inform the ‘push’/’pull’ gap between research and practice.
There were also some limitations to our project, including a smaller than expected sample size and a time
frame that did not allow us to capture full redesign projects in all CCGs.
Future work: With these findings in mind, future work may look more closely at how information comes
to be treated as evidence and at the relationships of capabilities to project outcomes. Going forward,
knowledge, especially that related to generalisability, may be built by means of a longer time and the
study of redesign projects in different settings.
Funding: The NIHR Health Services and Delivery Research programme.
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Plain English summary
C linical Commissioning Groups (CCGs) comprise managers, doctors, nurses, consultants and otherhealth-care professionals. These groups make decisions about health-care services in local areas.
Because the NHS needs to improve care and spend less money, CCGs must design the best possible
services. Evidence use is one means to achieve this, but this is far from straightforward. Often, the needs
of evidence users are not met or understood by evidence producers. To inform evidence-based CCG work,
we conducted research at eight CCGs across England. Through case studies at each CCG, we found that
decisions are based on a range of different evidences, including those produced in scientific research, local
data, expertise and experiences and examples from elsewhere. We also found that certain conditions
and practices (capabilities) increase the chances of evidence use, particularly those that encourage and
manage stakeholder engagement and collaboration. We also visited a producer of evidence for use by
NHS commissioners. We found that they hold varied ideas about how other people pick up and use
evidence. We suggest that it is important to support NHS commissioners in understanding and identifying
different categories of evidence relevant to their work and in using these together. We also identify
specific capabilities that, our findings suggest, help enable the use of evidence. Based on our findings,
we designed a learning tool (an online resource for self-assessment) aimed at supporting commissioning
organisations in developing their own capabilities to use evidence when redesigning services.
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Scientific summary
Background
Innovation driven by authoritative evidence is a key priority for the NHS. Much of the responsibility for
innovation rests with NHS Clinical Commissioning Groups (CCGs), which are tasked with designing services
to meet local health needs. Evidence-based products and recommendations are increasingly supplied to
assist CCGs in making effective evidence-based decisions. However, the uptake of evidence in health-care
contexts is problematic and patchy. A major challenge, then, for NHS commissioners is to proactively and
strategically consider how their organisations can be better equipped to take hold of, and use, evidence in
service design and delivery decisions. Alongside evidence users, the supply of authoritative evidence does
not always connect closely to demand. Therefore, another consideration is to better match evidence
production to the realities of evidence use.
Objectives
Of relevance to these challenges are findings from a rich stream of research on evidence ‘pull’ (demand)
and ‘push’ (supply) in health-care settings. In terms of ‘pull’, the theoretical approach of knowledge
mobilisation is particularly relevant. This situates evidence use as a locally situated social and political
process. It shows, for example, that health-care workers often rely on evidence from a variety of sources,
including their peers, in a form that is compatible with their daily activity. For these reasons, equipping
NHS organisations for evidence use may begin with identifying what evidence is used and when in
decision-making processes, that is, the ‘evidence journey’. This is the first objective of our project.
In addition to understanding what evidence is used, work is needed to identify and articulate how NHS
organisations can develop and improve their capabilities to use evidence effectively. Some previous
research has shown that evidence use may be improved by certain enabling practices and conditions in
the decision-making context. One practice that has an obvious importance in CCG work is to proactively
manage relationships among stakeholders to create coalitions. There is, however, a dearth of research on
the topic of capabilities for evidence use in health-care management, and so we seek to identify and
clearly articulate the practices and organisational conditions that support commissioners in using evidence.
This is the second objective of our project. Our secondary interest relates to evidence ‘push’. Here,
we gain insights into how evidence producers envisage end-users, and how this relates to the realities
of commissioning work. Research on ‘inscribed meanings’ provides important insights here. This work
encourages us to consider how evidence producers expect that their research will be used in practice.
Understanding the meanings inscribed in evidence products provides further insights into discrepancies
between producer expectations and user reality. This is the third objective of our project.
Method
Building on previous research, we adopt a comparative research strategy to investigate how commissioning
organisations use evidence, especially National Institute for Health and Care Excellence (NICE) evidence
given its importance to health and social care reforms. Based on eight case studies of CCGs involved in
redesigning services, we describe what evidence is used and identify capabilities for evidence use. We
compare across the cases to explain how more successful evidence journeys differ from relatively less
successful ones. Specifically, we understand evidence use, objectives and stakeholder experiences in the
light of capabilities in the CCG for evidence use. We also conducted a small number of interviews and
observations with evidence producers to better understand evidence ‘push’.
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Results
Our analysis suggests, first, that, in addition to NICE evidence, CCG stakeholders use a mix of different
kinds of evidence to inform decision-making in their redesign work. Applying both inductive and deductive
coding, we categorise these evidences as ‘universal’, ‘local’, ‘expertise-based’ and ‘trans-local’. The first two
categories (universal and local) were used in all CCG projects, with stakeholders attempting to understand
how authoritative guidelines and standards could be implemented in the local context. Expertise-based
evidence was most often used to understand and identify solutions. The last evidence (trans-local) involved
taking and applying local evidence originating from another place in the current context. Trans-local evidence
was used to identify new ways of providing services and was usually accessed through informal channels.
The four categories of evidence identified in our study were never used in isolation; instead, stakeholders
mobilised multiple categories together to inform sense-making across the redesign process. Importantly,
and as expected, using these evidences was far from straightforward. Personal, social and political
challenges were just some of the barriers stakeholders faced in their efforts to conduct evidence-based
redesign work.
Although there were certainly challenges, there were also clear enablers of evidence use. From our cases,
we identified five capabilities that were shown to enable and enhance evidence-based decision-making in
commissioning organisations. These were ‘sourcing and evaluating evidence’, ‘engaging experts’, ‘effective
framing’, ‘managing roles and expectations’ and ‘managing expert collaboration’. Although the first
capability refers to actively gathering, evaluating and applying relevant evidences, capabilities were largely
social, rather than technical, in nature. That is, evidence use was visibly enhanced when CCGs worked to
engage stakeholders in contributing and legitimating evidence, often through effective framing, and
managing individuals’ role expectations and group collaborations.
Comparing across cases provided important insights into relationships between evidence use, capabilities
for evidence use and project outcomes. We considered redesign project outcomes in terms of evidence use
(i.e. overcoming challenges), stakeholder experiences (i.e. how satisfied or dissatisfied redesign actors were)
and objectives (i.e. whether or not project objectives were met). We found that CCGs with the fewest
capabilities for evidence use also reported the most challenges in their redesign attempts. The frequency
of capabilities was not directly proportional to outcomes, that is, more capabilities did not necessarily mean
equivalently better outcomes. Instead, applying relevant capabilities as necessary in context seemed to be
more beneficial to evidence-based redesign work. We suggest that commissioning groups should be
supported to develop capabilities and understand when and how to apply them.
Importantly, we are keen to ensure that findings become actionable in the real world, and so we have
developed a toolkit to enable stakeholders to assess their capabilities to use different types of evidence and to
identify opportunities for improvement. The toolkit documents routes to effective evidence use, accounting for
organisational dynamics and complexities. It contains questions intended to help commissioning stakeholders
and redesign teams to reflect on how well they use evidence and to identify opportunities for improvement.
Toolkit development was supported by an Economic and Social Research Council Impact Acceleration Grant
(July–December 2016). A secondary set of findings relates to an exploratory study of ‘push’ by evidence
producers (the start of the evidence journey). Specifically, we consider how producers think their evidence
should, and will, be used by commissioning organisations, and how this meaning is inscribed in their work
and artefacts (e.g. published guidance). We identify three main ‘discourses of evidence users’: ‘discourse of
production’, ‘discourse of audience feedback’ and ‘discourse of implementation consultancy and marketing’.
The first discourse is more traditional, assuming that the quality of published evidence itself assures its route
into practice. The second and third discourses reflect alternative knowledge mobilisation views that consider
evidence production and use as a socially dynamic process. The co-existence of these three discourses among
producers indicates an evolving landscape for the production of evidence, one that may be more aligned with
user needs and practices in future years.
SCIENTIFIC SUMMARY
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Conclusions
In sum, we show that commissioning groups making redesign choices use multiple evidences. Evidence use
is often informed by applicability and accessibility rather than by mode of production. Evidence use is a
dynamic sense-making process dependent on the task at hand. It is not, however, completely random or
fortuitous. Instead, certain organisational conditions and practices enable effective evidence mobilisation.
These capabilities entail effectively managing social and political issues that arise in redesign work in which
multiple forms of expertise are needed. We show, albeit in a preliminary way, a relationship between
evidence use capabilities and project outcomes. We also shed light on the way in which the production of
evidence-based products may reflect and shape their use.
The findings provide a tool aimed at supporting commissioning groups to improve evidence use by
understanding the political and social nature of redesign work. More broadly, identifying, developing and
applying capabilities relevant to context may be a means of ensuring more effective evidence-based
redesigns in the NHS. In identifying these implications, we make a small but important contribution to
evidence-based innovation in this context.
Funding
Funding for this study was provided by the Health Services and Delivery Research programme of the
National Institute for Health Research.
DOI: 10.3310/hsdr05180 HEALTH SERVICES AND DELIVERY RESEARCH 2017 VOL. 5 NO. 18
© Queen’s Printer and Controller of HMSO 2017. This work was produced by Swan et al. under the terms of a commissioning contract issued by the Secretary of State for Health.
This issue may be freely reproduced for the purposes of private research and study and extracts (or indeed, the full report) may be included in professional journals provided that
suitable acknowledgement is made and the reproduction is not associated with any form of advertising. Applications for commercial reproduction should be addressed to: NIHR
Journals Library, National Institute for Health Research, Evaluation, Trials and Studies Coordinating Centre, Alpha House, University of Southampton Science Park, Southampton
SO16 7NS, UK.
xxi

Chapter 1 Relevant literature and research context
In this chapter, we provide an overview of the National Institute for Health Research (NIHR) brief, as wellas the literature that can be drawn on to address this brief. We will consider the research needs of the
NHS in the light of the knowledge mobilisation literature, which offers a strong theoretical foundation for
this type of research. We should note that the aim of this project was not to provide a systematic literature
review: several reviews have been conducted previously in this domain. Rather, to identify relevant
literature, we began by consulting previous NIHR final reports and scholarly works focused on evidence
use in commissioning practice.1,2 As these were rather few, we then turned to reviews of evidence use in
health-care management and, in particular, to recent studies of evidence use in practice.3–11 We also
accessed the literature reviewed, more broadly, by leading scholars in the field in our work in editing our
own book on knowledge mobilisation in health care.12 We combined these sources with other specific
works, as relevant to particular topics of interest (e.g. research in clinical commissioning, innovation
capabilities and so forth). Given the current gap in knowledge on evidence use in commissioning, we
address questions about what counts as evidence, when it counts, how it is used and how it is created in
order to develop a conceptual framework for the study.
Introduction to the research
Sustained and successful innovation in health-care services, driven by the best available evidence, is critical
to the survival of England’s NHS.5,13 A major provider of authoritative evidence is the National Institute for
Health and Care Excellence (NICE). NICE synthesises and publishes authoritative evidence that is widely
considered to be ‘gold standard’. New legislation places NICE at the heart of reforms in health and social
care to ensure that patients receive high-quality and cost-effective care.14 At the same time, more stringent
measures to accelerate the uptake and implementation of NICE recommendations are being proposed.
Expectations are higher than ever that this evidence will drive innovation as well as lower the costs of
service delivery in the NHS.
Much of the responsibility for innovation in the NHS now lies with Clinical Commissioning Groups (CCGs),
which are tasked with the design and procurement of health-care services. Multiple evidence-based products
are available to commissioners in making informed decisions, including NICE guidance (e.g. guidelines) and
quality standards and metrics [e.g. Quality and Outcomes Framework (QOF), CCG Outcomes Indicator Set].
However, fragmentation and variation in the uptake of evidence in health-care decision-making is widely
noted.2,3,15 It is clear that the (abundant) supply of evidence-based products does not always connect to the
needs of health-care decision-makers.1,16 This is especially so when dealing with the kinds of complex,
time-dependent and political decision situations faced by health-care managers.16,17 Walshe and Rundall17
aptly note that the:
constrained, contested, and political nature of many managerial decisions, [make] it difficult for
managers to apply research evidence even when it is available.
p. 44517
Thus, a major challenge for NHS commissioning groups is to proactively and strategically consider how
they can be better equipped to take hold of, and use, evidence in decisions. A key challenge then, lies in
‘building high learning capacity and appropriate core competencies in NHS organisations, rather than
relying on a technological fix’.5
The imperative for NHS organisations to innovate sits alongside the need to make savings, often by adept
commissioning. These objectives can be met only by improving existing services. The need for commissioning
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managers to use sound evidence is, therefore, greater than ever.1 In the light of this, organisational
capabilities to use evidence in their pursuit of service redesign are especially important and need to be
carefully nurtured. Our study, thus, focuses on capabilities to use evidence in service redesign initiatives led
by commissioning groups. It seeks to provide an important practical resource for the frontline managers and
the clinical leaders of commissioning organisations who will be responsible for making some tough decisions
over the coming years. The focus of our work, then, is on improving NHS commissioning organisations’
capabilities to use evidence in decision-making.
Aims and objectives
As stated in our original protocol, the aims of the research were to identify the capabilities (organisational
and managerial) that NHS CCGs need to become better users of authoritative evidence. Given our focus
on evidence use among social groups in organised settings, we take a knowledge-based view of
organisations.18 As Grant19 comments:
. . . organizational capability, defined as a firm’s ability to perform repeatedly a productive task which
relates either directly or indirectly to a firm’s capacity for creating value through effecting the
transformation of inputs into outputs.
With this in mind, the objectives of our research were to:
1. Study how authoritative evidence travels into, and is used by, different CCGs (by documenting
‘evidence journeys’).
2. Compare and contrast the travel of evidence across CCGs to understand how and why variations in
evidence use occur in practice.
3. Create a toolkit to guide CCGs to better use evidence. Specifically, the tool will help CCGs to assess
and improve their capabilities to use evidence. It will be built on process models of how evidence travels
in the real world, rather than on abstract accounts.
Our aims and objectives have not changed, but it was apparent from our initial literature search and
fieldwork that to understand authoritative evidence use we also needed to consider how commissioners
use other forms of evidence too. We had also intended to examine ‘disinvestment’ and ‘investment’ decisions,
but it became apparent that, in reality, these are two sides of the same coin. That is, commissioners’ decisions
about what not to do occur only when deciding what to do in service design. Hence, the two cannot be
practically disentangled when looking at the ways evidence travels in practice, at least in this context.
In the following sections, we outline how our research contributes to the NIHR brief and describe the
commissioning landscape as our research context. We then outline our theoretical approach, drawing from
‘knowledge mobilisation’ and evidence-based management (EBMgmt) health-care literatures.20 Although much
can be learned about the ways in which evidence is used in the NHS from these literatures, we conclude
that further work is needed to articulate how organisations can improve their capabilities to use evidence
more effectively.1
Response to the National Institute for Health Research Health
Services and Delivery Research commissioning brief
This study was funded in response to the NIHR Health Services and Delivery Research (HSDR) programme’s
call for ‘research to improve knowledge transfer and innovation in healthcare delivery and organisation’
(HSDR call number 12/5002). The call builds on the Cooksey report21 particularly the observed ‘T2 gap’
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between the research output and transfer into practice. The call emphasised research that generates
actionable findings to help the NHS make better use of evidence. The three main themes were:
1. research on ‘pull’ by managers (increasing the receptivity and research/innovation capacity of
organisations and individual managers)
2. research on ‘push’ by researchers (making the research product/innovation more usable)
3. research on knowledge linkage and exchange (bringing service decision-makers and researchers/
industry together in different ways).
The NIHR call focused specifically on the evidence used by organisations and managers to inform decisions
about services, rather than on evidence informing clinical interactions, into which there had already been
substantial research.22 Notably, the call sought to build on previous work on ‘knowledge translation’, for
example by the Canadian Institute of Health Research, to improve the translational work of NHS management
and organisations. The call was premised on the idea that knowledge translation includes a diverse array of
activities and should be understood as highly complex, not only in technical, but also in social, organisational
and political terms.6
Research on ‘pull’ by managers
Our study responds directly to the first theme in the NIHR brief for research on evidence ‘pull’. Specifically,
we sought to ‘assess the capacity in healthcare organisations to accelerate innovation’ (p. 4 of the brief)
by identifying capabilities for evidence use in commissioning decisions. This aim followed directly from
earlier NIHR-funded research, including our own, showing how knowledge and evidence was used by
commissioning managers in primary care trusts (PCTs) (Service Delivery and Organisation reference
08/1808/244)3 and by NHS chief executives (Service Delivery and Organisation reference 09/1002/36).5
Findings of those studies indicated the importance of mobilising different kinds of evidence and local
knowledge in a timely manner, managing interfaces across project stages, proactively building and
managing relationships to create coalitions and building personal knowledge.2
Informed by previous work, we use the metaphor of the ‘evidence journey’ in our study to capture our
emphasis on the flow of evidence into and through practices of commissioning and the capabilities that
influence this flow. We intend to:
l identify key capabilities to use evidence
l produce a process-based model (roadmap) aimed at improving capabilities by showing the route by
which evidence becomes effective in decision-making
l develop a ‘toolkit’ as a resource for CCGs to assess their evidence-use capabilities.
Research on ‘push’ by knowledge producers
A secondary contribution of our study relates to the theme on evidence ‘push’ by knowledge producers.
We also consider the ways in which guidance is produced and communicated, and how this shapes its
mobilisation and usage in context. This part of our research begins to explain, albeit in a preliminary way,
how the properties of evidence and expectations about the user inscribed in the evidence matter to the
way it travels in commissioning organisations.
Research context: the shifting commissioning landscape (2013–16)
Our study began in October 2013, just 6 months after CCGs took over from PCTs. CCGs are part of the
government’s attempt to improve health services by bringing the commissioning closer to the community.
CCGs differ from PCTs in size and composition. CCGs are much larger and are led by general practitioners
(GPs), whereas health-care managers ran PCTs. Commissioning GPs must work alongside managers,
consultants, nurses, patients and other experts to manage resources. These groups work together to plan,
contract, monitor and transform health care.23 NHS reforms have sought to create commissioning supported
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(but not led by) external commercial and not-for-profit providers, changing the relationship between
managers and clinicians. Evidence use in commissioning has no doubt been influenced by new modes of
working between CCGs and external providers.1 This shift means there is a need to identify opportunities for
learning with regard to developing and sustaining capabilities to use evidence in commissioning.
At last count, 211 CCGs had responsibility for about two-thirds of the NHS budget between them. CCGs
can commission any services as long as they meet NHS standards and local needs. Importantly, the Health
and Social Care Act 201224 compels CCGs to use evidence to assure the quality of commissioned services.
Such evidence is, for the most part, produced by NICE in the form of ‘authoritative guidance, standards,
and information’.25 NICE guidance is considered important so that patient experiences are improved
and costs are reduced.2 However, as above, the uptake of NICE guidance and products has been patchy
in commissioning, and recent NIHR research suggests that this shows no sign of changing soon.1
A key difference around evidence use from these reforms is that some support functions that were
formerly ‘internal’ are now ‘external’.1 Data production, management and analysis is now the remit of
commissioning support units (CSUs), whereas PCTs often had dedicated information support managers.
These ‘external’ organisations want to support commissioners to make better informed choices. However,
a recent qualitative study suggests that this is proving extremely problematic.1 Wye et al.1 conclude that:
One consequence of . . . competing organisations . . . was to curtail freely exchanged knowledge
transfer . . . organisational boundaries not only frustrated knowledge exchange but also established
substantial barriers to the NHS clients’ scope for strengthening commissioning skills . . .
p. xxvii1
This suggests that, although commissioning decisions are now taken by GPs at ‘the coal face’ of service
delivery, the ways in which evidence reaches decision-making in commissioning is just as (if not more)
varied now as it was in the past.
Theoretical approach: knowledge mobilisation
The so-called ‘gap’ between creating knowledge and using it in practice remains a persistent problem.23
Policy initiatives aimed at closing the gap include Academic Health Sciences Centres, Biomedical Research
Centres and Units, Genetics Knowledge Parks and Collaborations for Leadership in Applied Health
Research and Care (CLAHRCs), and new programmes of research (such as this one). NICE was renamed
in 2013, following the Health and Social Care Act, in part to emphasis its role in closing the gap. Such
initiatives are reinforced by the social and economic costs of not using evidence.25
However, outcomes have been mixed,5 and it seems that the underpinning assumptions about knowledge
may be, in part at least, to blame.20 Problems still tend to be framed in terms of transferring knowledge
in a linear sequence from producer to user.21 This view treats knowledge as objective facts (e.g. ‘best
evidence’) established by scientists and scientific methods, synthesised and captured (e.g. in NICE
guidelines) and transferred to users who will pick it up and use it. The limitations of this transfer view as
a means of understanding evidence in health care have been well rehearsed (e.g. see Swan et al.12 for
details). While we do not wish to rehash these here, most converge on the observation that health systems
often fail to optimally use the substantive body of research evidence available to them.26
First, linear models depict decision-making as rational process, whereby knowledge travels as objective
‘facts’ from producers to users who rationally decide based on the best information. This objectifies
knowledge and divorces it from context and so greatly underestimates its fundamentally social nature and
its basis in practice. As critics note, ‘knowing’ is inextricably tied to ‘doing’, and it is divisions of practice
(e.g. professional, occupational and organisational) that create divisions of knowledge, and power,
in organisations.15,27,28
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Second, health-care settings comprise multiple professional groups, partaking in different practices, with
naturally different interests. Experts (e.g. GPs, consultants, nurses and patients) usually seek to use
evidence that fits their own ‘epistemic stances’, frames and values. This means that what counts as ‘best’
knowledge and evidence is often contested.6
Third, the transfer view sees knowledge as an object (e.g. a piece of evidence), divorces it from its context
of production and its use (e.g. how things become evidential), and ultimately sees evidence users as merely
‘information sponges’.29 The knowledge transfer view fails to adequately address the point that mobilising
knowledge across boundaries created by different kinds of practice is always a political process.5 As Crilly
et al.4 note:
The importance of power contests among occupational groups in health systems makes it appropriate
to temper positivistic and purely technical approaches to knowledge management with scepticism.
p. 74
Despite these criticisms, the idea of ‘knowledge transfer’ remains pervasive among policy, practitioner and
academic groups, with many still attempting to resolve the ‘gap’ between evidence and practice. Indeed, the
very notion of a ‘gap’ separates the production and supply of knowledge (or push) from its use (or pull), and
places the root of the problem in the hands of ‘users’ who fail to ‘take up’ evidence. The premise is that, if
we communicate ‘good’ evidence well, the ‘user problem’ will be resolved. Even the well-informed NIHR
programme brief that funded our study called for ‘push’ and ‘pull’ research. This view also predominates the
evidence-based medicine (EBM) movement (with its emphasis on ‘the hierarchy of evidence’) and has also
been incorporated into streams of research on EBMgmt and implementation science.1,30 Recently, Greenhalgh
et al.30 argued for a return to ‘real’ evidence-based decision-making, whereby ‘those who produce and
summarise research evidence must attend more closely to the needs of those who might use it’.30
Along with others, we seek to go beyond linear views, which we see as particularly ill-suited to understanding
managerial work in health care.31 When problems are multifaceted, complex and ambiguous, relevant
knowledge is not produced in a linear way but, instead, is co-produced through interactions among
participating actors.2 For example, CCGs must account for a multitude of considerations when deciding
how to design a service, including quality of care, cost of service delivery and capacity to deliver.
Such decisions invoke multiple forms of knowledge and expertise: science alone is not the way to
effective decision-making.31 As Wright et al.16 put it:
Situated expertise – which is underpinned, in part, by personal experience and judgment – is needed
in the handling, adaptation and communication of this evidence . . . evidence does not speak for itself,
and neither does it allow decision processes to be enacted without context-sensitive judgement.
p. 17516
We adopt, then, a ‘knowledge mobilisation’ approach, embracing situated and social processes.20 We pay
attention to how evidence is circulated, transformed and arrived at by decision-makers. We define knowledge
mobilisation as ‘a proactive process that involves efforts to transform practice through the circulation of
knowledge within and across domains’.12 We share with others the view that evidence is not only passed
around as objective facts, but that things become evidential as a result of practice.9 This approach is
underpinned by the following theoretical premises adapted from Swan et al.:12
l Knowledge is social and context specific; evidence exists in midlines, communities of practice and other
collectives that sustain, legitimise and transform it.
l Knowledge claims depend on people’s epistemic and interpretive frames; what counts as evidence may
be contested across professional and occupational groups.
l At any point certain actors or collectives purposefully pursue knowledge mobilisation; understanding
this is, therefore, fundamental to understanding evidence use.
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l Agents produce knowledge across multiple contexts, or ‘domains of action’; how evidence is used in
one context (e.g. in the practices of CCGs) is nested within, and shaped by, what happens in another
(e.g. in the practices of NICE).
l Knowledge mobilisation results from complex interactions under specific conditions (often referred to
as institutional context); context matters to evidence use.
l Social relationships and networks (formal and informal) matter to the mobilisation of knowledge; who
brokers evidence is important to its use.32
l Politics, legitimacy and interests inform knowledge mobilisation; evidence does not speaks for itself,
and what counts as evidence may change over time.3,5
l Knowledge does not travel untouched through social interactions; evidence is modified at the point of
decision-making.
l Knowledge mobilisation is a transformation process; the same evidence (e.g. NICE guidelines) can be
used differently in different organisational contexts.33
The consequence of adopting this approach goes beyond mere theoretical premises, however; it has
concrete implications for the way the ‘gap’ between research and practice is dealt with. In brief, knowledge
transfer deals with the robustness and diffusion of evidence, while knowledge mobilisation considers social
practice differences that cause different ways of knowing and doing.12 In knowledge transfer, the gap is
closed by creating more research and knowledge in a more timely fashion, upskilling stakeholders to use
this evidence and encouraging research cultures in organisations. Conversely, knowledge mobilisation
addresses the gap by facilitating and leveraging social processes to circulate knowledge, connecting across
boundaries, understanding the role of artefacts and recognising the realities of context.
Knowledge mobilisation and evidence-based management
Evidence-based management literature gained importance in the mid-2000s, having stemmed from the
EBM movement.3 Given its origins, it is unsurprising that the EBMgmt has become particularly salient in
health care. Debates about EBMgmt relate to definition and, indeed, whether or not there is good
evidence for EBMgmt.7,34 Some take a rationalistic approach, seeing EBMgmt, similar to its forerunner
EBM, as a practice of ‘using scientific knowledge to inform the judgment of managers and the process of
decision-making in organisations’.35 The underlying premises are more akin to a knowledge transfer model,
and the key challenge is to ensure the uptake of best scientific knowledge by managers to optimise the
rationality of the choices they make. This traditional approach to EBMgmt is criticised for:
1. privileging scientific facts as the objective ‘truth’, which fails to account for the contested nature
of knowledge16,31,36
2. underestimating the complexity of management (vis-à-vis professional disciplines such as medicine)
and the incompleteness of scientific evidence alone in arriving at management decisions in
politically-charged situations17,37
3. lacking support from empirical research on evidence use, which notes the importance of social context in
determining what forms of knowledge and information become ‘evidential’, and when, in decision-making2,38
4. losing the importance of situated expertise and judgement of the decision-maker.10,16,39
Others take a view akin to knowledge mobilisation, recognising that ‘organisational realities seldom map
unproblematically onto their idealised “evidence-based” representations’.33 Furthermore, case study
research on evidence use in health-care management suggests that, although practitioners often value
scientific evidence [such as NICE guidelines and randomised controlled trial (RCT) data], the way in which
they actually use evidence in practice is very different.32 The complexity of management decisions and
organisational context means, also, that the outcomes of evidence use are hard to predict.40 Walshe
and Rundall17 highlight that EBMgmt is challenged by the ‘constrained, contested, and political nature of
many managerial decisions, it may be difficult for managers to apply research evidence even when it is
available’.17 These studies reveal that decision-makers, via co-production, mobilise evidence with others.2
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Arndt and Bigelow thus see evidence as ‘an artefact of the social processes that lead to its creation’.40
That is, things become evidential during, not prior to, decision-making. As Crilly et al.4 put it:
The original model of strict hierarchies of evidence within clinical practice, transmitted in a linear and
rational manner, has been supplanted by a more human and interactive model.
p. 384
This stream of research tells us quite a lot about what types of evidence are likely to be used, and also a
bit about when they are likely to be used, in commissioning decisions.
What counts as evidence?
Traditionally, EBM was seen as a means to ensure effective clinical interactions between health-care
professionals, patients, families and carers.41 Decisions were to be based on authoritative, universally
applicable evidence from scientific research, including RCTs and evaluation studies.42 The internal validity
associated with scientific research was seen to justify causal links between evidence and clinical
behaviour.43,44 Indeed, evidence champions argued that ‘rational and systematic application of science
[brings] about effective, efficient, and accountable practice’.45 NICE has major responsibility for collating
and disseminating this type of evidence in the UK.13 It is now expected that this type of evidence will be
used to ‘organise, structure, deliver, and finance’41 health-care service provision, too.
Although authoritative evidence is still emphasised (e.g. in the ‘hierarchy of evidence’), the role of other
evidences is also recognised. In one study, Gabbay and Le May22 showed that primary care clinicians rarely
accessed or used explicit research-based evidence but relied on ‘mindlines’, which were informed by
colleagues’ experiences and their interactions with each other and with the knowledge, mostly tacit, of
opinion leaders, patients and other experts. Indeed, it has been said that there is ‘little compelling support
that scientific evidence is treated differently to other types of information’.43 As Crilly et al. note, ‘even in
the medical arena, which draws on experimental, replicable and ostensibly generalisable knowledge, the
notion of a hierarchical evidence is contentious’.4 These findings are also echoed in more recent studies of
evidence use commissioning. Wye et al.1 conducted a study (parallel to ours) of knowledge exchange
between commissioners and external providers. They found that commissioners sought information from
many sources to build a case for action, defend their position and navigate their proposals through the
system. Information was clustered into four primary types:
1. ‘people-based’ sources (relationships, ‘whole-picture’ views, experience, contracting and procurement
expertise and information on finance, budgets and performance)
2. ‘organisation-based’ sources (NICE guidelines, Department of Health information such as National
Outcome Frameworks and information from NHS Improving Quality, Public Health, CSUs, ‘think tanks’,
such as The King’s Fund, Royal Colleges and other providers)
3. ‘tool-based’ sources (electronic software tools, national benchmarking, national and local dashboards,
and project management tools)
4. ‘research-based’ sources (journals, search engines, universities, Cochrane reviews, regional networks,
such as CLAHRCs, Academic Health Science Networks and electronic newsletters).
Wye et al.1 note, however, that access to data in their study was obtained mainly through external
providers; given the timing (in the transition period from PCTs to CCGs), commissioning organisations
proved more difficult to enlist. This might have provided a somewhat broader picture of sources of
evidence (especially authoritative sources) than those actually used by commissioners.1 Even so, the study
suggested that, for clinical commissioning, local clinical knowledge from GPs about service provision was
prioritised: ‘Local information often trumped generalised research-based knowledge or information from
other localities’.1 Most often, this evidence was acquired interpersonally through ‘conversations and stories,
as oral methods were fast and flexible, which suited the changing world of commissioning’.1
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Our previous study used a more direct, detailed ethnography of commissioners’ evidence use in redesigning
services.2 Case studies of four PCTs showed the need to source information creatively so that it was fit
for purpose. Evidence use entailed a ‘heterarchy’ rather than a hierarchy of evidence, with local and
interpersonal practical knowledge and information being coupled with other scientific sources. Evidence
did not ‘speak itself’ but needed to be advocated by experts or authorities. Interestingly, a wider sample of
commissioning managers suggested that ‘the single most important source of evidence was examples of
best practice from other organisations’.2 Harvey et al.46 also describe different kinds of evidence, particularly
‘theoretical’ (how and why something works) ‘empirical’ (efficacy) and ‘experiential’ (personal experiences)
evidence. They note that the ‘. . . complexity and context-dependent nature of implementation [makes it]
impractical to prioritise one type . . . over others’.46 This work raises questions about what counts as
evidence in CCG decision-making, and so this will be an initial focus of our study.46
This literature suggests that, in addition to NICE, commissioning stakeholders may mobilise a range of
other evidences in their decision-making. Thus, we respond to calls to ‘broaden and deepen our
understanding of what counts as “evidence” and which types of evidence are best used to inform
differing aspects of clinical decision making’.47
When is evidence used?
To better understand when evidence is used, we draw from studies of innovation processes that recognise
complex problems and developing new practical means of dealing with them.48 Rogers’ very widely cited
work refers to three broad stages of innovation: ‘initiation’, ‘adoption/decision’ and ‘implementation’.49
Responding to criticism that ‘stages’ are an overly linear and rationalised depiction of innovation processes,
Clark et al.50 developed, instead, their ‘Decision Episode Framework’. This suggests that innovation processes
unfold in a series of recursive and overlapping ‘decision episodes’.50,51 These entail the awareness of new
ideas to formulate a problem (‘agenda formation’), designing, sorting and selecting potential solutions
(‘selection’), introducing these (‘implementation’), and, finally, embedding them into organisation routines
(‘routinisation’). It is important to recognise that these are seen as episodes of work, with feedback loops
between them. For example, at any point during the selection or even the implementation of a solution,
new problems may arise that require the reformulation of the initial problem (agenda formation).
There are different concerns across episodes, from a focus on matters at stake, to practical design of
usable solutions, to outcomes and issues of sustainability. Bledow et al.52 see innovation as resulting from a
dissatisfaction with old ideas (‘thesis’), which, in turn, motivates new ideas (‘antithesis’). Synthesis between
ideas creates innovation.
Kyratsis et al.9 usefully applied a process approach, albeit in a different context: a study of the use of
evidence in decisions about technology adoption in nine acute care organisations. They found that the
practitioners involved (clinicians, nurses and non-clinical managers) held diverse ‘evidence templates’ when
seeking and using evidence. These cognitive templates stemmed from the different practical experiences,
professional identities and training of these groups, resulting in different ways of defining and making sense
of what constituted acceptable and credible evidence in decisions. All groups drew on a ‘practice-based’
template, using experiential practical knowledge as evidential in their decisions. However, whereas clinicians
drew mainly from a ‘biomedical-scientific’ template, prioritising science-based, peer-reviewed and published
evidence, non-clinical managers drew more from a ‘rational-policy’ template, preferring evidence based on
cost, productivity and fit with policy imperatives. Nurses, in contrast, drew from all three templates.
Importantly, different evidence was valued at different points of the process, depending on who the key
actors were at the time and how they made sense of the problems within their professional domain.
. . . local trials, and the need for ‘pragmatic evidence’, were deemed important by decision-makers in
the early stages of innovation adoption. For innovations (and especially those that require changes in
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practices or processes), creating an evidence base will require agreement about what is regarded as a
legitimate epistemological basis for verifying and validating evidence and relevant knowledge.
p. 1369
Evidence use is not, then, a one-off event. It reflects the priorities present at a particular point in time.
It is entirely plausible that different evidences will have differing utility and weight across episodes of
innovation work.52 For example, RCTs may be used as evidence when identifying solutions to a problem,
whereas financial data may be used to understand feasibility.
Certain types of evidence relevant in one episode may also be questioned or disregarded in another.
Recognising this, we use a processual approach in our own methods and analysis,53 tracing evidence use in
service redesign over decision episodes. As Wright et al. observe, ‘deeper insights are uncovered when
decisions are investigated in ways that “open up” the role of the decision-maker and of the context in the
processes leading to the commitment to action’.10 Keeping with a knowledge mobilisation approach allows
us to understand forms of agency that may make decisions evidence based. It can be expected that
multiple evidences will be used and that different capabilities may apply across different episodes of
commissioning work in service redesign.
How is evidence used: capabilities for evidence use
Although the literature says much about what evidence is used and when it is used, how it is used is less
clear. It is important to understand, also, how evidence comes to be used in practice. In other words,
what capabilities are required to actually use evidence? Existing research, noted above, points to the
fundamental importance of understanding the social and political processes underpinning evidence-based
decision-making. Much of the literature from both the UK and Canada points to the social discursive
aspects of evidence use.54
However, questions remain unanswered about ‘the detailed process by which ideas are captured from
outside, circulated internally, adapted, reframed, implemented and routinised in a service organisation’.30
Crilly et al. conclude that ‘NHS Boards should take a clear view on organisational design elements needed
to support knowledge mobilisation’.4 These elements include ensuring that capabilities (including
appropriate work practices and enabling organisational conditions) are in place. A few insights can be
found in the literature about these capabilities.
First, evidence-based decision-making involves mobilising knowledge across diverse experts, including
patients. Recent health-care research shows that stakeholders bring their own values and sense-making to
any decision, which informs how evidence is sought out, shared and applied in transforming services.1
Professional differences influence the use of evidence, too, with McGivern et al.11 showing clinical
consultants as having the ‘power, knowledge, and self-confidence’ to critique NICE guidelines. Other
clinicians (e.g. GPs) in this study were shown to ‘not have the time’ and were too ‘overwhelmed’ by the
range of guidelines. Instead, these stakeholders worked to balance research findings with local needs. In
that study, management saw NICE guidelines as a means for stakeholders to reach consensus and avoid
negative consequences from regulatory bodies.11
Second, just having appropriate experts and evidence present does not guarantee evidence-based decisions.
Actors also pursue particular purposes, with varying degrees of influence (they have agency, in other words).
The issue of who searches for, synthesises and presents evidence is, therefore, important.7 When this
happens may also be important, as different priorities beckon at different points (ensuring sufficient evidence
to solve a problem, identify solutions in our context, etc.). ‘Knowledge brokers’, or individuals who make
knowledge embedded in one community available to another, may enable such evidence sharing.6
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Third, research points to the subjective aspects of evidence use and the importance of human judgement.5
Harvey et al.46 describe evidence ‘as forms of knowledge seen as “credible”’, while Freeman and Sweeney55
suggest that use relies on perceived ‘relevance’. In a study of hospital organisations, Jones and Exworthy56
describe how different ‘frames of reference’ shape perceived relevance. They show that framing an issue
in terms of clinical necessity engages practitioners with change. Frames may be strengthened through
co-construction and discussion. Champions or opinion leaders may also communicate certain evidences
and push them into dominance.57
Broader insights can be gained from organisation studies. Organisational structures (e.g. networks)
underpinned by trust-based relationships are said to promote the ‘open sharing’ required to innovate.58
Crilly et al. argue that ‘Relationships trump organisational design . . . Connective ability of individuals is
more important than organisational structure when it comes to making organisations effective’.4 Another
influential stream of research is ‘resource-based theory’ (and, its successor, the knowledge-based view),
which points to the importance of resources, especially knowledge, in improvement.59 It is argued that
ability to integrate, build and reconfigure internal and external competences to address rapidly changing
environments informs competitiveness.
The work outlined to this point sensitises us to the kinds of capabilities NHS organisations and managers may
need to use evidence. Indeed, in one of the few studies of capabilities for evidence use in commissioning,
Swan et al.2 show that evidence use in PCTs entails timely evidence use, managing interfaces across the
project and proactively building and managing relationships. By better understanding what counts as
evidence, when it counts and how it comes to count as evidence, we can begin to develop capabilities to
enable evidence use in decision-making. As Ferlie et al.5 note, the imperative for mobilising knowledge and
evidence in NHS organisations lies not in producing ever more information, but in ‘building high learning
capacity and appropriate core competencies in NHS organisations’.5 We seek to understand capabilities for
using different types of evidence in the decision-making that occurs across episodes of work involved in
CCG innovation.
How is evidence produced?
A knowledge mobilisation approach reminds us that the use of evidence in one domain (e.g. commissioning)
is intertwined (or ‘nested’) with the machineries of its production in another.12 We thus consider, also, the
ways in which evidence is produced by considering ‘inscribed meanings’.60 This research suggests that a
‘programme of action’ or ‘script’ is inscribed in all artefacts.60–62 Inscribed meanings constitute a sort of
instruction manual for the artefact. Designers of artefacts take a view of how it should be used in order
to perform its expected function. Akrich et al. describe how the large part of the work of producers involves
‘defining the characteristics of their objects [and] making hypotheses about . . . the world into which the
object is inserted’.60
Inscribed actions exist in everyday objects such as door handles, which carry the programme of action
‘pull the door’. Actions are also inscribed on the internet, where readers of underlined blue text are invited
to click and follow related links. In similar ways, evidence is an inscribed artefact. The inscribed use of
evidences must be translated into practice through a relational and negotiated process that requires work,
time and motivation.12 Encounters between scripts and users can broadly result in three possible scenarios:
1. Scripts may persuade actors to play the proposed roles through training, coercion or discipline.63
If scripts differ from established actions and actors subscribe to them, the artefact produces change.
For example, a NICE guideline highlighting risks of current methods may change behaviour.
2. More often, users try to descript artefacts and modify actions to fit what they already do.60 Users try to
adapt the artefact to their ‘tastes, competences, motives, aspirations, [and] political prejudices’ through
reinvention.60 It has been suggested that ‘if potential adopters can adapt, refine, or otherwise modify
RELEVANT LITERATURE AND RESEARCH CONTEXT
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the innovation to suit their own needs, it will be adopted more easily’.64 For example, NICE guidelines
may be disassembled and used selectively when they fit existing priorities and work patterns.
3. Reinvention has limits, however, which may cause users to ignore, disregard or resist the artefact. The
third scenario is, therefore, one of non-use. Coercion can be applied, but users may find ways to
circumvent the impositions of the artefact. They may, for example, revert to workarounds or utilise
artefacts in a ceremonial way only. For example, NICE guidelines may be ignored or their appropriateness
for a particular population may be questioned.
Previous studies suggest that scenarios 2 and 3 often apply in health.63,64 We set out to explore what sort
of evidence users are inscribed in evidence production in order to develop further insights into the use of
authoritative evidence in commissioning.
Conceptual framework
Figure 1 summarises the conceptual framework for our study. It links capabilities to use evidence to
evidence production (e.g. NICE), decision episodes and outcomes. The framework provides a holistic
approach to explaining evidence use and how this links to variation in process outcomes. It builds on three
principles (from the review above).
1. It is processual.53 It takes on board the point that mobilising evidence entails dynamic practices (e.g.
sourcing, interpreting and creating evidence) that unfold over time in an iterative, episodic way (hence
the double-headed arrows and decision episodes in Figure 1). As per previous work on organisational
change, the journey is conceived as an often uncertain process to reflect the ongoing realities of
commissioning management decisions, which are far from linear or ‘rational’.65 It is also more practical
because it reflects the situations that managers face, rather than a more idealised version of events.
Hence, it helps to provide a direct link from research findings to actionable recommendations
for improvement.
2. Our model is underpinned by a knowledge mobilisation approach that sees evidence use as a social
and practical accomplishment requiring capabilities: that is, knowing how and when, not just what.
Knowledge mobilisation theorising makes us understand evidence use as a skilful performance, situated
in context, in which agency, practices and processes matter.12 We see capabilities as the practices and
enabling conditions needed to pursue and accomplish a particular purpose (evidence use in this case),
rather than as static variables, or fixed characteristics of individuals and organisations. Capabilities can
be applied at the organisational (e.g. resource management) and group level (e.g. role structures).
Forms of evidence
Decision episodes
NICE ?
Agenda 
formation
Solution
selection
Outcome  
(evidence used, 
stakeholder experiences,
objectives met)
Capabilities
FIGURE 1 Conceptual framework for the research.
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3. The model will help us to explain variations in evidence use by comparing similar cases, as other authors
have done.66 We will compare and contrast evidence journeys across different CCGs dealing with
similar kinds of redesign. We examine, in particular, if (hence the question mark in Figure 1) and how
authoritative evidence (e.g. NICE) makes its way into CCGs, along with other forms of evidence. As per
our protocol, ‘outcomes’ are to be assessed qualitatively, including evidence use (the extent to which a
range of evidences were sourced, interpreted and engaged with), stakeholder experience (the extent to
which stakeholders were satisfied or dissatisfied with the process) and objectives met (the extent to
which original objectives were met and, if not, whether or not change to them was justified).
Chapter summary
In sum, this research provides an in-depth examination of the use of evidence across NHS organisations
(CCGs) in order to identify capabilities for relatively more successful outcomes. As our review of the
literature indicates, authoritative evidence never stands alone but must be judiciously combined with other
forms of evidence. Viewing evidence use as a process of knowledge mobilisation provides a more realistic
(and, therefore, more useful) account. The study develops a process model that articulates the dynamics of
evidence use, without losing sight of local work practices, power dynamics and context. This allows us to
begin to generate relevant ideas and tools for improvement in practice.
RELEVANT LITERATURE AND RESEARCH CONTEXT
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Chapter 2 Methods
Research on evidence ‘pull’
As described in the introduction, our research responds to the NIHR commissioning brief by aiming,
primarily, to understand so-called research ‘pull’ by managers by studying evidence journeys in practice
(as evidence travels through CCGs). We contribute (as a secondary aim) to the understanding of ‘push’,
by considering, also, the start of the journey (i.e. how certain evidence products are made by producers).
The following objectives have been operationalised to achieve these aims:
l to study how authoritative evidence travels in, and is used by, different CCGs, that is, to document
‘evidence journeys’
l to compare and contrast the travel of evidence across CCGs and analyse comparatively ‘evidence journeys’
l to create a process model, a roadmap and a toolkit that will guide CCGs in becoming better users
of evidence.
Research design
A key parameter case study design was used to compare processes across organisations. Key parameters
are similar to inclusion/exclusion criteria. They ensure that a similar process is observed in different but
comparable contexts. In our case, redesigns had to be informed by recently released non-mandatory
guidance [e.g. on diabetes and on musculoskeletal (MSK) conditions] and had to be considered a CCG
priority. As Barley and Kunda note, ‘the design’s forte is that it enables researchers to articulate more
clearly how key contingencies differently shape work practices and, hence, engender different patterns’.67
As per our protocol, data collection combined real-time observations in two CCGs with retrospective
inquiry in six further CCGs, based on interviews and available texts. Process analytical methods, as per
Langley,53 were used to order to each case from start to finish using temporal bracketing strategies.
Innovative service redesign involves iterative, overlapping episodes of work.51 Process perspectives account
for these episodes, changing relationships, and interpretations over time.68
Patient and public involvement and a Scientific and Stakeholder Advisory Panel (SSAP) also shaped the
research. Through UNTRAP (University/User Teaching and Research Action Partnership), which is a
partnership between users of health and social care services and carers, and the universities of Warwick
and Coventry and the NHS, we engaged service users/carers interested in research and teaching. Two
UNTRAP members participated in our SSAP, which also included NHS managers, key opinion leaders and
academics. The UNTRAP members provided invaluable feedback throughout the life of the project from
the research design stages through to the final report write-up. They were especially helpful with regard to
the analysis and reporting, ensuring that the language used was accessible and relevant to service users.
They also shared their experiences of health care with us in the light of our findings, which was useful for
us in understanding and ensuring the relevance of our research. The SSAP directed us in our research
design and interpretation of emerging findings.
Data collection
The first aim of our research was to understand evidence use in the CCG context. In our original project
protocol, it was promised that ‘we will select, in close consultation with our Scientific and Stakeholder
Advisory Panel, two particular forms of evidence from NICE aimed at innovation in service delivery (not just
minor adjustment). We select one piece of evidence recommending pathway changes on the basis of
emerging scientific evidence (“Do recommendations”, e.g. NICE Clinical Guidelines on Diabetes in
children), and another recommending decommissioning of certain healthcare services or treatments
(“Do not do recommendations”, e.g. regarding mucolytic drugs as per NICE guidance CG101 [Clinical
Guidelines]).’ We also took into account the date of NICE guideline release, the care setting, the likely cost
consequences and the clarity of guidelines for a commissioning audience.
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We met our protocol objectives by taking the following actions. We accessed a list of all NICE guidelines
released (post 2011). The project team created a shortlist of all those guidelines that were released since
January 2012, and that were likely to be picked up by commissioners. We then created a survey targeting
senior NHS commissioning managers to identify which NICE guidelines were likely to be important for
service redesigns. Thirteen CCG leaders (mostly chief executive officers and associate directors) responded
to a list of health needs and were asked: ‘tick if you are confident that your organisations will actually use
the following guidelines in commissioning over the next 12 months’. The responses are shown in Table 1.
The findings were presented to 15 CCG leaders in November 2013. Feedback was the following: ‘NICE
guidelines are not used directly by CCGs’, ‘We are not confident the choices [list of guidelines] offered
reflect the priorities of the organisation’, ‘There is no formal process [in our organisation] for using NICE
guidelines’, ‘NICE does not drive commissioning . . . it’s clinical outcomes, performance of service (e.g.
referral rates, spending)’. Commissioners also told us that decisions on what not to do nearly always result
from decisions on how to do things better. In other words, they are two sides of the same coin.
This was an invaluable exercise for the project team, because it meant that we had to rethink our narrative,
which had thus far been focused on ‘how NICE guidelines are used in commissioning’. We quickly realised
that we had to be pragmatic for the purposes of this research and select a commissioning process that was
of importance to CCGs and in which the use of evidence (the recently produced NICE guidelines identified
above) was likely to be relevant and important. In further conversations with CCG leaders, we narrowed
down our focus to two core areas of care: MSK services and diabetes services. These were two areas
of ‘high importance’ for a large majority of CCGs for service redesign (i.e. CCGs had approved business
cases and sponsored related service redesign projects). They were also areas in which key NICE guidelines
had been released since January 2012. The implications were that it would be feasible for us to collect
meaningful data in accordance with our research protocol, if we focused on relevant redesign projects.
We discussed our choices and thinking with our multiexpert SSAP. We explained our rationale for choosing
MSK and diabetes services as the focus of our study, and the panel readily endorsed our decision.
Retrospectively, it proved a good decision to focus on these two areas, as we were able to recruit a large
number of CCGs in our research as a result.
Eight CCGs were used to maximise opportunities to capture variation, while paying attention to the
contextual dimensions. We contacted CCGs with varied spend, deprivation and geography through
recommendations from Dr David Sharp (then a director at NHS England), internet searches and existing
NHS contacts.69 The CCG names have been changed for anonymity. Four CCGs were working on diabetes
services (Seaport, Greenland, Rutterford and Chelsea) and four were working on MSK services (Horsetown,
Stopton, Coalfield and Shire). The Yorkshire and Humber Health Intelligence is used to classify CCGs in
TABLE 1 Clinical Commissioning Group sampling responses
Clinical area CCGs, % (n)
Hip fracture 58.30 (7)
Diabetic foot problems 50.00 (7)
Common mental health disorders 50.00 (6)
Ovarian cancer 41.70 (5)
Lung cancer 41.70 (5)
Infection control 41.70 (5)
Service users’ experience in mental health 33.30 (4)
Prostate cancer 33.30 (4)
Pressure ulcers 33.30 (4)
METHODS
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Table 2. The NHS measures mortality resulting from cardiovascular, respiratory, liver and cancer diseases
among those aged < 75 years, as well as emergency room admission for alcohol and death from treatable
disease, as CCG performance indicators. Greenland CCG scored in the best 25% for all indicators, while
Rutterford CCG scored in the top 25% for some and in the middle for others. Horsetown CCG scored
in the middle range on all indicators. Seaport, Chelsea, Coalfield and Shire CCGs scored in the middle
range for some indictors and in the bottom 25% for others. Stopton CCG scored in the bottom 25% for
all indicators.
We were referred to a ‘key stakeholder’ in the redesign (e.g. a consultant). We explained the purpose of
the research and asked them to participate. We also asked them to help us recruit other stakeholders.
Open-ended interviews were used,70 with items related to organisational background (e.g. roles and
structures), redesign rationale, evidence use, redesign process, supports, outcomes and challenges.
This allowed narratives to develop that provide rich, complex accounts.53,71 When we felt that richer
explanations would follow, we interrogated responses with additional probes and follow-up questions.
The participants were informed of the purpose of the study, that participation was voluntary and that
data would be anonymised. We use an ‘ethnographic approach’ to understand, in a systematic way, the
conduct of people studied from their own perspective. We see the ethnographic approach as a scientific
description of peoples and cultures with their customs, habits and mutual difference rather than complete
submersion as per ethnography.68 The interviews were completed in a location of participants’ choice, and
they were recorded and transcribed verbatim. The qualitative interviews lasted between 45 and 90 minutes.
We averaged about five stakeholder interviews per CCG (n = 35 stakeholders were interviewed in total),
which was fewer than we had expected in our protocol because CCGs were newly established when
our project was designed and at that time we did not know the size of redesign groups. During data
collection, we soon realised that the number of stakeholders actively involved in each redesign project was
lower than we had expected. We countered this shortcoming by conducting follow-up interviews to learn
about the outcomes of the redesign work as necessary (n = 77 interviews were completed in total).
In addition to interviews, we observed meetings in two CCGs to gain close familiarity of the groups’
decision processes as they unfolded ‘in vivo’ over time (over approximately 12 months in each case).72
There were also fewer meetings to observe than we had estimated in our original protocol. Redesign
meetings tended to occur once every 2 months and were often disrupted or postponed (other pressures
were intense at the time, given that CCGs were still being embedded). This meant that, even if we had
been able to start observations from February 2014 (as per protocol), we would only ever have been able
TABLE 2 Clinical Commissioning Group classifications
CCG
Young population, above-average
black and Asian ethnic groups,
moderate deprivation
Older population, rural,
low deprivation levels
Average age, deprivation,
low population
Seaport ✓
Greenland ✓
Rutterford ✓
Chelsea ✓
Coalfield ✓
Shire ✓
Horsetown ✓
Stopton ✓
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to complete an average of 14 observations per CCG. Although we gained access to one CCG (Horsetown)
early on in the project, we could not access the second until September 2015. This reduced the number of
observations further. These changes reflect the realities of commissioning. Indeed, in many cases, groundwork
for decision-making is through conversations over dinner or at coffee, and so we could not always capture
this. This groundwork then informs the decisions that go through more formal channels. Meetings lasted,
on average, between 2 and 4 hours and were concerned with planning, problem solutions and the
evaluation of potential changes. All changes to the protocol are summarised in Table 3.
Field notes and memoing (researcher reflections on field notes) were used to capture observations, ensure
that research objectives were being met and add trustworthiness to the data.11 Notes were handwritten
and typed up as soon as possible. We also collated documents related to the redesign, including those
shared by interview participants and those identified through internet searches. Fieldwork is summarised in
Table 4.
Ethics approval
Individuals invited to take part in this study were made aware that their participation was voluntary and
that their information would be confidential and anonymised. The participants were given the opportunity
to ask questions and given time to decide whether or not to take part in the study. Data are stored in
locked filing cabinets in locked offices on university premises. Computer files are password protected and
stored on the network drives (not local hard disks) of password-protected computers. Detailed plans for
handling ethics issues were approved by a NHS Research Ethics Committee.
Data analysis
We developed detailed case descriptions of redesign projects at each CCG.53 These were assembled from
reading and rereading all interview data, observation notes and collated documents for a specific case
and written by the team member who had been most closely connected with the data collection. The
case descriptions were initially structured chronologically, resulting in lengthy narrative accounts of what
happened, when and why, with particular reference to any information that became evidential during
the process, and supported by original quotations or excerpts from field notes. However, as the emphasis in
our research is on improvement, not just understanding and rich description, we decided to avoid overly
lengthy discussions of raw data in order to make our case studies more accessible to practitioners. To achieve
this, we rewrote each case according to analytical themes, in which we sought to identify the following.
Evidence use
From the literature, and in consultation with our SSAP, we considered NICE and other evidences.22,42
Evidence was defined as information with an evidentiary value in decisions.2 Information is legitimised
as evidence not through production but through use. Some information (even NICE guidelines) may be
questioned or dismissed as evidence by decision-makers. Therefore, our first step was to identify evidences
used. Here, we used deductive and inductive approaches. Deductive template analysis was used here, as we
TABLE 3 Changes from the protocol
Protocol Final report Rationale
Data collection Select two forms of evidence
from NICE related to ‘do’ and
‘do not’ recommendations
Focused on how NICE
guidelines are used in
commissioning
Commissioners told us decisions not to
do nearly always result from decisions on
how to do things better. In other words,
they are two sides of the same coin
Data collection 40 observations plus 40
interviews at two CCGs, plus
120 ethnographic interviews
across six additional CCGs
We averaged about five
stakeholders per CCG
(77 interviews), plus nine
observations
There were fewer stakeholders involved
and fewer meetings to observe
METHODS
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expected evidences already in the literature to appear in our data.73 We looked at studies of commissioning
work, noted the evidences used and searched for these in transcripts.1,2 We were also open to emergent
themes when searching for evidence used in our reading of cases.74
Capabilities for evidence use
Inductive coding was used to identify evidence-use capabilities.74 We collated data on evidence use via
open coding.75 Common excerpts were placed in provisional categories (first-order). Categories were then
integrated into higher-order researcher-induced themes via axial coding so the team could identify themes
from the data.74 Themes were compared and discussed to decide final classifications. Team members then
searched each transcript for any talk on capabilities that appeared to enable evidence use in situ. Themes
were also compared against those found in previous research and adjusted when appropriate, thus
iterating between data and theory, as suggested by others.74
Process mapping
Process maps were created to identify patterns of evidence use, capabilities and outcomes within and
across cases.53,76 In these we draw out the chronology of critical events in redesign work.74 To give
structure to our cases, we inductively labelled the episodes of work as they appeared in the raw data. As
seen in the literature review, episodes (sometimes labelled ‘phases’) of work are often used in innovation
literatures to give structure to process studies.32,51 We prefer the labelling ‘episode’ to highlight the often
non-sequential nature of the work activities entailed.
TABLE 4 Data collection summary
Location Participants Documents used Observations
Seaport Diabetes consultant (3), diabetes nurse specialist,
GP, diabetes specialist nurse with responsibility for
education and training
Published papers on the project (4)
Greenland GP lead on project, GP, CSU project manager,
non-executive hospital director, transformation and
innovation CSU lead (2)
Presentations (2), HSCIC evaluation
Rutterford Diabetes nurse consultant (2), transformation
manager, chief accountable officer
Board presentation, final report,
board papers (2), evaluation paper
Chelsea Contracting manager, diabetes consultant (1),
commissioning manager, patient representative
from Diabetes UK
Evaluations (Right Care and HSCIC),
service specification, newspaper
report
Coalfield Senior commissioning manager (5), clinical lead for
MSK, clinical director, CCG chairperson, support
manager for patient engagement
Board papers (2), CCG reports (2)
Shire Commissioning manager (2), GPwSI (2), GPwSI
and consultant, clinical service manager, clinical
therapies lead, deputy director of planning and
development
Board papers (3), Right Care
evaluation
Horsetown Two GPs, four physiotherapists, CCG director,
senior commissioning manager, radiologist,
orthopaedic surgeon, commissioning manager
Terms of reference, agenda, reports,
e-mails, model of care, provider’s
proposal, minutes
Four meetings
Stopton Senior commissioning manager (5), head of
therapies, clinical assessment team lead, GP,
orthopaedics consultant, rheumatology consultant,
physiotherapist, hospital representative
Meeting agendas, minutes, board
papers, evaluation presentation
Five meetings
GPwSI, general practitioner with a special interest; HSCIC, Health and Social Care Information Centre.
Numbers in brackets indicate occasions of follow-up.
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Cross-case comparisons
Building on within-case analyses, and following Stake,77 we then conducted cross-case comparisons.
To do this, team members examined cases to identify ‘prominent themes’ in each and ‘common patterns’,
as well as major differences in evidence use. The team then assembled to compare and contrast similarities
and differences across cases and to come to tentative assertions about the capabilities that appeared to
influence the CCGs’ evidence use, as well as any significant aspects of context. As we were interested in
capabilities to use evidence, we also mapped these against process outcomes, identified broadly and
indicated qualitatively in terms of evidence use (the extent to which a range of evidences were sourced,
interpreted and engaged with), stakeholder experience (the extent to which stakeholders were satisfied
with the process) and objectives met (the extent to which the original objectives had been met and, if they
had not, whether or not any change to them was justified).
These tentative findings were presented to the SSAP and non-Warwick team members for further discussion and
verification. Following this, the findings were presented at our one-day national multistakeholder engagement
workshop (n= 46) at which further feedback and verification was elicited. These steps were important in helping
to achieve trustworthiness in our analysis.71 Having identified evidences and capabilities, and compared across
cases, we summarised our findings into a toolkit for use by commissioning stakeholders. The questions for this
toolkit were also piloted at our national engagement workshop and were modified accordingly.
Research on evidence ‘push’
Our original protocol aimed to trace the evidence journey in CCG commissioning, including the place at
which evidence ‘enters’ the journey, as guidelines and other forms of evidence-based products. Here, we
conducted a further small-scale exploratory study in one large guidance-producing organisation, in which
we considered the ways in which projected users are inscribed in published evidence. Our objectives were
to understand:
l the user image inscribed in published evidence products
l how an evidence producer believes products will be used in general, and by CCGs.
Over the course of 6 months, during 2015–16, we carried out eight interviews, spoke less formally with
other evidence producers and consulted a number of documents, some publicly available and some
internal. Informants included project managers and clinical staff involved in the production of the evidence
(n = 4); and staff involved in communication, marketing and other customer-facing activities (n = 4). We
also observed one visit of an evidence producer to a CCG. We asked questions about the following in
semistructured interviews:
1. how the design and production of evidence (e.g. guidance, advice, quality standards) is organised and
the nature of the products
2. how products are made available to users and how this has changed over the years
3. a scenario question (according to critical incident interview),78 in which interviewees were asked to
focus on a specific product (guidance, quality standard or other) and describe how it is actually used,
with examples.
All interviewees gave informed consent. Interviews were recorded and transcribed verbatim. The same
inductive coding method was used as described above for identifying capabilities.
METHODS
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Summary of research methods
We conducted two phases of research to understand evidence ‘push and pull’. The findings were shared
with case study participants via feedback and with our SSAP by e-mails and meetings. In the next chapters,
we present findings from phase 1. We describe what evidences are used (see Chapter 3), and then
capabilities for use (see Chapter 4). Building on this in Chapter 5, we show evidences and capabilities in
practice through four analytically-structured cases (two on diabetes services and two on MSK services).
The remaining cases are shown in Appendices 1–4.
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Chapter 3 Clinical Commissioning Group
evidence use
We see evidence as information that enables understanding and legitimises judgements.2 In the firstphase of our study, four categories of evidence were identified in our analysis. These were labelled as
‘universal’, ‘local’, ‘expertise-based’ and ‘trans-local’. These labels reflect what kinds of evidence were used
in terms of their source. As seen in Chapter 1, universal (i.e. evidence produced through scientific methods
that is held to be widely applicable), local and expertise-based have been discussed in the literature to
some extent already, while trans-local evidence is more uniquely identified in our study.1,2
Universal evidence
Information produced by formalised or scientific investigation in institutions or organisations that are
deemed to have legitimate authority (e.g. universities, NICE and national bodies) is commonly treated as
evidence.1 This type of evidence is produced systematically through scientific method (e.g. RCTs and NICE
guidelines) and/or standardised nationally (e.g. QOF data), so it is considered robust, rigorous, widely
applicable and authoritative. Because this type of evidence is expected to be used widely, it has been
termed ‘universal’.2 We think of universal evidence as produced from the ‘top down’. Universal evidence
includes NICE guidance, but also NHS reports, public health data, Right Care guidance and academic
papers, among others. Previous studies showed the importance of this type of evidence in decision-making
in commissioning work.1,2
Stakeholders also described mobilising universal evidence to understand ‘good practice, best practice’
(Chelsea CCG). They were aware, for example, of ‘what’s being proposed in the Five Year Forward [View]’
(Seaport CCG), the NHS-produced document setting out a vision of ‘GPs, nurses, community health
services, and hospital specialists [providing] integrated out-of-hospital care’.79 A consultant at Seaport
CCG described using NICE to inform service design, in this case because it mandates that antenatal
diabetes has ‘a midwife, an obstetrician, a consultant, and a scanning machine’. Evidence from academia
was also used, including ‘studies about how do you improve service provision, about impact . . . tools’
(Coalfield CCG). Interestingly, some kinds of universal evidence appeared to be more prominent than
others. Cochrane reviews were not, for example, referred to in any case (at least directly), whereas NICE
guidance was referred to rather more often.
As in other studies, the rigour of universal evidence was understood, but its usability and relevance was
questioned. NICE guidelines in particular were problematic, with stakeholders seeing them as ‘very long . . .
it’s like reading a book!’ (Horsetown CCG).1 Furthermore, in order to be widely applicable, this kind of
evidence had, by definition, to be abstracted from any particular context, which often left commissioners
puzzling over how to apply it in their own setting. At Rutterford CCG, for example, stakeholders described
how ‘on top of all of that [NICE] guidance, you have to put in what is going on locally . . . and what
is available’.
Local evidence
Information produced and collected locally within CCGs or in their immediate locale was also, and very
often, treated as evidence.1,2 This information is wide ranging, including patient profiles, local activity
and performance data, finance data, contracting models and monitoring outcomes. It may also include
externalised observations and experiences of stakeholders. Unlike universal evidence, this type of evidence
is seen as more readily ‘to hand’ for those involved in commissioning decisions and, therefore, ‘useful’.
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Across all cases, local evidence featured heavily in the conversations among commissioning groups. It was
used to show problems, for example ‘a 41% increase in hip and knee replacements’ (Horsetown CCG) or
‘you serve only 10% of the population [in the hospital]’ (Seaport CCG). Local evidence was also used to
identify solutions to problems, for example ‘The CCG have done a piece [of research] that sort of says . . .
70% of activity can be stripped out [from the hospital]’ (Greenland CCG). Alongside these ‘hard’ numerical
data, stakeholders also relied on softer tacit knowledge about the local area: ‘a lot of patients . . . being
followed up in secondary care, which is not necessarily where they should be’ (Greenland CCG).
Evidence collected in the local area gives meaning in context, and so it is not surprising that is has been
shown as important in the broader literature, too.1,2 Although readily available at a relatively low cost
(in terms of search time and effort, at least), this type of evidence is not subject to the same scrutiny as
universal evidence, and so issues around its validity could often arise.80
Expertise-based evidence
Information based on the experiences and expertise of individuals could also be treated as evidence.
Expertise-based evidence can be sourced from health-care providers, colleagues, patients, families, carers
and many other groups.1,2 Stakeholders in our cases used expertise-based evidence to form agendas.
At Seaport CCG, for example, the consultant describes how ‘the idea [for the redesign] came from . . . a
group of us registrars’ because ‘we always used to talk about it, saying it isn’t quite right the way we’re
doing it’. Expertise-based evidence was also used to identify solutions. At Horsetown CCG, for example,
commissioners chose community-based solutions because they had ‘set up things in the community before
[and seen] the cost reduction . . . the better patient experience’.
Expertise-based evidence is personal, embodied and value-laden. It is often transferred through narratives.
It possesses few characteristics of scientific rigour; this evidence is very relevant to context. We noted that
individuals with clinical backgrounds who were considered charismatic and were respected tended to be
considered holders of ‘expertise’. Although anecdotal, our observation reflects the study by Wright et al.10
how one individual (‘Dr Clancy’) influenced service redesign in an Australian emergency department.
Trans-local evidence
Examples from elsewhere were also treated as evidence.1,23 We call this ‘trans-local’ evidence because
information is created in one place and used in another. We do not call it ‘best practice’, because evidence
can be trans-local without being validated as ‘good’ or ‘best’. In our cases, trans-local evidence was often
applied before efficacy evaluations. Rather, the fact that changes were made in other places seemed to
have legitimising properties. The GP at Greenland CCG, for example, described choosing to mimic Seaport
CCG’s diabetes model. When asked about this decision, the GP at Greenland CCG did not seem entirely
certain about efficacy, describing, ‘I suppose we haven’t really got long-term evidence’. The arrival of
trans-local evidence in new sites is also far from systematic. Instead, translation through stories or examples,
ad hoc gatherings or accidental encounters (e.g. conferences or meetings) seems important. Greenland CCG
mimicked Seaport CCG because a GP in the former had heard a talk from a consultant at the latter and
‘felt’ that Seaport’s was the right solution. Chelsea CCG mimicked Seaport CCG because their consultant
had seen ‘first hand that it works’. Interestingly, we saw relationships among all categories of evidence.
Local and universal evidences were often used together in sense-making activities. Stakeholders understood
local evidence (e.g. about patient waiting times) in reference to NHS standards, which are based on universal
evidence. In the case of Seaport CCG, for example, local evidence showed that patients were waiting
18 months for an appointment, when the maximum NHS waiting time is 18 weeks. At Greenfield CCG, the
transformation manager described how ‘amputation rates were quite high’ (local evidence), especially ‘when
compared nationally’ (universal evidence). Stakeholders at Coalfield CCG also described making changes
before they had been published (universal evidence) because they knew that certain recommendations were
CLINICAL COMMISSIONING GROUP EVIDENCE USE
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in the pipeline and they felt that those changes were appropriate (expertise-based evidence). It is important,
therefore, to recognise that different categories of evidence are relevant to redesign work, but that these are
often used, by necessity, in tandem in the practice of decision-making. Hence, in relation to the use of NICE
guidelines in commissioning practice, this is not simply a matter of accessing or adopting relevant guidelines
in a timely manner, but also requires skilful combinations of different forms of evidence in order to make
them actionable in a local context. The four categories of evidence are summarised in Table 5.
Chapter summary
In this chapter, we discussed the evidences used by stakeholders, identified as ‘universal’, ‘local’, ‘expertise-
based’ and ‘trans-local’ evidences. Evidences were identified deductively from existing literature and also
inductively from our raw data. Universal, local and expertise-based evidences have been discussed, albeit
under different labels, in previous studies. Trans-local evidence has also been discussed, to an extent, in
previous work. Much of the existing literature has described ‘examples from elsewhere’ or ‘best practice
examples’ as evidence. Although similar, we use the label ‘trans-local’ to better represent the fact that this
type of evidence must be sourced from a locality different from that of its creation. We also avoid ‘best
practice’ because, as will be shown in the cases, rigour, evaluation or efficacy were not always considered
in using this type of evidence.
Issues around the use of these evidences were clear, especially in the mobilisation of authoritative NICE
evidence. In the next chapter we consider capabilities for evidence use that might alleviate these issues.
TABLE 5 Evidence use
Category Examples Properties
Universal NHS reports, NICE, Right Care, public health
data and academic papers, national frameworks
Legitimated by science or organisational backing
Often abstract and taken for granted
Can be easily ignored
Local Patient profile, activity, finance, contracting,
outcomes, observations
Highly relevant to context
Not legitimised, can be contested
Difficult to ignore
Expertise-based Experiences and expertise of providers,
colleagues, patients, families, carers
Highly relevant to context
Value laden, biased and subjective
Can be contested, but difficult to ignore
Trans-local Examples from other sites, including new
pathways
Relevant if adopted by stakeholders
Often narratives, anecdotal
Can be overlooked
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Chapter 4 Capabilities for Clinical Commissioning
Group evidence use
We noted in Chapter 1 that evidence use is often a highly political social process.3 Drawing on theliterature, however, we expect that certain organisational practices and conditions will enable
evidence use in redesign work. Because of this, we identified inductively capabilities for evidence use
from our cases (see Chapter 2). Our analysis revealed five sets of capabilities that appeared to benefit
evidence use in redesign projects. We label these as ‘sourcing and evaluating evidence’, ‘effective framing’,
‘engaging experts’, ‘managing expert collaboration’ and ‘managing roles and expectations’. In the next
sections, each capability is defined, its importance is explained and examples from our cases are provided.
Sourcing and evaluating evidence
Clinical Commissioning Groups are expected to use evidence to assure the quality of services. Yet they
have received little guidance on how to achieve evidence use.41,81 The quality and quantity of evidence
relevant to health-care contexts is one factor that can undermine its use. It has been estimated that as
many as 75 trials and 11 systematic reviews are published daily.82 Stakeholders in our cases noted that
using universal evidence ‘became this minefield because . . . how do you synthesise all this so that you’d
end up with something that is succinct so that you can deal with it?’ (Rutterford CCG). Even if evidences
can be sourced, application can still be problematic. Stakeholders reported that it was difficult to apply
evidence to context, especially ‘NICE guidelines . . . they’re very long . . . it’s like reading a book!’
(Horsetown CCG). The quality of available evidence was also often an issue, as the GP below notes:
[The hospital] thought they had 2000 diabetics [but] it looks like . . . about 500. But they didn’t know,
they had no idea at all. If I’d have said to them you’re looking after 8000 they’ll have believed me.
Or if I had said it was 150 they would have thought well, we seem very busy but they don’t know.
I am astonished, absolutely astonished at the quality of data that comes out of the hospitals . . .
Greenland CCG
Efforts to source and evaluate relevant evidences must be made if CCGs are to conduct evidence-based
service design. As noted, ‘evidence does not speak for itself, but needs to be mobilised’.2 Although
mobilising evidence may seem like a fundamental practice, efforts differed across CCGs. In Rutterford
CCG, for example, ‘task and finish’ groups were established specifically to achieve evidence use.
Subgroups were asked to report if there was:
Any evidence . . . any models of care . . . any best practice . . . [anything] published in the literature
that we might want to adopt and change . . .
In other CCGs, efforts towards sourcing and evaluating evidence were weaker and more problematic.
At Horsetown CCG, for example, stakeholders reported that they had brought evidence forward but
‘then nothing happened’. At Greenland CCG, the evidence search and evaluation was limited because
the outcome had already been decided. Because the solution was predetermined, stakeholders ‘had not
considered a lot of options . . . It was just going to go for the community-based team’.
Existing literature (see Chapter 1) also shows that evidence use is time and task dependent.2 Redesigns
involve episodes in which different tasks must be accomplished. During agenda formation episodes,
stakeholders may have to scope evidence about demand, while later they may need evidence about
efficacy and evaluation. Therefore, it is unlikely that narrowly sourcing evidence early on (as in Greenland
CCG) will be sufficient. Instead, stakeholders may need to be responsive to evidence demands across the
process. Given the challenges of evidence use, the importance of evidence use in CCG work and the
variation shown across our CCGs, our first capability for evidence use is ‘sourcing and evaluating evidence’.
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Engaging experts
In addition to sourcing and evaluating, experts must be engaged to effectively apply evidence. By ‘experts’,
we mean individuals with relevant education or qualifications (e.g. doctors and consultants) whose
expertise is embedded, localised and invested in practice.27 We also mean non-professionals such as health
service users (e.g. patients, families and carers). Indeed, this group is key to the NHS mantra ‘no decision
about me, without me’.83 Both groups of experts can offer expertise-based evidence to redesign projects.
Studies have also shown that different types of evidence are used across professions.23 Consultants,
for example, rely more on universal evidence, whereas nurses and doctors are more familiar with local
evidence.11 It is, therefore, important to have multiple stakeholders engaged who can contribute, discuss,
interpret and critique a range of evidences (e.g. local, trans-local and universal). In our cases, engaging
experts was also a way to ensure a smooth redesign, because ‘you can’t just simply say well, we’re
changing the service as of tomorrow and expect everybody to comply’ (Coalfield CCG).
In the majority of our cases, efforts to engage experts were paramount from the outset of the project.
These efforts ranged from ‘sending an e-mail round to everyone’ at Seaport CCG, to contacting individuals
in person at Coalfield:
Before every board meeting I spoke to every board member . . . sticking my head round the door while
[saying] do you get it? Do you understand? Have you got any questions? Is there anything worrying
you? It’s literally simple as that. And they’d go that’s fine, get out, for God’s sake. In the end people
get bored, go away . . . we support you, we’re with you . . .
Senior commissioning manager
In some cases, expert engagement among professionals was limited. In most of the cases, patients’
expertise was invoked in a rather ‘afterthought to the main event’ type of fashion. At Greenland CCG,
for example, stakeholders described how they did not really feel part of the redesign project. In the next
quotation, a stakeholder describes how the project ‘belongs’ to the lead GP:
This is [his] project . . . we’re not really involved – we are in the sense that we’re involved to ask our
opinions in terms of information from our diabetes patients but we’re not actively involved with the
day-to-day . . . if you think about, if you’ve got only say five or six GPs, you know, that’s a lot of areas
that you’re leading on.
Because expert engagement is a means to promote and encourage the use of different types of evidence,
and to ensure a smoother redesign processes at CCGs, our second capability for evidence use is ‘engaging
experts’ in the redesign.
Effective framing
Effective framing appeared as one means of engaging stakeholders in redesign work.56 Frames are
‘organising principles that govern the meaning we assign to social events’.84 Framing allows groups to
construct and negotiate meaning.57 A strong frame resonates with actors and may increase engagement. A
weak frame is uncertain and can mean resistance, disinterest and incongruence.57 It can be expected, then,
that stakeholders may be more engaged when a frame resonates with them. In our cases, problems were
framed in terms of ‘capacity’, ‘care’ and ‘cost’. Patient care was not good enough, which was often caused
by capacity issues, and costs were too high. These issues are all interlinked: capacity issues increase waiting
lists, which exacerbates illness so that more complicated care is needed. Care, costs and capacity provide a
broad frame that can be understood by different stakeholders. Consultants, for example, may be concerned
by capacity, whereas commissioners may be concerned with cost. In many CCGs, this broad framing was
applied. The accountable officer at Rutterford CCG, for example, describes how diabetes care was ‘a poor
use of resources, not great value for money, and [having] not great outcomes for patients’. In other CCGs,
problems were framed more narrowly. In Horsetown CCG, for example, the problem was framed almost
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entirely in terms of cost: ‘MSK is a high-cost, high-volume activity . . . we were conscious that a lot of people
were going into a hospital which is very high cost’.
Framing was also important during solution search. Searching for a solution in a way that was congruent
with stakeholders’ expectations was important because ‘you can’t just simply say well, we’re changing the
service as of tomorrow and expect everybody to comply’ (Horsetown CCG). A ‘blank sheet’ approach was
mentioned across cases, which invited stakeholders to contribute ideas about what could and should be
done to improve services prior to any formalisation of a particular model of care. Interestingly, ‘blankness’
occurred on a continuum, ranging from ‘not blank enough’ to ‘too blank’. In Greenland and Chelsea CCGs,
the sheet was ‘not blank enough’, because the solution had been pre-selected before stakeholders could
contribute to the search, such that they felt that their expertise was being excluded. In other CCGs sheets
were ‘too blank’, with experts struggling to understand what kind of evidence they might look at and for
what purpose. Some CCGs used, rather, a partially blank approach. In Seaport CCG, for example, the
redesign leader knew that community-based care would eventually be a part of the outcome, but asked
stakeholders to ‘have a discussion how can we do diabetes care better . . . you tell me what works’. Similarly,
stakeholders at Coalfield CCG were asked to give evidence about ‘trying to keep people out of hospital’:
One of them said so what do you want us to do? I said I want you to deliver the best possible care for
patients for the limited amount of money you’ve got . . . they said how do you want us to do it? I said
I don’t care. I said if you want to get a bag of bones and shake them if that makes a difference that’s
fine. I said I just want the outcome . . .
Clinical lead, Coalfield CCG
Our findings suggest that weak frames can mean that stakeholders are less likely to contribute to evidence
work, owing to the degree of ambiguity involved and difficulties in reconciling evidence pertaining to
multiple concerns (cost, care and capacity). On the other hand, framing problems and solutions too tightly,
prior to efforts to engage experts, may seal off the search for evidence too soon and could also create
problems of stakeholder engagement with the predefined approach. We suggest, then, that it is important
to consider not just what problems and solutions are considered, but how they are put forward, framed
and communicated in CCG redesigns if evidence use is to be effective. As a result, we identify ‘effective
framing’ as a capability for evidence use.
Managing roles and expectations
In engaging experts, it is also important that their roles and expectations are recognised. Certain CCG roles are
mandated (e.g. CCG chairperson and accountable officer), but others are more ambiguous. Stakeholders are
often brought in to participate in projects without clear governance on what their role is or what they expect
from the role. Although it may not be feasible or practical to detail the role of every stakeholder prior to project
commencement, this is not to say that roles should not be a considered. In some of our cases, stakeholder roles
were very clear. In relation to evidence use, the diabetes consultant at Chelsea CCG had a clear role in bringing
trans-local evidence forward because he had worked in a hospital in which the ‘model had already been
developed, delivered, evaluated’ and had ‘seen first hand how it works’. Similarly, at Greenland CCG, the CSU
project manager was tasked with bringing different evidences forward. As the GP at Greenland CCG describes:
Without [her] we wouldn’t have been able to do this . . . we are doing our day jobs . . . she . . . gets
the information on the table . . . on different models.
Roles were not limited to evidence use. At Seaport CCG, for example, one of the GPs described how his
role was to act as ‘similar other’ who could justify and legitimise the redesign work to other GPs. He
described, for example, how he would say to other GPs:
This affects me [too] . . . I work in the practice . . . I understand . . . I am going to have to do more
than I have traditionally done but . . . I can do that because I am supported and we’ve got the right
package of support that is available in the community . . .
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Roles, however, were not clearly defined and managed in all CCGs. At Shire CCG, it was felt that the
‘wrong’ people were sometimes involved, which was detrimental because ‘unless everybody understands
why they’re there and understands what their role is, then potentially you’re not going to get further
forward’. In this case, some stakeholders were not ‘engaged in doing that piece of work . . . and just
turning up and being there because they’ve been asked to be’. Similarly, at Horsetown CCG, stakeholders
had certain expectations of their role but these were not met. One of the academic GPs described how
‘nobody looked at the evidence . . . in the meetings . . . I was hoping . . . because I’m there and I work in
research . . . maybe they will ask me . . . they didn’t do that’. If stakeholder roles and expectations are not
considered, incongruence and conflict arising from ambiguity of roles may occur. Therefore, considering
what stakeholders expect, and what they are expected to do, is important, and we identify ‘managing
roles and expectations’ as a fourth capability.
Managing expert collaboration
Our analysis suggests that while engaging experts it is also necessary to manage ongoing collaborations
between them as the service redesign process unfolds. This is because interprofessional health-care work is
high-stakes and ‘fraught with tension and anxiety’.85 In commissioning, individual jobs, contracts, issues of
governance, compliance and patient care are simultaneously in question. The transformation manager at
Rutterford CCG describes: ‘challenges . . . disagreements . . . debates . . . change is frightening . . . it can
make you feel a bit insecure’. Stakeholders were well aware of the challenges inherit in this type of work,
describing how vested and competing interests mean that having everyone ‘around the table had got that
sort of political aspect to it’ (Horsetown CCG). These concerns could prevent stakeholders from ‘properly
discussing’, interpreting and critiquing different forms of evidence, Moreover, during the lifetime of these
redesign efforts, experts came and went. This meant that ongoing attention to managing collaborations
appeared to be very critical. In some CCGs, expert collaboration was managed well. Stakeholders worked
to have teams focus on a common ground, in many cases centred on patient care. In Seaport CCG, for
example, a nurse described how the consultant leading the redesign work had:
A way of getting people to recognise . . . we’re trying to achieve the same thing . . . good-quality care
for patients . . .
Collaboration was managed less successfully in other CCGs. In Greenland CCG, for example, the lead GP
made efforts, but he was unsuccessful in managing these collaborations. He was aware that there was
‘anxiety about levels of knowledge and the increasing workload’ and felt that he had done ‘a huge
amount of work’ to engage stakeholders and address these issues. He acknowledged, however, that
evidence for the redesign effort was still being ignored ‘there are still some practices who say that they
don’t know anything about it’. Concerns about collaboration persisted at Horsetown CCG:
[Y]ou suddenly think ‘oh, what are they going to change?’ There was quite a lot of concern over what
was it going to mean . . . Technically we’re in competition . . .
Because collaboration between stakeholders can be problematic and can limit their ability to share ideas
and discuss evidence openly, we identify the following ‘managing expert collaboration’ as our fifth, and
final, capability for evidence use.
Chapter summary
In this chapter, we identified capabilities for evidence use: ‘sourcing and evaluating evidence’, ‘engaging
experts’, ‘effective framing’, ‘managing roles and expectations’ and ‘managing expert collaboration’.
Figure 2 shows capabilities for evidence use (dark green box), why they are important (light green box) and
an example from the data (white box).
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Chapter 5 Selected cases
Introduction to case studies
In what follows, four case studies – Seaport, Greenland, Horsetown and Stopton CCGs – are presented.
These four cases were selected as exemplars of our finding across cases. Owing to constraints on space
in the main body of this report, the remaining four case studies – Rutterford, Chelsea, Coalfield and
Shire CCGs – are presented in appendices. Developing these case studies addresses our first objective
of studying how evidence is used in CCGs. These case studies also lay the groundwork for comparing
evidence use across cases (objective 2) and creating a process model (objective 3).
Each case study begins with an overview of the redesign project and of the study participants. This overview
is followed by a chronology of the main events. Decision episodes are applied to structure our cases.32,51
Stakeholders across cases described how redesigns usually began when a problem was recognised. Akin
to Robertson et al.,86 we label this episode ‘agenda formation’. After this, work to generate a solution
tended to commence. Again, we replicate Robertson et al.86 and label this episode ‘solution selection’.
Next, stakeholders described how (and if) they made changes to practice.86 Other outputs included reports
and future plans. We label this episode ‘process outcomes’. These episodes structure the cases described
throughout this report. We identify in the cases key themes related to (1) evidence use and (2) capabilities
for use so that these can be drawn out in cross-case comparisons. For ease of reference, we indicate
evidences used with bold text, and indicate capabilities with bold italic text.
We also summarise whether or not redesign projects were ‘successful’ at the end of the case study. As
seen, we adopt three broad criteria to assess this: (1) evidence used effectively, (2) satisfied stakeholders
and (3) objectives met. Process maps of the case are also drawn53 and will be presented at the end of each
individual case study.
The findings from Seaport CCG are presented first in detail to familiarise readers with our approach to
data analysis.
Seaport Clinical Commissioning Group
Case study overview
When we first visited Seaport CCG, we spoke with a diabetes consultant, a senior diabetes nurse specialist,
a GP lead for long-term conditions and a diabetes specialist nurse. At the time of our visit, Seaport’s
diabetes services had been redesigned and changes had been implemented for around 18 months. In their
interviews, stakeholders described how they had wanted to reduce diabetes care provided in the hospital
because of ‘capacity’ issues. They also saw reducing hospital-based diabetes care as a means to reducing
‘complications’ and ‘costs’. The diabetes consultant was described as the project lead and was responsible
for driving change forward with the support of other stakeholders. Although the consultant faced initial lack
of interest in change, they managed to engage multiple experts by inviting them to contribute ideas about
how diabetes care could be done better. After several meetings and discussions, stakeholders identified
aspects of care that could be removed from the hospital. With structural, educational and financial supports,
changes were made to diabetes care practice. At our last meeting, stakeholders were evaluating the impacts
of these changes, with a view to further improvements. The redesign process is described in detail next.
Agenda formation
Experts at Seaport picked up multiple evidences showing problems with diabetes care. There was the
diabetes consultant, for example, who described using his expertise-based evidence, describing how
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‘the idea [for the redesign] came from . . . a group of us registrars . . . we always used to talk about it,
saying it isn’t quite right [how we provide care] the way we’re doing it’. He described supporting his
expertise-based evidence with local and universal evidence, too. These evidences showed issues with
hospital capacity and the provision of diabetes care. Specifically, patients were waiting 18 months to be
seen in the hospital (routine local evidence), which is well beyond the NHS maximum recommended wait
of 18 weeks for ‘good’ care (universal evidence). The consultant describes the problem as follows:
You serve only 10% of the [diabetes] population [in the hospital] . . . 90% is out in primary care . . . if
anybody got in trouble you’d send him to the hospital [but] the hospital never had the capacity to deal
with that . . . you build up waiting lists . . . have people waiting to be seen for 18 months . . . [that] is a
lifetime. It’s not good care . . .
Consultant
The community diabetes team, which was established in 2007 to ‘support and educate nurses, dieticians,
administration staff, and consultants about improving care’ (report), also used local evidence to show
issues with care caused by a ‘huge range of standards and quality of care’ (diabetes nurse) across
GP practices.
As described above, multiple evidences (expertise based, local and universal) were used to show care and
capacity issues. Two capabilities for evidence use are shown: effective framing and expert engagement.
During the agenda formation episode, the problem with diabetes care is framed in terms of care and
capacity issues. Specifically, care is not good enough because the hospital does not have the capacity. These
issues are likely to speak to a range of stakeholders because they are about improving service efficacy and
patient experience. Perhaps because of this, multiple experts (consultant, nurses, GPs) were engaged in the
redesign from the outset. As noted in Chapter 4, expert engagement enables evidence to be contributed
and evaluated from multiple sources. In this case, the diabetes consultant contributed expertise-based,
universal and local evidences, with the last of these being echoed by the diabetes team.
Selecting a solution
Having framed the problem in terms of care and capacity, the consultant described seeking a better
approach to service provision. He described the first step he took was sending ‘an e-mail round to
everybody’ (the GPs), in which he suggested that changes to diabetes care services were necessary. This
action shows efforts to further engage experts in the redesign effort. In this case, however, GPs, who are
known to have access to expertise-based and local evidence11 were slow to respond. In the consultant’s
words, responses were a bit ‘hit and miss’. He attributed this initial resistance to the fact that secondary
care was ‘reluctant to make any changes’, while primary care was reluctant and had a sense of being
underqualified. This resistance was informed by ‘historical rhetoric’, wherein consultants are capable of
treating diabetes, but GPs are not (diabetes consultant). This type of historical rhetoric was seen as a
barrier to actors sharing their expertise with each other.
To overcome this, the consultant ‘got a handful of GPs’ that he knew to ‘start the ball rolling’. He asked
them ‘why don’t we have a discussion how can we do diabetes care better . . . you tell me what works’.
This framed the solution search in a way that made stakeholders feel the ‘ball is in their court and
provides an ‘open canvas’ for discussion’. Doing so also drew out expertise-based evidence and was a
way to avoid getting:
. . . people’s backs up, because [they don’t] think hang on a second, you just made an independent
decision . . . I don’t want that . . .
Consultant
Framing the solution search in this way further engaged experts and gave them clear role expectations.
The GP, for example, described how his role was, at least in part, to act as a ‘similar other’ who could
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justify and legitimise redesign work to GP stakeholders. He described, for example, how he would say to
other GPs:
. . . this affects me just as much as it affects you . . . I work in the practice, I look after diabetes
patients, I understand that . . . I am going to have to do more than I have traditionally done but . . .
I can do that because I am supported and we’ve got the right package of support that is available
in the community . . .
GP
Stakeholders were also involved in sourcing and evaluating universal, expertise-based and local
evidence. The consultant, for example, seemed to be more familiar with universal evidence. He described
in his interview how the national situation emphasises community-based care. For example, he referred to
‘the Five Year Forward View’, in which it is noted that services can ‘close health, quality, and spending
gaps by . . . creat[ing] integrated out-of-hospital care’. He also referred to other universal evidence (NICE)
to understand how to achieve this community-based care. He noted that NICE says that antenatal diabetes
requires ‘a midwife, an obstetrician, a consultant, and a scanning machine’, which means that secondary
care is better equipped to provide this particular aspect of care. GPs also had a role in contributing
expertise-based evidence. GPs used their ‘common sense’ about insulin pumps being too ‘high tech’.
This knowledge meant that they wanted to avoid ‘having a crack at [that because] . . . that’s something
that needs specific training’ (consultant).
The consultant also commented on the role of external individuals. He emphasised project managers, who
were at the ‘core of trying to make things improve, they’re always there . . . their role was to steer the
clinical view through’. Project managers provided finance data showing that the hospital may lose income
initially because they would no longer be paid for care that was moved to the community, but that they
could break even by making ‘a similar reduction in the workforce’ (diabetes consultant). The project
managers were also necessary because clinicians come with their own values and perspectives on an issue
and the evidence associated with it. Professional backgrounds can skew the interpretation and use of
evidence, and so having a ‘neutral outsider’ was an important means to ensure that the redesign stayed
on track.
After several months of discussions, stakeholders at this CCG managed to develop and agree a new
pathway. Based on local, universal and expertise-based evidence, and aided by framing and role
management, they identified that the majority of diabetes care could be moved to the community. They
also agreed that a small amount of diabetes care needed to remain in the hospital (e.g. antenatal care).
Process outcomes
Having agreed the new pathway, stakeholders worked to implement changes in practice. Managing
roles and expectations was particularly important in this episode of work and was achieved through
education, training, support and financial incentives. Education and training, for example, was used to
‘upskill’ the primary care workforce so that they could provide the diabetes care that was normally offered
in the hospital. This training enabled GPs to understand their role. Structural rearrangements were also
made so that consultants assumed a new role in which they were deployed to community-based clinics.
This rearrangement ensured the presence of expertise-based evidence while changes were being made
practice. In some instances, they had a physical presence in the practice, with the consultant describing
how he would say to the GPs, ‘why don’t you see me as your employee for 3 or 4 hours for the patients in
your surgery’. In other situations, consultants were also available virtually:
When we have said that we [would be at the end of the phone] we meant it . . . we deliver it at the
end of the day so it didn’t conflict with existing duties, we deliver till 7 in the evening . . .
Consultant
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Financial incentives were also offered during this episode of work to encourage changes in practice.
Incentives meant that stakeholders understood what they should be providing, and were not fearful of
losing money as roles were changed to reflect the new pathway. The diabetes nurse describes how:
. . . each surgery could have one GP and one practice nurse undergone training to initiate insulin, so
patients who previously have been referred to the hospital [could be seen in the community] . . . and
they would get paid more . . .
Diabetes nurse
The project documents that were reviewed as part of this case study indicate that the new pathway was
largely successful. By 2011, contracts were signed and the pathway was rolled out to the majority of
surgeries. By 2012, a number of inpatient diabetics had been discharged and considerable savings were
reported. Documents also note that ‘amputation rates [are also] improving’. Stakeholders commented
during face-to-face interviews that the change to roles meant everyone was ‘doing what [they were] paid
for’, including answering ‘e-mails and phone [calls].’ The diabetes nurse describes starting to see ‘that
people weren’t falling through the net, there wasn’t this great big gaping hole that all these patients were
sitting in and nobody was looking after them’. When probed about any initial doubts she might have
experienced about the redesign work, the same nurse commented how, if there had been evidence:
. . . I guess I would have felt a bit more reassured but . . . it’s the people that put those models into
practice . . . you can have the best model in the world but if the team don’t work together, then it
won’t work . . . people make it happen . . .
Diabetes nurse
The nurse emphasised how the consultant managed expert collaborations because he was someone
who ‘has this gift [laughs] with people . . . can build relationships, build bridges, get people thinking
outside the box’.
Other influences included time to build the relationships (diabetes nurse). Being early adopters was also
described as enabling change. The consultant described how there is currently a ‘huge move to move
everything into primary care [which means] you’re overburdening primary care’. Picking up on this, the
GP commented:
Some of the things that we were able to do . . . might not be so easy or so possible at the moment . . .
we’ve got an overworked primary care workforce . . .
GP
The nature of the NHS was also a feature in stakeholder reflections. The consultant described the
organisation being ‘risk averse’, which he saw as a barrier to redesign work:
I think the other thing is that in the NHS I think we’re too risk averse. That stops things from happening.
I think clinicians, and I include nurses and doctors and any clinicians really, we are our worst enemies . . .
because sometimes we think too much, we mull too much, we want to get the perfect system . . .
Consultant
At the same time, the NHS was seen as poor to measure and understand changes, which seems
contradictory in ‘a risk averse organisation’. Yet, as shown in the following quotation, the GP sees the NHS
as emphasising change without properly measuring impact:
One of the biggest challenges for the NHS is that there are so many changes . . . nobody ever gives
one change a chance to work before they decide I’m making another . . . it would just be nice to let
this bed and see over a little bit . . .
GP
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Overall, the redesign at Seaport CCG was very successful. It used a mix of evidences without any major
hurdles, it managed to implement changes in practice, and stakeholders seemed largely satisfied with the
process. This last point was shown throughout the case study, but also by the fact that stakeholders were
still engaged long after implementation. The GP described, for example, the new pathway as still being
subject to interpretation and debate. The GP commented that they are still ‘learning and adapting’ to
make it ‘fit for purpose as we move forward’, summarising the new pathway as having:
. . . the right principles, but actually we’re still not getting the outcomes that we would want and
desire there so it needs some fine-tuning . . .
GP
Seaport summary of findings
Local, universal and expertise-based evidence was used to frame care and capacity issues related to
diabetes services at Seaport CCG. A number of experts engaged with these evidences (e.g. GP, diabetes
nurses and consultant). Led by the clinical consultant, these stakeholders began to work to select a
solution. Although not everyone was enthusiastic to begin with, the consultant framed the solution search
in terms of a blank sheet, which meant the multiple stakeholders selected and evaluated universal, local
and expertise-based evidences. From this, stakeholders agreed a new pathway in which the majority of
diabetes care would be moved to the community setting. They also agreed a small amount of diabetes
care that would remain in the hospital.
Process mapping: explanation
Process maps are split into two levels, with the top level containing evidence (shaded in white) and the
bottom level containing capabilities (shaded grey). Evidences are shown in differently bordered boxes as
follows: local evidence is in a box with a solid line and represented by (L); universal evidence is in a box
with a dotted line and represented by (U); expertise-based evidence is in a box with double lines and
represented by (E); and trans-local evidence is in a box with dashed lines and represented by (TL). When
more than one evidence is used, a double box is presented with both evidence letters included.
The capabilities are shown in circles and labelled as follows: engaging experts (EE), managing expert
collaboration (MEC), effective framing (EF), sourcing and evaluating evidence (SEE) and managing role
expectations (MRE). If outcomes were achieved (effective evidence use, changes in practice and satisfied
stakeholders), these are indicated in hexagonal shapes.
Process maps should be read left to right, following the arrows. Agenda formation, solution selection
and process outcome episodes are indicated along the bottom. The rotated triangles indicate barriers to
progress. The process map symbols are summarised in a legend in Figure 3 and the redesign process at
Seaport CCG is shown in Figure 4.
Greenland Clinical Commissioning Group
Case study overview
When we visited Greenland CCG, we spoke with the GP leading the project, another GP lead for mental
health, maternity, and patient engagement, a project manager from the CSU and a non-executive hospital
director. At the time of our visit, they had been working to redesign diabetes services for around 6 months.
They described concerns over the quality of ‘care’ and ‘duplication of work’ in diabetes care. The GP lead
and the CSU project manager were particularly involved in the redesign efforts. They were keen to mimic
changes that had occurred in Seaport CCG because they felt that this was the best way to address their
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problems. Although efforts were made to push this new practice forward, they were met with several
challenges. Almost 1 year after our first contact, we managed to follow up with a transformation and
innovation lead at the same CSU. She had replaced the original CSU manager and informed us that the
CCG had not yet managed to overcome the challenges it faced. The redesign project had been put on hold
and the CCG was re-evaluating evidence to understand the need (if any) for the redesign.
Agenda formation
The GP lead and the CSU project manager picked up several types of evidences which showed a problem with
diabetes care at Greenland. Local evidence, specifically information sourced from ‘primary care discharge
letters’ and ‘feedback from patients during a consultation in practice’ (GP), was used to show that there
was a problem with care. Other local evidence included routine data, which in this case showed ‘a greater
number of complications . . . [and] amputation rates [that] are quite high’ (GP). These local evidences were
given meaning by reference to universal evidence, with the GP describing how complications and
amputations were high when ‘compared nationally’. They also used local and universal evidences to
understand problems related to fragmentation and duplication of work. The GP described how ‘[the
patient] goes to the hospital, [but] the consultant may not have the up-to-date bloods, and they may not
have the up-to-date investigation’. National benchmarking standards and key performance indicators
caused work to be repeated unnecessarily. The GP describes how the QOF (universal evidence) means
that patients have the same tests multiple times:
To hit our QOF targets patients still have to go through a diabetes check at the local surgeries . . .
patients find that frustrating because they’ll say I’ve been to the diabetes clinic at the hospital. Yet the
hospital may not provide us enough clinical information for us to put that into our database . . . when
I send a patient into A&E [accident and emergency] and I’ve recorded their blood pressure do they
really need to have [it] repeated?
GP
The GP and the CSU project manager used local and universal evidences to show problems in terms of
care and capacity. The problem was framed only in terms of ‘improving outcomes . . . [and the] patient
journey’ (GP), which is narrower than in the previous CCG.
Selecting a solution
Having decided they wanted to change diabetes care, the GP and the CSU project manager led the work
at Greenland. They felt that the problems were caused by ‘a lot of patients . . . being followed up in
Evidences are shown in boxes:
(L) Local (U) Universal (E) Expertise-based (TL) Trans-local
Capabilities are shown in circles:
Other symbols:
Engaging 
experts 
(EE)
Barrier to evidence use Process output
Managing 
expert 
collaboration
 (MEC)
Effective 
framing 
(EF)
Sourcing and
evaluating 
evidence 
(SEE)
Managing 
roles and 
expectations 
(MRE)
FIGURE 3 Process legend.
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secondary care, which is not necessarily where they should be’ (local evidence; GP lead). At around the
time, the GP attended a talk by the consultant from Seaport. He described how:
. . . it just struck me as a very good idea . . . the most innovative . . . there were others there, which
we’d already dealt with, you know, GPs with special interest or practices who were looking after
patients for neighbouring practices and that sort of thing, and none of them seemed very original.
And we had already considered many of those in the past . . .
Seeing the work that had been completed Seaport as ‘particularly interesting’, the GP decided to bring it
‘to the board . . . as an idea and they were enthused by . . . and so we decided to develop it’. In doing so,
the search for a solution is framed in a closed and predefined manner. That is, rather than using a blank
sheet approach as in Seaport, stakeholders (lead GP and CSU manager) decided explicitly what the
solution would be. Because this solution was transformed from Seaport for use at Greenland, it acts as
trans-local evidence. The non-executive hospital director describes the value of mimicking Seaport CCG
because ‘all the indications were it [Seaport’s model] seemed to work . . . there’s a better outcome’. He
also felt that it would make their work less risky:
If it hadn’t been de-risked, and somebody came up with it as a concept it would be very much more
difficult to get it implemented. The NHS is risk averse and people generally manager included will not
do anything, which exposes them . . .
The GP made efforts to also engage other stakeholder experts (GPs, nurses). He described asking them
to ‘read material, and try to evaluate the information’ about what had been achieved at Seaport. Meetings
were held so that stakeholders could evaluate evidence. They were asked to contribute expertise-based
evidence, with the GP lead describing efforts to involve ‘various stakeholders and trying to [get their]
advice’. Patients were also asked ‘how we can try and improve patient care and patient ownership of their
condition too?’ (GP lead). Local evidence was also drawn on in these meetings, with one of the GPs
describing how they contacted ‘the hospital . . . to look at anonymised patient data . . . in terms of how
appropriate those patients were to be seen at the hospital’ (GP). Last, they considered universal evidences
at the meeting. They used NICE evidence, for example, to understand ‘appropriate management of patients
[with comorbidities]’ (GP).
The CSU project manager had a clear role in making information accessible to clinicians who were too
busy to search for it alongside their day jobs:
Without [her] we wouldn’t have been able to do this . . . we are doing our day jobs . . . she ultimately
writes the projects . . . She’ll organise the stakeholder events, gets the information on the table . . .
GP
In addition to discussing evidences, meetings were about managing role expectations. The GP lead
described ‘anxiety about levels of knowledge and the increasing workload’ among stakeholders. He
reflected that he did ‘a huge amount of work [around] patient . . . and GP involvement’ to address this.
He felt he had ‘been quite good’ at engagement, but did acknowledge, however, that ‘there are still some
practices who say that they don’t know anything about it’. Other stakeholders we spoke with were not
entirely convinced by the evidence for the redesign, questioning how it had been framed, with one of the
GPs describing that:
. . . the CCG have done a piece [of research saying] 70% of the activity can be stripped out . . . we’re
challenging that . . . I’ve spoken to a GP colleague [who had] one patient that she felt could be
managed in their practice . . .
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Perhaps because of this, there were issues with project ownership. The other GP felt that they lacked
expert engagement because the project ‘belonged’ to the GP lead:
This is [his] project . . . we’re not really involved – we are in the sense that we’re involved to ask our
opinions in terms of information from our diabetes patients but we’re not actively involved with the
day-to-day . . . if you think about, if you’ve got only say five or six GPs, you know, that’s a lot of areas
that you’re leading on.
GP
The GP lead also felt a lack of collaboration among stakeholders and felt that they did not want to make
changes even though the case was ‘self-evident’. He described them as wanting to ‘deliver as they’ve
always delivered it’. He also commented on resistance at the patient level because patients ‘like to be seen
at the hospitals . . . to be seen by the specialist’.
Process outcomes
After the initial interviews, we struggled to engage stakeholders in follow-up interviews. Almost 1 year
later, we managed to secure a follow-up interview with a CSU project manager who had taken over from
the original manager. The new manager told us that the redesign project had been put on hold owing to
a requestioning of the evidence and limited expert engagement. The lead GP had resigned in order to
set up his own company. The original CSU project manager had left with the GP to work in the new
company. This staffing change had created conflicts of interest because the GP’s new company offered:
. . . management support and solutions to GPs . . . It became a massive conflict of interest . . . he was
the clinical lead for the work, they were writing a business case for it for investment for a community
based team and all of a sudden he was going to go and start his own. So the project was stopped
immediately . . .
CSU project manager
The second reason the redesign was put on hold was related to the framing of the solution. The CSU
manager described that the initial framing was too narrow and that alternative approaches (other than
community-based care) had not been widely considered:
It seemed [the commissioners] weren’t happy with the way the project had gone . . . There was a lot
of flux . . . which muddies the waters as to who was at fault . . . their business case had not considered
a lot of options . . . just the community team . . .
CSU project manager
Other challenges included a continued lack of interest and lack of engagement from clinicians. The fact
that the project was led by a GP, meaning that the link to secondary care was not in place as it had been
in Seaport CCG, was also seen as problematic. The new CSU manager reflected in her interview that
‘unless you have an acute diabetician who is very keen I think you are pretty much scuppered’. She also
noted ambiguity around framing the case for need for change and uncertainty about the evidence,
expecting that ‘[the CCG] won’t be high [on a list of underperforming CCGs]’. Access to secondary care
evidence also problematised the redesign. Uncertainty numbers muddied the clinical need. The new CSU
manager described difficulty in sourcing and evaluating the data:
It depends how it is coded though. So every intervention in a hospital is recorded and coded . . . it is
just a matter of deciphering what it is that is relevant and what is not. So someone might come in
with a stroke and it might not necessarily say they have got diabetes but it could have been the
diabetes that caused the stroke . . .
CSU project manager
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At our last meeting, the new CSU manager described how she was trying to identify what outcomes the
CCG would want from the redesigning of diabetes services. She told us that there was no timeline for a
redesign to happen in the area, and there was a general uncertainty about one happening at all. Overall,
it can be said that the redesign at Greenland CCG was not very successful. There were several barriers to
evidence use in this context. They did not manage to implement changes in practice, and stakeholders
were largely dissatisfied with the process.
Greenland summary of findings
Local and universal evidence was used to frame issues with patient care. The GP lead and the CSU
manager decided to mimic Seaport CCG’s redesign (trans-local evidence). Efforts were made to engage
experts in the solution search. The CSU manager had a role in selecting the evidence. There were efforts to
manage fears and anxieties, but not everyone felt included. After nearly a year, we managed to conduct
follow-up interviews in which we learned that the project had been ‘put on hold’. This resulted from the
narrow stakeholder engagement and difficulties in searching and evaluating evidence. There were also
questions about the evidence used to frame the problem. The redesign process for this CCG is summarised
in Figure 5. Guidance for reading process maps is shown in Figure 3.
Horsetown Clinical Commissioning Group
Case study overview
We conducted interviews and observations at Horsetown CCG. The participants included three GPs (3),
the CCG director, a senior commissioning manager, a commissioning manager, a radiologist, four
physiotherapists and an orthopaedic surgeon. They were asked to source evidence and ‘provide clinical
advice . . . and produce options for a simplified clinical model that improves patient outcomes, service
quality and patient experience’ (report). Simply, they were instructed to produce a report about how MSK
services could be redesigned to shift care closer to the patient’s home (terms of reference, January 2014;
emphasis added by authors).
It should also be noted that Horsetown had already commissioned a MSK community service in which a
‘physio and a GP [were] in the room to triage the patient’ (CCG manager). This had been unsuccessful,
and its failure seen to result in the hospitals not being ‘represented’ in design, GPs being unhappy about
being ‘told what to do’ (GP), and expense (CCG manager). Referral between GPs had also been an issue,
as was communication between primary and secondary care (GP). Thus, part of the current redesign was
to ‘decommission that pilot community service’.
The CCG framed the redesign as an effort to reduce cost and improve care. The CCG developed a
‘clinical reference group’ (CRG) to advise on the redesign. The group was instructed to use multiple
evidences to identify a solution. Several challenges were faced, however, and many stakeholders were
dissatisfied with the process. The commissioner produced a new pathway that was heavily criticised by
stakeholders. At our last meeting, a second pathway had been produced but stakeholders were uncertain
that it would be put into practice.
Agenda formation
Commissioning managers at Horsetown CCG used local, universal and expertise-based evidences
to frame problems with MSK services in terms of costs. They suggested that moving care into the
community would reduce these costs. Local evidence showed that MSK services was a high-cost activity,
but the CCG director was keen to emphasise that ‘new clinical solutions should precede financial
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calculations’ in meetings with stakeholders. A senior commissioning manager describes his framing of the
redesign project as follows:
MSK is a high-cost, high-volume activity . . . as people age, they’ve got more problems . . . we were
conscious that a lot of people were going into a hospital which is very high cost when we could find
some other community based services . . . Because people have to travel [to the hospital] . . . If we can
find some way of providing a service that’s closer to where they live then that has to be better for
them in they’ll actually appreciate the service more . . .
Senior commissioning manager
Local and universal evidences included analyses of hospital admission and referral rates. Local evidence
showed a ‘41% increase in elective hip and knee replacements . . . [meaning] referrals into orthopaedics . . .
are increasing’. Universal evidence was also used, showing ‘the rate at which we intervene in
orthopaedics in an acute setting is far higher than other CCGs’. Other universal evidence was shared,
including the Right Care document,79 which showed MSK services as a source of potential savings. Drawing
on their expertise-based evidence, commissioners justified a focus on community-based solutions:
We’ve set up things in the community before we can see the cost reduction, we can see the better
patient experience. You know, we run things. I can’t give you specific examples but . . . it’s things that
people like and it saves us money . . .
Commissioners established a CRG. The CRG engaged experts, including ‘GPs, specialists, radiologists,
physiotherapists’. Role expectations were clearly outlined: the CRG was to advise on community-based
solutions to current problems with MSK services in the region [general practitioner with a special interest
(GPwSI)]. Evidences were communicated to the CRG prior to the first meeting to highlight the need to
create community-based care.
Selecting a solution
The commissioning manager framed the solution search by asking experts to identify ‘how to shift
hospital-based care to community . . . we want to use your expertise’. He described:
. . . engaging with people . . . Even if it’s not a significant change, you still need to take the hearts
and minds of people . . . some of our contracting colleagues don’t quite appreciate [that] you can’t just
simply say well, we’re changing the service as of tomorrow and expect everybody to comply. You can’t.
Commissioning manager
However, there was uncertainty in the CRG about the search and evaluation of evidence used to frame
the problem. Clinician questions about the ‘validity of this [analysis]’ were a barrier to progression, with
stakeholders re-evaluating the evidence and questioning ‘the actual proof of where it wasn’t working’
(private physiotherapist):
We’ve never had any numbers on referrals to secondary . . . what is the extent of the problem? Show
me the extent of the problem and I’ll see if we can help . . . They [CCG] did a whole load of figures
but it didn’t break it down . . . it just showed that there were a lot of referrals. It didn’t say that they
were inappropriate . . .
A NHS physiotherapist contrasted her experience with a meeting at another CCG, where:
. . . they’d done a whole piece of work on ‘this is the demographic . . . the costs [and] it felt more
robust . . . The consultants got a chance to sort of say ‘I don’t agree with that statistic and you know,
can you tell us where you got that from?’. . . So I think in terms of getting over some of the political
stuff, the use, the facts, the figures, the data . . .
Physiotherapist
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The GPwSI summarised how the CCG wanted ‘us to find out how to improve the service but they didn’t do
a lot of work on giving us information on what is actually happening’. The exception to this was one NHS
physiotherapist, who was aware of the issues but explained how she had ‘the advantage of being the staff
governor [and going] to the board meetings . . . so I understand the finances from the trust perspective’.
Despite the challenges and barriers, the CRG was tasked with sourcing and evaluating evidence about
community-based care. Physiotherapists were tasked to look specifically at local evidence and ‘consider
local evidence for self-referrals and telephone triage for patients’. Physiotherapists were also asked to
consider universal evidence, specifically to ‘review published research . . . the START back pathways’.
In both instances physiotherapists reported that the evidence was ‘difficult to evaluate’. Commissioners
also relied on clinicians to use their expertise to translate other universal evidence from NICE:
There are NICE guidelines around orthopaedics . . . they’re very long . . . it’s like reading a book! If
we’re going to . . . put in place something that works it’s got to be simple . . . [we] are the ones going
to take on board all the information . . . and distil it into something, which is sensible and simple for
people to follow . . .
Although commissioners were relying on clinicians to interpret universal evidence, this message did not
seem to be widespread. When asked about using NICE evidence in a later interview, a GPwSI commented:
Nobody looked at the evidence, specifically, properly, in the meetings . . . I was hoping . . . because I’m
there and I work in research and have a research background maybe they will ask me: ‘could you tell
us the evidence about something, could you go and summarise the evidence and tell us what works
for shoulder pain? Do injections work? Does physiotherapy work?’ . . . They didn’t do that.
GPwSI
Even if this evidence was to be explicitly used, the GPwSI commented that it was very hard to evaluate and
so there were problems related to interpretation and contextualisation:
There are guidelines on management of knee pain . . . But they are national . . . [you have to]
summarise them to help you locally which might be slightly different [across contexts] because the
services are different . . .
GPwSI
Indeed, talk between physiotherapists at meetings showed variation in the evaluation of universal
evidence. In one case, acupuncture for lower-back pain had been completely decommissioned from NHS
providers, but private providers continued to offer the service (still paid by the NHS). Private providers
commented that this was to be in ‘line with NICE’, but the NHS physiotherapist counterargued that ‘we
got the stance that the NICE evidence is not very strong’. The private physiotherapist said: ‘I told the
commissioners . . . we wouldn’t be stopping [acupuncture] because . . . it was in the NICE guidelines’.
One NHS provider said: ‘It is frustrating that you do acupuncture. There is inequity here!’.
Alongside problems with interpreting and evaluating the available evidence, there was uncertainty
about role expectations among stakeholders. Many were unclear about the purpose of their task. When
asked what the main objective of the project was, for example, the GPwSI responded: ‘I don’t know! If
you ask me now what is the objective I really don’t know. I can tell you a broad thing, which is improving
MSK service but if you tell me what does that mean . . . I don’t know’. One of the physiotherapists
commented that ‘there should be a little bit more of a framework . . . for us to work with because you
know, we could have made suggestions that were completely random‘ (private physiotherapist). A NHS
physiotherapist echoed similar sentiments, describing contrasting work done in another CCG that had:
. . . a completely different approach, they brought in a company that presented a lot of analysis . . .
then they sort of presented a model they want to work towards . . . they’re being very overt in their
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intention about the lead provider model. So that seems to be moving apace. I mean, that’s really
moving and very different feel about it.
Others felt that expert engagement was lacking and that their contribution to interpreting the evidence
was tokenistic. The GPwSI said in an interview:
The whole system needs to be aware of it [the STAR Tool] because it all works on GP, sick patient, and
applying the tool and decide this patient need to go to have this, or this patient need to go to have
that, but then you’ll need to let the physiotherapist know about this . . . But then nothing happened.
Finally, political issues around managing expert collaboration were noted. One physiotherapist described
‘so many people in the room, with so many different ideas . . . we were floundering a bit’. She noted how
‘There was quite a lot of concern over what was it going to mean . . . what would be the effect on my
business?’. Another physiotherapist said she felt ‘a little bit wary about what information to share and what
to hold back’. Another physiotherapist summarised: ‘Technically we’re in competition . . . I’m not sure the
commissioners fully appreciated that putting that group around the table had got that sort of political
aspect to it’. Whereas the physiotherapists might have felt that politics were not acknowledged, a commissioning
manager later noted:
We recognised that everybody has got a vested interest . . . we tried to make sure we got all the vested
interest in the room . . . So rather than have no agendas in the room, if you don’t have anybody with an
agenda in the room, you don’t have any expertise in the room, so better to get them all.
However, difficulties in managing collaboration once experts were ‘in the room’ were also quite evident.
Professional boundaries also caused issues around ‘what conditions ought to be included in the MSK
pathway?’ and, therefore, what evidence should be sourced. A physiotherapist reflected how they all
Realised we were talking at cross-purposes because what us physios were talking about as MSK triage
was totally different to what the commissioners understood to be MSK triage . . . because to them
MSK triage was a service . . . To us triage is what we do day in, day out.
Even with these challenges, several meetings were held so that each group could present and discuss its
evidence search. One NHS physiotherapist described this evidence sharing as necessary because ‘there
was a wealth of data there . . . And [the] presentation about ‘this is the challenge’, ‘what can we do about
it’. Some discussion, some feedback’.
Process outcomes
Quite suddenly, and in the face of ongoing hurdles around the evaluation and interpretation of evidence,
task purpose and politics, the commissioning manager attempted to reframe the problem by sharing
a drawing of a new pathway with the group. No other member of the group (apart from another
commissioning manager) had contributed to this new pathway, meaning that expert engagement was
lacking from this. In presenting the pathway, the manager suggested: ‘This is what the pathway might
look like . . . no way final’. Multiple reactions from providers resulted (based on their particular expertise).
Comments included: ‘there is nothing about diagnostics’, ‘this is clearly about cost, I am not clear what
happens’, ‘How do you oversee the appropriateness of this new pathway?’ and ‘I don’t think GPs will be
interested’. The proposed pathway also reinforced stakeholder views that their engagement was
tokenistic and that their contribution was not taken seriously:
It felt like . . . we did the work and [commissioners] ticked a box by asking us . . . but . . . in one of the
last meetings . . . it was kind of ‘oh, and by the way we’ve introduced this model with the GP provider
in the city and this is what’s happening’ . . . it was kind of well, why did you ask us to do that then?
NHS physiotherapist
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We started off with thinking . . . it’s great, they’re listening . . . the last meeting they went ‘oh, by the
way, here’s the model’. And you went: ‘actually that doesn’t bear resemblance to the work or what
you asked us to do . . .’
Private physiotherapist
The map was redrawn and shared again. The commissioning manager explained that they had looked at
another CCG (trans-local evidence) that had ‘reduced their costs since introducing the new [pathway]’.
When the pathway was recirculated, replies included: ‘your diagram looks very simple . . . I [think it is]
important [to] include patient support groups, education for GPs, decision-making tools for patients and
clinicians’ (hospital manager). At our last contact, the senior commissioning manager described the ‘next
phase would be looking at how [to] implement it and . . . scope what is included in the MSK . . . And then
we need to work out how we’re going to actually get those services in the . . . local area’. Others were less
clear, with the GPwSI commenting that ‘it became . . . like loose end. It’s not stopped, no conclusion, we
were not told what will happen next’. A NHS physiotherapist also mentioned how she was ‘a little bit
disappointed with . . . where we’ve got to . . . because it feels like everything is suspended at the moment’.
Overall, it can be said that the redesign at Horsetown CCG was not very successful. There were several
barriers to evidence use in this context. The CCG did not manage to implement changes in practice, and
stakeholders were largely dissatisfied with the process.
Horsetown summary of findings
Horsetown CCG sought to identify how community-based services could be provided, framing this in
terms of local (e.g. increases in procedures) and universal (e.g. more surgery than other places) evidence.
Work was done to engage experts in CRG, who, in turn, questioned the evidence validity. CRG members
were tasked with evaluating a variety of local (e.g. referrals to triage) and universal (e.g. START back
pathways). This evidence search was narrowly focused on community-based options. The CRG reported
that the evidence was difficult to interpret. Issues with expert collaboration and role expectations also
problematised their work. A commissioner suddenly developed a new pathway, which was met with
several criticisms. The pathway was redrawn (using trans-local evidence). At our last contact we were told
that more work would be needed (e.g. defining MSK) to take the pathway forward. The redesign process
for this CCG is summarised in Figure 6. Guidance for reading process maps is shown in Figure 3.
Stopton Clinical Commissioning Group
Case study overview
We conducted interviews and observations at Stopton CCG with participants: a senior commissioning
manager, the head of therapies, a clinical assessment team lead, a GP, an orthopedics consultant, a
rheumatology consultant, a physiotherapist and a hospital representative. Stopton had been working on
the lower limb MSK pathway and wanted to create ‘a gold standard [with] outcomes [built] into contract’
(report). Once we arranged to do fieldwork at the CCG, however, it had decided that it needed to address
issues with its triage service before tackling the whole pathway. As such, the triage is the focus of the case
study. The team had been working together for about 15 months, believing that ‘the patients might not
be going through the right service’ (senior commissioning manager). In terms of the pilot, there was
already a triage in place but the team felt that it was necessary to redesign it.
A transformation group was established once issues with care and capacity were recognised. We followed
the team for just under 1 year. During this time, they discussed a mix of evidences, many of which were
provided by the team lead. They were hampered by a lack of funding but still managed to design and
implement a new pilot. There were several challenges to evaluating the effectiveness of the pilot. At our last
point of contact, the team were conducting further evaluation and waiting to present it to the next board.
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Agenda formation
A triage service had been established in Stopton in 2009 in which patients could refer directly (or be
referred by a GP) to a MSK service (e.g. physiotherapy). This type of triage is intended to stop patients
going to the hospital unnecessarily and so improve their care experiences. At the same time, it prevents
unnecessary hospital care and so, as a by-product, reduces costs and addresses capacity issues. At our
first meeting, the transformation manager at Stopton explained that the existing MSK triage service had
‘played its part when it was created’ but there were some problems with it. Issues were framed in terms
of care and capacity and based on local evidence, which suggested that more patients than anticipated
were using the self-referral option and that the GPs were still doing a lot of work:
Physio was completely over the planned demand so they started to struggle. The GPs were still being
inundated by MSK . . . they would just be referred on, sometimes appropriately, sometimes
inappropriately . . .
Transformation manager
The clinical assessment team lead described how local evidence was gathered from ‘a couple of
engagement sessions’ in which clinicians mapped out the current pathway, looked at ‘where the
bottlenecks were’ and considered ‘how we could actually change’. At meetings, stakeholders seemed
to agree that there was a problem that needed to be addressed (i.e. the frame was strong).
Because the contract for the current triage service was ‘running out’, a group of providers was engaged in
discussions. From this group, a ‘transformation team’ was established with the aim of trialling a new triage
‘this side of Christmas’ (transformation manager). This team engaged experts who contributed to
designing a better triage service (transformation manager). Although the commissioners initiated the triage,
it was hoped that the transformation team would be the ones to manage the ongoing collaborations
deemed necessary to ‘drive it forward, steer it’ (transformation manager). In a later interview, the clinical
assessment team lead commented that this engagement and ongoing collaboration with GPs, patients
and providers meant that:
. . . there was common ground . . . here I think it’s been more like an open discussion of actually how
we can all move forward together. And I think that’s why it’s been so successful in actually being able
to do the change because it, you know, nothing has been imposed, it has been consultation . . .
Selecting a solution
Recognising issues with the MSK triage, the team set about discussing a new pilot. The clinical assessment team
lead had clear role in sourcing evidence for evaluation, including ‘article[s] in physio journal[s]’ as well
as challenges set by the NHS and other bodies (e.g. the Prime Minister’s Challenge). The local evidence
showed ‘some GPs have MSK expertise, some don’t’, meaning variation in care (head of therapies). The
team decided to move away from GPs being the first contact; instead, patients would go straight to ‘an
MSK centre, [and they] would receive the same input, same level of expertise and . . . the same outputs’
(head of therapies).
Local evidence suggested that there would be no objections ‘because in this area . . . we actually haven’t
got any . . . GP with special interest in musculoskeletal’ (clinical assessment team lead). Trans-local
evidence about another CCG that had trained receptionists to triage patients was also used. The script
contained ‘red flags’ that sent patients to an urgent clinic, a general MSK clinic or a clinician (clinical
assessment team lead). Other trans-local evidence was also discussed, with stakeholders describing how
similar services had been implemented: ‘in Berkshire . . . Pennine Trust do something . . . trying to think,
was it Surrey? No, no, Lake District . . . in Cumbria’ (therapies lead). Taking these evidences together,
stakeholders concluded that the proposed ‘type of model will work quite well . . . you’ve got to look at your
demographics of your patients, also your GPs and everything and try and get the best fit of what actually
happens’ (therapies lead).
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The team talked about running the pilot at meeting, including discussions of shared time frames. They
agreed ‘6 to 8 weeks in one practice’ (transformation manager). Some felt that this was insufficient,
commenting that ‘if it’s too complicated to do it in more than one [practice] it might be too complicated
anyway’ (hospital representative). This was countered with ‘it’s not that it’s too complicated, it’s a resource
issue’ (clinical assessment team lead). Resources were limited at Stopton because they had applied for
money to support the redesign but had been unsuccessful. This meant that ‘there was no extra funding to
actually do this, we were actually doing it on existing staff and whatever’. Thus, they agreed to ‘scale
back’ some of their plans (transformation manager).
They also talked about reactions. The GP drew on expertise-based evidence to say that it would be ‘good
for patients’ and so would be welcomed by his GP peers. He expected some contention, but felt that this
would be minimal because ‘it’s not about replacing GPs, it’s about modern medicine’. The team agreed
that GPs would ‘probably be OK’ with self-referred patients. The transformation manager later noted how
important the GP was in engaging ‘his colleagues . . . making sure they are happy’. The GP also allowed
the pilot to run in his practice, thereby allowing further local evidence to be sourced and evaluated.
Last, the team discussed how they would evaluate the pilot to understand its efficacy. They wanted to get
both qualitative patient feedback and comparisons against local data, thus creating evidence as they went.
The former (patient feedback) was viewed as ‘difficult to capture’, but they felt that they were fortunate
with the latter because:
. . . compared to others we get quite a lot of really good data so we get really detailed referral data
[on] which elements of the service have they [the patients] gone into. So have they gone into triage?
Have they gone into physio?
Transformation manager
The transformation manager explained that much of the evidence would be collected by the clinical
assessment team lead because she was ‘really good at keeping her own track of patients’. As such, this
individual had a clear role in bringing evidence to the table. The same individual benefited the team in
terms of managing collaboration among stakeholders too, particularly because ‘she is that kind of link
between primary care and secondary care’ (transformation manager).
Process outcomes
Overall, the pilot progressed as planned. The transformation manager attributed this to a ‘subset of the
community contract already [being in place]’. She commented that it was not ‘a big bang change’ that
involved ‘moving care from the hospital’ because this type of change had already been done in original
triage and so stakeholders were not worried about risk. Stakeholders described how they conducted ‘an
assessment, and then tried to actually start [patients] off on self-management, and then signpost them to
the most appropriate management option’ (clinical assessment team lead). They also collected local
evidence to help them evaluate the pilot:
We kept a record of where we sent patients to . . . Then we entered it into a database after we’d
done the 3 months’ trial . . . They also sent out patient satisfaction questionnaires . . . on the day of
the assessment . . .
Clinical assessment team lead
The evidence showed that pilot was not as successful as expected. Patients were still going ‘to the hospital
because they know the hospital’ (therapies lead). The transformation manager explained this pattern with
a shopping metaphor, where people think ‘I always shop at [supermarket] but now there’s a corner shop
. . . I might try it but actually I’m going to go back to what I know’. They also had issues interpreting the
data because of ‘a lot of hidden activity’. Broadly, their local evidence showed that a lot of patients
referred into the ‘self-management’, which could mean anything from ‘advice and exercises, advice on
diets, advice on what to do with their condition . . . let’s see how you go’.
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They presented their results to the ‘Service Development Committee’ (SDC), which has responsibility for
deciding next steps. The transformation manager described how the committee would have:
[T]he chance to question [their data] . . . And then . . . decide what they want to do . . . they could turn
around and say actually . . . we’ve looked at this and we don’t want to do it. And then it’s back to the
drawing board. And they’ll probably say we want you to come back with some other options or we
want you to work with the existing model . . .
The SDC’s judgement was based on expertise, especially ‘in terms of what’s bothering them, does this
address it?’ (transformation manager). In this instance, its judgement was that the team should ‘do a
supplementary, week-long perspective audit to find out what this hidden demand is so that we can
accurately cost up the service’ (transformation manager). Essentially, it was not convinced of the pilot’s
efficacy. The team planned to source more evidence, suggesting that with ‘a bit more data we can make
a robust, cost-effective case for the model that they are happy with’ (transformation manager).
Overall, the project at Stopton CCG was largely successful. Although it had issues interpreting evidence,
this related to evidence collected during the pilot. It achieved its objectives, and stakeholders were largely
satisfied with the process, which is indicated by the fact that they were willing to persist beyond the
SDC’s rejection.
Stopton summary of findings
Stopton CCG sought to pilot a new MSK triage. It used local and universal evidence to frame this as a care
issue and did a lot of work to engage experts and manage collaboration. There were also clear roles, especially
with the clinical assessment team lead sourcing and evaluating the evidences. The team used trans-local
evidence to identify how the new pilot would run, and, bar some minor challenges, they seemed to be on
board with the pilot. The transformation manager saw this as resulting from the fact that there was no real
risk involved. The team ran the pilot and collected evaluation data. At our last contact, they had presented this
to the SDC, which had requested an additional audit.
The redesign process for this CCG is summarised in Figure 7. Guidance for reading process maps is shown
in Figure 3.
DOI: 10.3310/hsdr05180 HEALTH SERVICES AND DELIVERY RESEARCH 2017 VOL. 5 NO. 18
© Queen’s Printer and Controller of HMSO 2017. This work was produced by Swan et al. under the terms of a commissioning contract issued by the Secretary of State for Health.
This issue may be freely reproduced for the purposes of private research and study and extracts (or indeed, the full report) may be included in professional journals provided that
suitable acknowledgement is made and the reproduction is not associated with any form of advertising. Applications for commercial reproduction should be addressed to: NIHR
Journals Library, National Institute for Health Research, Evaluation, Trials and Studies Coordinating Centre, Alpha House, University of Southampton Science Park, Southampton
SO16 7NS, UK.
49
Funding
‘. 
. .
 S
o
m
e 
G
Ps
 
h
av
e 
M
SK
 
ex
p
er
ti
se
, s
o
m
e 
d
o
n
’t
 . 
. .
’ (
L)
‘A
rt
ic
le
[s
] 
in
 
jo
u
rn
al
[s
] 
. .
 . 
th
e 
p
ri
m
e 
m
in
is
te
r’
s 
ch
al
le
n
g
e’
 (
U
)
‘. 
. .
 E
n
g
ag
em
en
t 
se
ss
io
n
s 
sh
o
w
ed
 
w
h
er
e 
th
e 
b
o
tt
le
n
ec
ks
 
w
er
e’
 (
L)
‘A
 b
it
 m
o
re
 d
at
a 
w
e 
ca
n
 m
ak
e 
a 
ro
b
u
st
, 
co
st
-e
ff
ec
ti
ve
 c
as
e
 f
o
r 
th
e 
m
o
d
el
’ (
L)
‘. 
. .
 P
h
ys
io
 w
as
 o
ve
r
p
la
n
n
ed
 d
em
an
d
 
so
 t
h
ey
 s
ta
rt
ed
 
to
 s
tr
u
g
g
le
’ (
L)
Lo
ca
l e
vi
d
en
ce
 
sh
o
w
ed
 is
su
es
 w
it
h
 
ca
re
 a
n
d
 c
ap
ac
it
y
Ev
id
en
ce
 
b
ro
u
g
h
t 
b
y 
te
am
 le
ad
Ev
id
en
ce
 
b
ro
u
g
h
t 
b
y 
G
P
Several 
challenges
Tr
an
sf
o
rm
at
io
n
 
te
am
 e
st
ab
lis
h
ed
‘B
er
ks
h
ir
e 
. .
 . 
Pe
n
n
in
e 
d
o
 s
o
m
et
h
in
g
 . 
. .
 
Su
rr
ey
 . 
. .
 L
ak
e 
D
is
tr
ic
t 
. .
 . 
C
u
m
b
ri
a’
 (
E)
‘. 
. .
 It
’s
 n
o
t 
ab
o
u
t
re
p
la
ci
n
g
 G
Ps
 . 
. .
it
’s
 g
o
o
d
 f
o
r 
p
at
ie
n
ts
 . 
. .
’ (
E)
W
o
rk
in
g
 o
n
 
fu
rt
h
er
 e
va
lu
at
io
n
O
b
je
ct
iv
e 
m
et
: 
p
ilo
t 
d
es
ig
n
ed
 a
n
d
 
im
p
le
m
en
te
d
Ev
id
en
ce
 
u
se
 
is
su
es
R
ej
ec
te
d
 
b
y 
SD
C
Pr
o
ce
ss
 o
u
tc
o
m
es
So
lu
ti
o
n
 s
el
ec
ti
o
n
A
g
en
d
a 
fo
rm
at
io
n
C
ap
ac
it
y 
an
d
 c
ar
e
(E
F)
 
Tr
an
sf
o
rm
at
io
n
 
te
am
 (
EE
)
G
P
(M
R
E)
Interpreting
data
Patient
resistance
St
ak
eh
o
ld
er
s 
sa
ti
sf
ie
d
C
lin
ic
al
 
as
se
ss
m
en
t 
te
am
 le
ad
(M
R
E,
 S
EE
)
FI
G
U
R
E
7
R
ed
es
ig
n
p
ro
ce
ss
at
St
o
p
to
n
C
C
G
.
SELECTED CASES
NIHR Journals Library www.journalslibrary.nihr.ac.uk
50
Chapter 6 Cross-case comparisons
Overview
The second objective of our research was to compare and contrast across cases in order to gain insights
into capabilities for evidence use by commissioning organisations. In doing so, we endeavoured, also, to
understand qualitatively how and why variations in evidence use occur in practice. We began this with our
coding exercise (see Chapter 2), which used the whole data set to identify what forms of evidence were
being used by CCGs and which kinds of capabilities actually mattered to innovation (the service redesign)
process. We have presented these for each of our cases above (and in Appendices 1–4). In this chapter,
we extend this analysis by directly comparing patterns of evidence use across the eight cases. We then
consider the presence and absence of capabilities across cases, before summarising the outcomes.
Cross-case comparisons are summarised in Table 6.
TABLE 6 Cross-case comparison
CCG
Seaport Greenland Rutterford Chelsea Coalfield Shire Horsetown Stopton
Evidence use
Agenda formation L, U, E L, U L, U L, U, E, TL L, U L, U L, U L
Solution
selection
L, U, E L, U, E, TL L, U, E U, E, TL L, U, E L, U L, U, E L, U, E
Process
outcomes
– – – L, U, E TL L TL L
Capabilities
Engaging experts ✓ ✗ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Managing expert
collaboration
– ✗ ✓ – ✓ ✗ ✗ –
Effective framing ✓ ✗ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✗ ✓
Managing roles
and expectations
✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ – ✗ ✗ ✓
Selecting and
evaluating
evidence
✓ ✓ ✓ ✗ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Outcomes
Evidence use ✓ ✗ ✗ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✗ ✗
Objectives met ✓ ✗ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✗ ✓
Satisfied
stakeholders
✓ ✗ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✗ ✗ ✓
✓, present in the data; ✗, not applied/not achieved; –, not recorded in the data; E, expertise based; L, local; TL, trans-local;
U, universal.
DOI: 10.3310/hsdr05180 HEALTH SERVICES AND DELIVERY RESEARCH 2017 VOL. 5 NO. 18
© Queen’s Printer and Controller of HMSO 2017. This work was produced by Swan et al. under the terms of a commissioning contract issued by the Secretary of State for Health.
This issue may be freely reproduced for the purposes of private research and study and extracts (or indeed, the full report) may be included in professional journals provided that
suitable acknowledgement is made and the reproduction is not associated with any form of advertising. Applications for commercial reproduction should be addressed to: NIHR
Journals Library, National Institute for Health Research, Evaluation, Trials and Studies Coordinating Centre, Alpha House, University of Southampton Science Park, Southampton
SO16 7NS, UK.
51
Evidence use
As shown, local, universal, trans-local and expertise-based evidences are used together in redesign work.
Evidence use is shown in the process maps. Rather than one type of evidence being more ‘authoritative’,
with regard to carrying more weight and legitimacy, different evidences are used, often in tandem, in
decisions. During the agenda formation and solution selection episodes, multiple forms of evidence were
apparent in every case. Local evidence was often judged against universal evidence. At Greenland CCG,
for example, local and universal evidences to show ‘amputation rates were quite high . . . when compared
nationally’ (transformation manager). In some cases, expertise-based and trans-local evidences were also
used. When describing process outcomes episodes, stakeholders made rather fewer references to evidence
use. This finding should be considered with caution because only just over half of our CCGs (n = 5)
actually began to implement changes. Many stakeholders also described plans to implement or pilot new
models and then evaluate efficacy, so that process outcome episodes become more about creating new
evidence than about implementation per se. This reflects the open-ended nature of the decision processes
in this context; projects to improve services were rarely ‘finished’ but were ongoing endeavours in which
work generated new forms of evidence and judgements that changed, or sometimes halted temporarily,
redesign efforts.
This open-endedness of management decisions raises challenging questions about how to assess and
understand variation ‘decision outcomes’, in our case in terms of whether or not they are evidence based.
In other words, if ‘outcomes’ are continuously emerging, then decision-making is never quite complete,
which makes it difficult to judge the efficacy of evidence use. We can, however, compare cases in terms of
the processes themselves and see patterns in the extent to which (in the time frame observed) these are
relatively smooth (or not) in so far as they allow actors to take action and proceed to the next step. Table 6
provides a summary of evidence use across cases and across episodes. In sum, the patterns of evidence use
are as follows:
l Because it was used during agenda formation and solution selection in all eight CCGs, it can be said
that local evidence plays an important role during initial redesign episodes. Of the five CCGs that
managed to actually implement their service redesign, local evidence was mentioned in three. This was
largely in relation to conducting evaluation (e.g. Chelsea CCG) or understanding local needs in more
detail (e.g. Shire CCG, Stopton CCG).
l Universal evidence was used during agenda formation in seven CCGs. Stopton CCG was the only CCG
not to explicitly use universal evidence in this episode. Universal evidence was also used during solution
selection in all eight CCGs. Therefore, universal evidence is equally important during initial redesign
episodes. Chelsea CCG was the only one to refer to universal evidence during process outcome episodes.
l In all CCGs, bar Shire, expertise-based evidence was explicitly used in solution selection episodes.
Interestingly, expertise-based evidence was relied on in just two CCGs in agenda formation and process
outcome episodes. This evidence was used to identify the problem (Seaport CCG) and to push a better
way of doing things forward (Chelsea CCG). Expertise was then used to guide practice changes at both
CCGs. Both Seaport and Chelsea CCGs were implementing community-based diabetes care (with
Chelsea explicitly mimicking Seaport). Both were also led by a diabetes consultant, which may explain
the emphasis on expertise-based evidence in these contexts.
l Last, trans-local evidence was used during agenda formation at Chelsea CCG, during solution selection
at Greenland and Chelsea CCGs, and during process outcomes Coalfield and Horsetown CCGs. The
reasons for using trans-local evidence varied, however. At Coalfield CCG trans-local evidence was used
in terms of evaluating outcomes using examples from other countries, whereas at Horsetown this
evidence was used to justify the new model.
Local and universal evidences are most commonly used, perhaps because CCGs are under pressure to
implement evidence based (usually meaning universal evidence) in context. Whereas previous research
suggests that local ‘trumps’ universal evidence, our findings suggest that the two operate together. We
saw many instances in which local evidence is judged against a backdrop of universal evidence (albeit not
CROSS-CASE COMPARISONS
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always formally presented) and becomes ‘evidential’ because discrepancies are seen that indicate there is a
problem. Thus, our findings suggest that local evidence needs universal evidence in order to be interpreted,
and, on the flipside, universal evidence needs local evidence in order to be made to fit the context. Without
local evidence and expertise, universal evidence lacks precision and applicability.
Expertise-based evidence was used across episodes but appeared to become particularly important in
solution selection. Here, individuals’ experience of ‘what actually works’ played a particularly important role
in concretising designs ‘on paper’ into designs ‘in use’. Hence, in those cases where we saw relatively
more positive outcomes, we also saw the design being worked through, and championed, by individuals
with significant experience and legitimate authority among other groups that were to be relied on to
implement (or pilot) the redesign. Trans-local evidence was used across multiple episodes, acting as useful
heuristics or short-cuts to redesign efforts. However, although it was often assumed that these were based
on ‘good evidence’ (hence the label ‘best practice’), this was not always the case. This suggests that
trans-local evidence, although helpful, needs to be interrogated and unpacked, not simply mimicked, or its
‘evidential’ qualities taken at face value, especially as the local conditions (e.g. population demographics,
public health economics) vary significantly.
Capabilities for evidence use
Capabilities that enable evidence use in redesign work included ‘sourcing and evaluating evidence’, ‘effective
framing’, ‘engaging experts’, ‘managing expert collaboration’ and ‘managing roles and expectations’. We
distinguish between the presence of a capability, the failure to apply a capability and the absence of a
capability in the data in Table 6. When a capability was present in the data, a tick is used (✓). A dash (–)
indicates that the capability was not shown in the data, while a cross (✗) indicates that a capability was not
applied. We see the distinction between failure to apply a capability and the absence of it in the data as
important, because all capabilities may not be needed for evidence use in certain contexts.
In sum:
l Rutterford was the only CCG in which all five capabilities were shown.
l Seaport and Stopton CCGs showed four of the five capabilities. Here, ‘managing expert collaborations’ was
not prevalent in the data. It may not be necessary to manage collaborations if issues do not arise, which
would explain the absence of this capability in CCGs where multiple other capabilities were recorded.
l Coalfield CCG also showed four capabilities, bar ‘managing roles and expectations’, which was not
recorded in the data, perhaps because the group leading the redesign had been working together over
a long period of time. Because of this, roles and expectations may have been established, which would
remove the need for them to be managed.
l Chelsea CCG showed three of the five capabilities. ‘Managing expert collaboration’ did not appear in the
data, perhaps because the consultant led the project almost single-handedly. As mentioned, our study
missed prior discussions, and perhaps disagreements, about community-based care. During our fieldwork
such agreements had already been reached. ‘Sourcing and evaluating evidence’ was also not achieved at
this CCG, but this may have been less of a concern because they had decided to mimic Seaport CCG.
l Shire CCG also showed three of the five capabilities, but in this case efforts to manage expert
collaboration and manage roles and expectations were not successful.
l Both Greenland and Horsetown CCGs showed two of the five capabilities. Both failed to ‘manage
collaborations’ or apply ‘effective framing’. Greenland CCGs also failed to engage experts’, while
Horsetown CCG failed to ‘manage roles and expectations’.
Certain capabilities also appeared to be particularly important in certain episodes of work. Effective
framing, for example, was noted in both agenda formation and solution selection episodes in those cases
that had relatively positive outcomes. Expert engagement, where observed, also occurred on early in the
process in relatively more successful cases. In most instances, a problem was identified and then redesigns
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leaders worked to engage other relevant stakeholders in fine-tuning their understanding of the central
issues. Sourcing and evaluating evidence, managing expert collaborations, and managing roles and
expectations all tended to be important when stakeholders were working to select a solution.
It is important to note that the capabilities we observed, while distinguished analytically, were also linked.
For example, the way in which problems and solutions were framed also had implications for engaging
experts, managing collaboration and sourcing evidence. Here, a ‘blank sheet’ approach helped to engage
active contributions of experts and also helped to widen the search for information, because it did not
pre-prescribe a particular course of action. However, using a completely ‘blank sheet’ also had drawbacks,
leaving experts puzzled as to quite what their roles were, opening up room for conflict and ongoing
disagreement around what actually comprised evidence, and generating inertia. Effective framing (blank
but not too blank) appeared, in contrast, to let stakeholders set aside their own interests and values, which
are at least partly responsible for failed collaborations, but also to contribute expertise and information
focused on a shared goal (e.g. the patient). Our findings suggest, then, that it is not just the presence or
absence of a particular capability that matters, but, rather, the ways in which capabilities are used together
in particular contexts. As seen, lack of capability in one area (e.g. managing roles and expectations at
Coalfield CCG) may not preclude positive outcomes where contextual conditions substitute for it in some
way (e.g. in that case by having a long-established group that already had clear role expectations).
Outcomes
As discussed, commissioning decisions are characteristically open-ended and iterative (as, we would argue,
are most complex management decisions). Therefore, there is often no clear end (or start) point. Here, a
process approach is useful as it reminds us that ‘outcomes’ are always in flux (and can be ‘inputs’, if the
focus is to explain the next step). This means that the success or otherwise of ‘outcomes’ is always
subjective, being judged relative to where one is (or hoped to be) at that particular point in the process.
Nonetheless, we can use qualitative indicators to compare cases in terms of whether or not process
outcomes were relatively successful, when judged against actors’ own expectations. We thus assessed
outcomes qualitatively in terms of evidence use, objectives met and stakeholder experiences, as shown in
Table 6.
Evidence use
To evaluate process outcomes, we consider, first, the extent to which the project team managed to
identify, select, evaluate/interrogate and use different kinds of evidence, as relevant to their redesign work.
We also consider whether or not major barriers to evidence use, identified in the case studies above (e.g.
access, political stand-offs or difficulties of evaluation), were effectively overcome. Evidence use is judged
as effective if a CCG redesign team used a range of evidences to inform their decisions. It would not be
effective, however, if a team focused narrowly on certain pieces of evidence and/or were inflexible about,
or ignored, additional sources of information.
In four cases (Seaport, Chelsea, Shire and Coalfield CCGs), barriers to evidence use were relatively few. In all
of these cases, we identified effective framing of the problems too. Effective framing of the search for
solutions was also noted at both Seaport and Coalfield CCGs, where a partially ‘blank sheet’ was used to
guide the search for information. Although the blank sheet was not used at Shire CCG, evidence use was
proactively managed via the creation of subgroups (e.g. a working group and a GP group). While Chelsea
CCG showed no explicit efforts to manage evidence use, this redesign occurred against the backdrop of a
trust-wide agreement to address diabetes care by reducing demands on hospital capacity. Because this
agreement had already been reached when we commenced data collection, it is possible that disagreements
and issues around evidence use were just not captured by our research.
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Key actors in Horsetown, Greenland, Stopton and Rutterford CCGs all reported significant issues with
evidence use. In Horsetown CCG, for example, actors reported issues with the applicability and usability of
universal evidence. For example: ‘There are NICE guidelines around orthopaedics . . . they’re very long . . .
it’s like reading a book!’. And:
There are guidelines on management of knee pain . . . they are national . . . [you have to] summarise
them to help you locally which might be slightly different [across contexts] because the services are
different . . .
Unique problems were reported at Greenland and Stopton CCGs. Evidence use at Greenland CCG became
a problem after a solution was selected and the project had been put on hold. The CSU manager described
evaluating the evidence that had been considered in the first iteration of the project with a view to
understanding if there was a clinical need for changes. In Stopton CCG, issues arose with evaluating the
evidence that had been collected from its own pilot project, rather than external evidence.
Interestingly, we noted effective framing (both problem and solution search) at Rutterford CCG. Stakeholders
at this CCG also used a blank sheet approach and created subgroups. Yet issues with evidence use were still
reported. In this case, actors described problems with data quality, and having too much information, which
meant that they failed to reach an agreement.
Meeting objectives
In addition to evidence use, we considered whether or not objectives of redesign projects were met (to
date, at least) against actors’ own expectations. These objectives varied: two CCGs had sought to create
a report about how changes could be made (Rutterford and Horsetown CCG), and the remaining six CCGs
(Seaport, Chelsea, Shire, Coalfield, Stopton and Greenland) had sought to implement actual changes in
service delivery.
Project objectives were clearly met in four of our CCGs (Seaport, Chelsea, Shire and Coalfield). We also
noted fewer issues with evidence use in these cases. Objectives were also met in Rutterford CCG, however,
even though evidence use had seemed quite problematic. Perhaps proactively managing these issues
allowed Rutterford CCG to meet its primary objective (to create a report to guide change) and to begin
making changes in practice.
Objectives were only partially met in Horsetown CCG. In this case, a report was produced as per the
original plan, but commissioners developed it ‘quite suddenly’ and in the midst of ongoing stakeholder
disagreements. Thus, here there remained doubts among some team members about whether or not
objectives had actually been met as expected.
Stopton CCG had met its objective of implementing a pilot triage. However, the board decided to block
the wider implementation of the triage, pending further data collection, leading to quite some frustration
within the team. Stakeholders were actively engaged with this data collection and so it is possible that
broader practice changes would have been witnessed if our study had been over a longer time frame.
Last, Greenland CCG’s project was stalled when the GP lead and CSU manager left the CCG, and so
objectives were not met at the time of our fieldwork. The CCG was, however, considering the clinical need
for changing pathways, which the original redesign team had felt to be well established.
Stakeholder experiences
The last outcome indicator relates to stakeholders’ experiences, specifically the extent to which key actors
felt satisfied or dissatisfied with redesign projects. Of course, in the following, we must bear in mind that
this may link to a number of things others than whether or not evidence was used in their decision-making
(e.g. to unexpected shifts in priorities at board level). Across the majority of CCGs (Seaport, Coalfield,
Chelsea, Stopton and Rutterford), most stakeholders we spoke to during interviews and in follow-up told
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us that they were generally satisfied and had been able to overcome major challenges faced during
redesign work. At Seaport CCG, for example, the diabetes nurse described quite succinctly that, after the
redesign, everyone was ‘doing what [they were] paid for . . . [and] people weren’t falling through the net’.
Similarly, at Stopton CCG, the clinical assessment team lead commented that they ‘move[d] forward
together as a group . . . it’s been more like an open discussion . . . And I think that’s why it’s been so
successful . . . because . . . nothing has been imposed, it has been consultation’.
In other CCGs, however, stakeholders were very openly dissatisfied with the redesign process. Horsetown
commissioners produced a report, and stakeholders reported that the project was left at a ‘like loose
end . . . no conclusion, we were not told what will happen next’ (GPwSI). A NHS physiotherapist also
mentioned how she was ‘a little bit disappointed with . . . because it feels like everything is suspended at
the moment’. Interestingly, stakeholders at Shire CCG were not at all satisfied with the redesign process,
especially as the project had been put out to tender. They described how, in implementing the new
pathway, they were ‘firefighting and ironing out the crinkles’ (clinical therapies lead). They did say,
however, say that this was ‘less and less every day’, and that they remained optimistic with ‘lots of great
ideas about what we’ll want to do and how we want to deliver it’ (clinical service manager).
Comparing across cases
Objectives were broadly met in Seaport, Chelsea, Coalfield, Rutterford, Stopton and Shire CCGs. Of these,
Seaport, Chelsea and Coalfield CCGs appeared to have the best outcomes. They met their objectives, we
found few issues with evidence use, and there were broadly satisfied stakeholders. These outcomes occurred
even when certain capabilities were not recorded [Seaport CCG (managing expert collaboration) and
Coalfield CCG (managing roles and expectations)], suggesting that capabilities may not always be necessary.
Rutterford CCG demonstrated all five capabilities. Here, issues with evidence use were reported but overcome.
Similarly, Stopton CCG showed four capabilities, but there were issues with evidence use. This case is slightly
different from the others because the issues with evidence use arose from data it had collected to evaluate its
own triage. In both of these CCGs, however, objectives were met and stakeholders were satisfied. Shire CCG
showed only three capabilities, but still achieved its objectives and used evidence effectively. Stakeholders were
largely dissatisfied, however, especially as the project was put to external tender.
Greenland and Horsetown CCGs experienced the worst outcomes; both failed to meet objectives, use
evidence or satisfy stakeholders. Both lacked framing and managing collaboration capabilities. Greenland
CCG failed to engage experts, while Horsetown CCG failed to search for and evaluate evidence. Thus,
although redesign projects may certainly fail for all sorts of reasons, our data indicate that CCGs with
fewer capabilities also experienced worse outcomes with regard to the redesign process overall. These data
must be treated with caution, of course, as larger studies would be needed to evaluate the strength of any
links between the two factors. Two main propositions can be drawn from these findings:
1. There is an inverse relationship between applying evidence use capabilities and redesign outcomes.
That is, CCGs with fewer capabilities report poorer outcomes.
2. Context matters. The absence of some capabilities to use evidence did not guarantee poor service
redesign outcomes. Rather, using capabilities as appropriate to the particular context seemed more
important with regard to outcomes.
We conclude, then, that a tightly prescriptive ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach to capabilities for evidence use in
redesign work is not appropriate. Instead, consideration is needed of what capabilities are required in
given particular contextual contingencies.
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Chapter 7 Toolkit development
Introduction
In this chapter, we report work on our development of a toolkit aimed at helping commissioning
organisations improve capabilities to use evidence. To this point our research has identified four categories
of evidence and particular capabilities to use evidence (Table 7).
We see these capabilities as being able to be nurtured, both at the level of the commissioning teams
working on redesign projects and at the level of the organisation. Accordingly, the design of the toolkit
takes two target audiences into account: (1) those responsible for the overall functioning and management
of commissioning organisations (usually director level staff), and (2) those managing/leading local redesign
projects (usually middle-level commissioning leads and the teams they assemble). We develop in our toolkit
a structured set of questions aimed at each of these groups. The intention is not to prescribe a particular
course of action, but to allow each of these groups to (1) reflect on how well they use evidence and
(2) identify opportunities to improve their own capabilities to use evidence.
The toolkit may also allow practitioners to track the development and maturity of their own capabilities
over time (e.g. during different stages of a project). Owing to its interactive features, the toolkit will
prompt practitioners to think critically about the role of evidence in redesign projects. Our toolkit is centred
on the five capabilities identified from the CCG data (see Chapter 4): sourcing and evaluating evidence,
engaging experts, effective framing, managing roles and expectations, and managing expert collaboration.
TABLE 7 Summary of evidence and capabilities
Simple definition
Evidence
Universal Information produced through formalised or scientific investigations in institutions and
organisations deemed to have legitimate authority
Local Information produced and collected locally within CCGs or their immediate locale was also,
and very often, treated as evidence
Trans-local Information produced in other local areas and taken up as evidence in the current locale,
e.g. examples of ‘best’ or ‘good’ practice from elsewhere
Expertise based Information based on the experiences and expertise of individuals could also be treated as
evidence
Capabilities
Sourcing and evaluating
evidence
Making efforts to source and evaluate evidences relevant across episodes of redesign work
Engaging experts Ensuring individuals with relevant education, qualifications, and experiences are involved in
the redesign
Effective framing Constructing and negotiating shared meanings
Managing roles and
expectations
Considering what stakeholders expect, and are expected to do, in redesigns in order to
avoid incongruence, conflict or ambiguity
Managing expert
collaboration
Efforts to overcome boundaries, politics, and anxiety associated with different professional
groups working together
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Designing the toolkit
We developed our toolkit using feedback from stakeholders and examples in the existing data. In terms of
stakeholders, we held two workshops to elicit feedback from individuals external to the research team. The
first workshop took place on 1 March 2016, in which a small group of SSAP, including patient representatives,
participated. We made a short presentation outlining the aims and objectives of the toolkit, including a set of
questions targeted at different toolkit users. Stakeholders suggested we should make the following changes:
l remove the word ‘diagnostic’ from the toolkit, as this may have misleading connotations
l target different types of users within the toolkit (e.g. director-level CCG managers and redesign project
leads) because these individuals will have different interactions and understandings of evidence and
capabilities
l simplify and reword the language used in some questions to increase usability
l include the criterion ‘assessing local applicability and relevance of evidence’ to make clear the purpose
of the toolkit.
On the basis of this feedback, other offline comments and emergent findings regarding the capabilities,
we revamped the toolkit questionnaire. In addition to using stakeholder feedback, we looked at examples
of toolkits developed by academics for practitioner audiences, including the normalisation process toolkit
(http://normalizationprocess.org). This toolkit includes a number of user-friendly features, such as a radar
plot, which visualises answers and enables users to understand potential strengths and weaknesses (in that
context, implementation of new technology). The radar plot can also be used to visualise ‘performance’
against specific capabilities (e.g. showing high ‘expert engagement’ vs. low ‘effective framing’). We decided
to include a radar plot in our toolkit to enable users to get a sense of how well prepared their organisations
and teams are to use evidence. A consequence of this decision is that item wording needs to elicit answers
that are not simply ‘yes’/’no’ or open-ended, but reflect different levels of capability (e.g. Likert-scale types
of questions). We therefore took particular care about how items were phrased to make the production of
a radar plot possible.
Against this background, we presented an updated toolkit at our second national workshop (18 May
2016). This was a much larger workshop, comprising 46 participants with backgrounds in a number of
NHS organisations, including CLAHRCs, Academic Health Science Networks, NHS commissioning policy
units, CSUs and foundation trusts. We presented the findings of our research and then used interactive
exercises to elicit participants’ feedback about the toolkit. After we made a short presentation describing
the toolkit, the workshop participants were split into five groups. Each group was asked to examine three
or four questions from the toolkit for approximately 20 minutes and offer their feedback on these. We also
supplied each group with sticky notes and asked them to give comments on question sets. For example,
one group was asked to comment on the set of questions concerning ‘managing expert collaboration’,
while another was asked to debate and discuss the appropriateness and practical usefulness of the set of
questions concerning ‘engaging the expert’.
Owing to the interactive nature of this workshop, the feedback we gathered was very rich and immensely
helpful. The workshop participants made specific and constructive comments on all aspects of the toolkit.
The participant comments and suggested questions per capability are summarised in Table 8 and were
used to inform the final toolkit development. Feedback informed significant changes, and the resulting
toolkit is presented in Appendix 5. This toolkit would be accompanied by a summary table that defines
different types of evidence and different capabilities with concrete examples.
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Chapter summary
In this chapter, we described our toolkit for improving evidence use in commissioning. The development of this
toolkit was shaped by our research findings, by the literature and by feedback from our SSAP and workshop
participants. We have described the importance of appraising capabilities for evidence use, both within the
team and at the organisational level. We have selected a radar plot tool to enable easy interpretation among
users. It is important to note that this is just an overview of our toolkit. We also secured an Economic and
Social Research Council Impact Acceleration Grant to refine the design and develop this toolkit (e.g. wording)
into a user-friendly online learning resource. Work (6 months) began on this resource immediately after the
completion of the current NIHR project. The resource ensures that our ‘actionable findings’ have the best
chance of having an impact on practice. The work was being carried out in collaboration with Health Education
England, the West Midlands CLAHRC and local AHNs. The resource is available at www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/
soc/wbs/research/ikon/commissioning/.
TABLE 8 Stakeholder feedback on toolkit
Capability General comments/considerations Question selection
Sourcing and
evaluating evidence
Make explicit reference to NHS Academic
Health Science Network, library and
knowledge services
Do you have access to evidence?
Are there explicit criteria to assess evidence?
Engaging experts Consider:
l Expert categories (e.g. clinicians, patients)
l When and how experts evaluate evidence
l How experts respond across the
redesign process
Include questions about identifying, not only
engaging, the right experts
Effective framing Is it about framing or scoping or defining? Is the problem a symptom of another, deeper
problem?
Can we solve the problem by adapting what
we do now, copying what others do, or
starting from scratch?
Managing roles and
expectations
Some projects may not have clearly defined
roles so a flexible approach is adopted
Think about project life cycle
Too advanced for commissioners!
–
Managing expert
collaboration
What does ‘balancing’ and ‘preparing’ for
divergent interests mean?
Is it managing or facilitating/accommodating?
How do you measure divergence of interests?
–
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Chapter 8 Exploratory study of evidence
production
In the previous chapters of this report, evidence use by managers was considered as our main response tothe commissioning brief (i.e. research on ‘pull’). A secondary aim was to consider the ways in which the
production of evidence shapes its use in health-care organisations (research on ‘push’). In this chapter, we
consider the design and production of evidence-based products in one large guidance-producing organisation.
We use the lens of ‘inscribed meanings’ to conduct this part of the analysis.60 Inscribed meanings
constitute, in effect, the ‘instruction manual’ for evidence, whereby the view that designers take of how
target audiences are meant to use evidence become incorporated into the design of their products.63,64
Accordingly, we set out to explore what sort of imagined and projected users are inscribed in evidence
products aimed at improving design and commissioning of health-care services. From our interviews and
visits, we saw three main discourses, which we label as ‘the discourse of production’, ‘the discourse of
audience feedback’ and ‘the discourse of implementation consultancy and direct marketing’. These are
described next.
Discourses of use and users
During our interviews and visits it became increasingly clear that the meaning behind key terms used – such
as ‘adoption’, ‘implementation’ and ‘impact’ – and the ways in which these were being operationalised
varied across the producer organisation. These observations are important because previous research
suggests that complex organisations are unlikely to constitute totally coherent entities. More likely, they
may host a number of slightly different organisational ‘logics’ or subcultures. The result is a situation of
institutional pluralism and culture complexity, which generates specific challenges for management.87,88
From our initial interviews and observations, it appeared that different parts of the organisation operated
slightly different visions and projections on how their products would be used in practice, and on what
concerned commissioning groups. Most of the time, such visions were not openly discussed (although
there were notable exceptions). They were, however, reflected in the different ways members of the
organisation talked about how they could sustain the take-up and utilisation of evidence products and
other forms of guidance. At least three of these local discourses of use and users were encountered in
our study. We call them here the discourse of production, the discourse of audience feedback and the
discourse of implementation consultancy and direct marketing. We use the term ‘discourse’ to reflect the
fact that these broad views defined different ways of talking, choices of words and ideas, but also practical
beliefs, predispositions and specific practices around how you deal with use and users.89 It is important to
reiterate that these three discourses emerged from a limited sample of interviewees (and observations),
and all findings from this exploratory study would need further work to be developed, corroborated and
possibly refined.
The discourse of production
A first discourse we heard during our exploratory study stemmed from the concerns associated with the
production of core evidence products (guidelines, health technology assessment). Developing such
materials, quite naturally, is the largest, most traditional activity in organisations that publish evidence. It is
also the task that many of our informants indicated as ‘core’. The work of developing evidence products in
this organisation was carefully structured, highly regulated by standards and operating procedures, and
closely monitored. It was also highly sensitive and exposed to close external accountability and scrutiny.
According to our conversations, these activities were driven by an operational culture that is (appropriately)
strongly outcome focused and quality driven. Our informants indicated that most of their corporate key
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performance indicators were focused on internal processes: ‘quality is controlled at each step’. Great effort
and focus are also placed on ensuring that the processes are robust and ‘very much evidence driven’.
Quality assurance and several layers of internal checks were often mentioned and described to us.
The relationship between this core production and the end-users, although present and considered by all
to be very important, was highly mediated by the processes in place, which were often document based.
Many of the informants reported that ‘we look at consultation documents . . . report from stakeholder
consultation’. Externally facing parts of the organisation did report back to this production core on how
their products were perceived in the users’ world, but for efficiency reasons this was often done in a highly
structured way through succinct summaries, slides packs and brief structured interactions. Informants were
aware of the existing constraining conditions:
One of the issues for us is about the cycle of evaluating and of course implementation doesn’t happen
just like that so it is about well, what can we do in our resource levels that allows us to have another
go at it or evaluate . . . pretty much internal process stuff.
As this quotation suggests, the attention to implementation was tempered by a healthy dose of realism
and by the daily work pressure – fuelled in part by the fact that one of the traditional criticisms of
guidance production is that products often take too long to surface and are not available when needed
(this was also mentioned by the same interviewee).
The image of the user inscribed by the existing processes and procedures was, in turn, a rather rational
and traditional one, based on the idea that the quality of the product will determine its fate and, in the
end, evidence will speak for itself:
The key point is it’s established from best evidence and the assumption is that when you use best
evidence to inform your practice that you will then achieve excellence.
In this discourse of production, the burden of use is mainly (albeit not exclusively) on the side of users, and
the main duty of the producer is to deliver high-quality and timely products. This is illustrated by a focus on
improving the usability of the products. This included, among other things, a focus on timeliness, ‘how
guidelines are presented’, and how people access the information. Most interviewees gave us a sense that
they believed the organisation was taking important strides to grapple with such issues.
In general, and somewhat as expected, members who were associated with a discourse of production
admitted limited direct knowledge of CCGs, with one respondent candidly affirming that ‘I have never
been to a CCG and I do not have an idea of how they look like’. Reasons included lack of opportunities,
their recent establishment and the type of task they were engaged in (‘my work is very similar to project
management’), but also difficulties in engaging with these organisations. The projected image of CCGs as
users was also slightly vague and generally rather normatively constituted. Consider the following response
to our scenario question (‘Can you describe in detail how will specific guideline XYZ will be used in a
specific CCG?’):
I don’t know how much the commissioning groups themselves per se will be looking at it. I think their
expectation maybe may be that others will be looking at it. I think they would be interested in
particular aspects of care within the guideline which may sort of, you know, make a big improvement
to practice but will be saving money I suppose is, would be a key component. In terms of who are the
people who will be actually looking at it . . . Some of them, I think some of them will be support
teams. I think some of them will be, there will be clinical roles within that so it could be a clinical lead
for patient safety for example.
In the extract, there is an open admission of scarce familiarity with this particular type of organisation
(respondents seemed much more confident when it came to describing activities in acute trusts). This
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model of use is based on the idea that the burden of evidence uptake is on the side of the receivers,
the expectation being the ‘that commissioners would, I think ‘pay regard’ or ‘take account’ of [the
organisation]’. Although these results are not totally surprising – one would not expect all members of
such an organisation to be closely acquainted with all of its multiple stakeholders – they indicate that the
user inscribed in the product may result from the coming together of a number of very practical concerns
and processes that may result in both intended and unintended consequences. Critically interrogating
these processes to ensure that they align with the espoused mission of the organisation is an important
effort to ensure the success of the product and of the organisation.
The discourse of audience feedback
A second discourse that we encountered in our exploratory investigation was much more openly oriented
towards the needs of the end-users, the sense being that all efforts needed to be made to make
evidence-based products as accessible as possible, in terms of dissemination, retrievability and usability. This
second discourse was informed by a communicative view of innovation diffusion.49 The related assumption
was that providing the right information at the right time to the right stakeholders, using the appropriate
channels, is critical for innovations to be adopted. This discourse, we suggest, could be recognised both in
how people talked about use and users and in the institutional initiatives they described. It was informed by
an attention to better outward communication (e.g. through the use of the web and social media) and
better use of the feedback from the users. Two examples are as follows:
There is a dissemination strategy which will target who it should be sent to, the format usually being
electronic, possibly supported by bulletins and articles in professional journals which will not only tell
people that the guidance is out there but perhaps will focus on key areas of potential confusion
or controversy.
There is a need to understand how people actually are using it, how people find out about the guidance
and through that searching journey and then once they find out information is that what they are
looking for. And if it is how they use it, why they use it and if there are any challenges . . . And then
when we look at the user we break out as different audience groups as like GPs, commissioners,
doctors, nurses, managers, commissioners because each one they look at evidence and the search for
evidence, how they use evidence may be different and to then get their feedback.
These two extracts suggest that the discourse of audience feedback focuses especially on the communicative
affordances of the products, the communication channels used to make them available, the information
behaviour of potential users and the reinstating of a feedback loop that can be used to improve the existing
products accordingly.
We propose that this discourse of audience attention and feedback co-exists with the discourse of
production discussed above (the same respondent would use both). Indeed, at times, both discourses
seemed to interact. The discourses of production, for example, seemed to inflect (or infect) the discourse
of audience attention with a positive orientation. One of our respondents, for example, talked about the
current effort to incorporate users’ feedback and users’ needs in the production process itself:
My understanding of where we are trying to move to is more, not so much producing a piece of
guidance and then implementing it but actually bringing, going much further upstream and actually
bringing the implementation process into the development of guidance itself and having it evolved
right from the early stages of guideline development rather than trying to do it later.
This quotation also suggests that injecting the traditional production-centred discourse with an attention to
the need of the customers is (still) a work in progress (although, again, the size of our sample may have
been a factor here). This was attributed sometimes to the fact that, historically, the organisation did not
have a remit for implementation and sometimes (in part) to the current division of labour within the
organisation.
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At least in our interviews, we found that this discourse was carried and actively promoted by staff who
worked in the teams faced with new and non-clinical stakeholders as well as by staff belonging to new
internal services and staff functions. Carriers of the discourse of audience feedback tended to have a much
more defined and less abstract view of the projected users as demonstrated by the following quotation
from an interview:
Whether or not they use . . . products is based on their awareness level whether they are aware of . . .
products or not. However, awareness doesn’t . . . is one of the factors whether they use it or not but
it’s not the only essential thing because that is also influenced by whether it’s suitable or not, the
content, how it is presented, and also impacted by their national priorities and whether is there any
resources impact . . . we don’t have any statistical data in terms of how it impacts on each other but
we have, you know, informal model about how they are related together.
The quotation is interesting because it indicates the existence of a rather well-defined projected user. This
user invoked in the extract is much more clearly, and, we would argue, realistically depicted than in the
previous discourse. Awareness is central, but recognition is given also to other factors. Pragmatically, the
focus is on improving dissemination. In fact, several informants told us of the importance of ‘using a
number of routes’ and different forms and ‘modes of presentation’ of the products (how the guidance is
written, packaged and presented so that it fits the needs of the users) to reach different audiences. There
is also a more clearly articulated sense that evidence does not implement itself and competes with other
priorities. Moreover, unlike in the previous discourse, there is a recognition that evidence tools can be
designed around the need of the users so that the latter are not required to do all the work of translating
the former in practice.
The traditional idea that one form of evidence fits all, which seemed to inform the production discourse,
is replaced here with a more pluralistic view; one that accepts that form, if not substance, needs to be
profoundly changed when talking to different publics. Finally, some of the interviewees displayed an acute
sense that the organisation needs to accompany their products with tools that facilitate such translation.
One of the middle managers we interviewed, for example, spoke of the importance of producing costing
tools that provided an assessment of the financial impact or the resource impact estimated at both the
national and the local level. In her words, ‘[we are] trying to bring cost impact alongside the cost
effectiveness analysis which obviously goes into the production of the guidelines themselves’. In short, the
respondents taking this discourse saw the organisation itself as needing to shoulder some of burden of
translation of the evidence in practice by helping to marry universal and local forms of evidence. The image
of CCGs as clients, or customers, also seemed to be more concrete and realistic than in the production
discourse, although direct information was still in short supply.
[Our product] goes out as a link, a hyperlink, and then whoever in the Clinical Commissioning Group
receives that in theory but I am not so up to speed with how the CCGs work should have some kind
of governance process in place that allows them to disseminate that appropriately.
This lack of direct empirical experience of CCGs may, of course, reflect the limited number of participants
in our exploratory study. However, in one case at least, this was attributed to the difficulty of finding
points of entry in CCGs: ‘[it has been difficult to engage with CCGs although] we’ve made an effort to
include them as stakeholders, to invite them and that means they get lots of information if they’re not sure
what’. It should be added that this comment was accompanied by the recognition that not all CCGs are
the same and, just as we need to differentiate between types of organisation, we need to distinguish
between ‘good and bad CCGs’.
Our interview indicated, however, that the lack of direct understanding of how CCGs actually work tended
to go hand in hand with a view of the take-up of evidence that was much more structured and procedure-
based than in the actual cases we observed of CCGs working with evidence (described in Chapter 5). From
a distance, and in the absence of direct experience with commissioning work, designers were often
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projecting images of users borrowed from acute trusts: ‘In the trusts the idea was that the manager would
receive that so they may well be a band 5 clinical audit facilitator but in the end it was their role to look at
guidance and disseminate it onwards’. The assumption is that in CCGs it will work the same way.
The discourse of implementation consultancy and direct marketing
A third discourse that we encountered was one of implementation consultancy and direct marketing. This
discourse was recognisable mainly from what people did and the terminology used (‘we do campaigns’;
‘we are consultants’; ‘we deal with consumers’). Our hypothesis is that this discourse is rather different
from the other two, which assume that good and rigorous evidence products will eventually be adopted
by virtue of their inner quality. Indeed, the reverse is true in this case: evidence products need to be
accompanied to the clients, presented to them and, if necessary, ‘sold’ in terms of the benefits they
will produce:
I have always thought of it as being a sales role. Some of my team find that a little bit unseemly. But
I look upon myself as a salesman . . . The great thing is that there are no price fees in our products
other than the opportunity cost at the time.
This third discourse manifested itself in a small number of tasks, especially in the work of a number of
implementation consultants whose activities loosely followed the model of a medical sales representative
(but without some of the difficulties associated with this). Work included meeting customers, carrying
product folders, sharing promotional materials, informing them of new products, promoting new tools and
products and collecting feedback that is constantly fed back, also, to the production core of the organisation.
The vignette reconstructed from field notes, next, provides an example of this particular organisational
discourse and set of practices (names have been changed for anonymity):
Mr Smith, the implementation consultant, starts his ‘pitch’ in a way that is similar to how he
introduced his work to me: ‘what [the organisation] is trying to do . . . improve the offer to GPs . . .
improve the take up of guidelines’. He explains he ‘wants to know where the CCGs are . . . how
guidelines are used . . . locally on [a named product] and how they can be improved’. Second, he is
interested in knowing whether there has been any progress with the inclusion of certain products in
the general practice records system [Egton Medical Infomation Systems (EMIS), EMIS Health, Leeds, UK).
He mentions that he has met the EMIS developer but that this ‘did not lead to any concrete follow up’.
Later, Mr Smith produces a folder with a number of documents. He shows Mr Green, the CCG client,
the new content of the document and the menu of indicators, explaining them and giving one
example. He talks Mr Green through the document, explains the benefits and gives the document to
him so he can handle it – not unlike what a medical sales representative would do . . .
Here, Mr Smith is actively trying to persuade the client of the relevance of the product, and illustrates both
the potential uses and the added value that this could have for the CCG. He is, in effect, translating
the product so that it fits the local situation of the CCG. Through his mediating function he localises
evidence-based products in conversation with the client. This contrasts with what we have seen in the two
previous discourses of use. Whereas in the two previous discourses most of the translation work was on
the part of the users, the reverse is true here. The implementation consultant is now taking up a significant
part of the burden of translation by trying actively to find out a correspondence between local needs and
available solutions.
Although this particular way of talking and dealing with user and customers was limited to the activity of a
very small team in the producer organisation, we mention it here for two reasons. First, the work of this
team was often referred to in our conversations with others and, therefore, was considered particularly
relevant. Second, it carries the seed of rather different and more service-oriented way of conceiving the
work of an evidence-producing organisation. For example, the self-image projected by this activity is
significantly different from the one embodied by the dominant production paradigm.
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Because they interact with CCGs on a regular basis, the implementation staff seemed to have very grounded
view of CCGs as users of evidence products. One aspect that is often emphasised is the high variability of
CCGs and their differential processes and capabilities with relation to the adoption and assimilation of
evidence. In the words of one implementation consultant, ‘The main thing within commissioning which is
what we’re talking about now as opposed to say a provider organisation is one of variability’. Implementation
consultants have learned, in particular, to distinguish between ‘good’ and ‘not so good’ CCGs in terms of
process and capabilities:
If it was a good CCG which there are some examples, they would have somebody whose job is to
receive a monthly newsletter . . . and to scan it to see what guidance has come out which is likely to
be relevant for their services and then they will pick that up and they will make sure that somebody
knows about it. But more importantly they will make sure that that person knows what it is they are
meant to do with it.
These, and other carriers of this discourse, are also more aware, or more verbal, about the situated and
therefore unpredictable ways in which evidence products enter organisations. In CCGs people may come
across evidence products ‘by accident probably because it gets on the front page of Pulse’; with ‘a bit
of luck’, they will look at them and say ‘hmm, I know a lot of my colleagues still prescribe aspirin for
people who come in with atrial fibrillation, we need to do something to get them to move them on to
anti-coagulation’, and, ‘if they remember . . .’, may do something. In short, and in line with our study,
implementation consultants seemed to believe that ‘implementation’ depends on the nature of the
evidence products as much as on the capabilities of the organisations that are supposed to adopt them.
What real users look like
Before concluding, it is worth reporting a brief extract of our observation in the field, this time turning our
attention to the actual conduct of the users. This is because, in spite of our extremely limited sample, we
encountered a user whose orientation was very different from that mentioned during our conversation.
The extract is from a visit to a CCG by one of the implementation consultants who we shadowed in the
field (names have been changed for anonymity):
Mrs Shore arrives with Mr Rainer, a junior person from the governance unit. Mr Rainer will remain rather
silent during the meeting while Mrs Shore unremittingly tells the implementation consultant all the amazing
things they have done. Mrs Shore starts the conversation explaining that she is moving to larger practice
and leaving the CCG. She will work on medicine management but also do some practice development.
After a short attempt by the implementation consultant to present his organisation’s offering, Mrs Shore
launches into what a long praise of the work of her CCG in relation to the use of technology to support
evidence based change of service provision. She speaks using highly technical language, mentioning
acronyms, showing thorough knowledge of evidence-based products and guidelines. For long stretches
the implementation consultant listens to Mrs Shore’s enthusiastic account. Mrs Shore starts by explaining
the work they have done to use the EMIS [Egton Medical Infomation Systems] system to identify patients
at risk. She explains that they modify the EMIS so that when certain input suggests people at risk, this is
flagged automatically to the GP. The implementation consultant is able to chip in briefly and add that
‘we have a guideline for this . . . it includes a scenario . . . I did a session with another CCG nearby’.
Unperturbed, Mrs Shore explains how recent guidance on drug safety was also included in the EMIS system
(in the process she ‘recites’ the content of the guidance). Mrs Shore continues by affirming that she is a
big fan of systematisation: ‘we have an automatic audit . . . we have a programme . . . we do it already’.
She explains that whenever they extract data they compare with ‘previous studies’ and then put in place
actions to educate their clients. She gives an example of how they worked with some of the care homes
in the area where certain indicators were not as good. She states that ‘our data are brilliant’. All the
implementation consultant can do is to nod and say ‘good stuff’.
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Mrs Shore appears to be quite a unique user who does not fit with the implementation consultant’s a
priori expectations. She is not resisting the use of evidence; quite the contrary, she endorses it to point of
being able to recite pieces of guidance. Yet she is keen to make evidence-based guidance ‘disappear’ for
frontline clinicians by embedding it in the local general practice records system. Although her interaction
with the implementation consultant is not as one would have expected (she is telling things to the
consultant, rather than the other way around), this is motivated by a desire to demonstrate (and showcase)
her CCG’s capacity and skill. The implementation consultant is granted the type of reception one would
give to a highly ranked authority.
We mention this encounter because Mrs Shore was a surprise to us and, more importantly, because
people like Mrs Shore were never even remotely imagined for us during our conversations with members
of the evidence-producing organisation. Our hypothesis, which would, of course, require further work to
be corroborated, is that a user of this type could hardly have been inscribed in any evidence product, as
she did not enter the collective imagination of the evidence producers. Mrs Shore reminds us that the only
way to design products around real end-users is to go out there and see what they do (something that the
producer organisation is starting to do).
Chapter summary
We set out to understand how teams at one organisation that produces evidence-based products think
their products will be used in general, and by NHS commissioning organisations in particular. Owing to the
very small sample and the limited duration of our engagement, we are in a position to offer only a few
brief considerations to inform future research.
First, different (in this case, three) discourses of use and users were detected between teams in the same
evidence-producer. As we suggested above, this can be expected given the type of organisation, and the
presence of complexity and pluralism is neither good nor bad. Pluralism can be a source of innovation or
internal conflict. Diverse discourses and subcultures can co-exist as long as they are brought to the surface
and managed at a strategic level.
Second, our exploratory study suggests possible historical parallels with other organisations in the private
sector that, over the years, have transitioned from seeing themselves (and acting) as makers of products
to providers of services. A notable example is IBM, an organisation that over two decades went through
a remarkable transformation from a struggling seller of hardware to a successful broad-range provider
of solutions.90 Our study raises the question of to what extent producers of evidence-based products in
health care are going through the same process, and whether or not what we observed was the first trace
of this process happening. The industrial context is quite different, of course, but comparisons with historic
cases may be a useful means by which to reflect on one’s own identity and try to manage such processes.
Third, and finally, our exploratory study raises questions about the potential benefits of a more explicit and
broad engagement of evidence producers with what is loosely described as ‘customer-centric design’ or
‘design thinking’. Brown and Wyatt91 refer to design thinking as an approach to innovation that draws
from the designer’s toolkit to integrate the needs of people, the possibilities of technology and the
requirements for business success. The approach is supported by a growing set of techniques and
engagement modes, some of which we recognised to an extent within this evidence producer. Design
thinking puts understanding of what users do, where they are and their active, direct involvement at the
core of the development of new product and services. In this way, implementation issues can be designed
out rather than grappled with at the ‘end of the journey’ of evidence, and users such as Mrs Shore can
become assets to the circulation of products rather than outliers.
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Chapter 9 Discussion and concluding remarks
In this chapter, we conclude with a discussion of the ways in which our findings inform evidence-basedpractice and service redesign work. In brief, we have shown the need for multiple ‘evidences’ to be
skilfully combined and have highlighted sets of capabilities can enable this to happen in specific contexts.
In doing so, we contribute to recent research on the ways in which different forms of knowledge and
information come to be mobilised as ‘evidence’ in health-care management and shed light on practices
and conditions that enable this. We have shown, as do others, that evidence-based redesign work is a
socially complex activity, shaped by the application of certain capabilities, not just the type of information
being used. We discuss these points further in the following paragraphs, drawing in theoretical and
applied implications from our findings, as well as considerations for this project and future research on
the topic.
Mobilising evidence
The use of ‘authoritative’ evidence (from NICE) is a central consideration of our study, but it was clear that
this needed to be coupled with other forms of evidence, identified as local, expertise-based and trans-local.
Although different labels can be applied, the categories of universal, local and expertise-based evidence
mirror those found in previous work.23 Rigorous scientific evidence (which we term ‘universal’), evidence
from within the local area (which we term ‘local’) and evidence from knowledgeable stakeholders (which
we term ‘expertise based’) have been repeatedly shown as important in the literature. The category of
trans-local evidence (i.e. evidence created in one place but used in another) is new. Although this resembles
what other studies have labelled ‘best practice’ examples,1 our cases indicate that this evidence had often
not been actually demonstrated as ‘best practice’ in its original setting before it was adopted and applied in
our cases. Hence we think that ‘trans-local’ is a better label, one that also acts as a caution to the assumption
that examples that have been tried elsewhere are actually ‘tried and tested’.
Although there were clear differences between the four categories of evidence, in reality they were used
in tandem. We showed, for example, that stakeholders do rely on universal evidence (e.g. guidelines on
amputations) to understand local evidence and performance data. Conversely, universal evidence needed
local evidence to make them applicable to the context of adoption. Evidences are also coupled in more
indirect ways. In terms of expertise-based evidence, for example, stakeholders may be asked directly for
their opinions. If this is not the case, their interpretations of, and reactions to, other evidences (e.g. local
and universal) are likely to be informed by their own expertise anyway. In some cases, experts questioned
even NICE guidelines with legitimate authority among their peers. Thus, categories of evidence need to be
understood, not as mutually exclusive (e.g. with one ‘trumping’ the other)1 but as tightly coupled, being
used interdependently for sense-making.
In addition to understanding what evidence is used, our qualitative research design provided rich insights
about these evidences. We know, for example, that commissioning stakeholders, in many instances, were
less concerned with the properties of evidence and more concerned with accessibility, relevance and
applicability to context. Trans-local evidence, which served as a shortcut to solutions in many instances,
may in itself be testament to the reality of evidence use in this context. Indeed, stakeholders who opted
to mobilise this type of evidence were often swayed more by the fact that certain CCGs had managed,
in fact, to implement a change, than by the efficacy or outcomes of change. Indeed, there was rarely
‘any long-term evidence’ available (e.g. Greenland CCG). Choosing a solution because it has been applied
elsewhere, without clear knowledge of efficacy, is likely symptomatic of the highly politicised, time-pressured
environments in which health-care managers work.
It is interesting that these evidences have been shown as important in many studies, but issues with
mobilisation still persist.3,5,12 The inherent challenges of mobilising NICE guidelines, for example, have been
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described by our stakeholders and in the wider literature.92 Whereas some kinds of universal were
mobilised (e.g. NICE evidence, Five Year Forward View, QOF data), it was apparent that other kinds of
universal evidence – Cochrane reviews, for example – were never referred to in our data.
Our case studies also offered insights into the challenges of mobilising evidence in other forms. Local
evidence, for example, was often difficult to access and interpret. Routes for accessing this kind of
evidence were often quite ad hoc and interpersonal, and so depended on the right experts being involved
at the right time. Variations in recording and coding data (e.g. between primary and acute care) also posed
problems for using local evidence in several CCGs (e.g. Greenland CCG). Structural issues related to the
use of different systems to store local evidence also problematised the use of this evidence (e.g. Chelsea
CCG). Similarly, the mobilisation of trans-local evidence seemed to be somewhat of a lottery. Although
there are centralised sources of ‘best practice’ examples (e.g. Right Care Casebooks), our stakeholders did
not describe using them. Instead, stakeholders were informed through more random avenues, including
attendance at presentations (e.g. Greenland CCG) and experiences in other settings (e.g. Chelsea CCG).
These prolonged issues with evidence mobilisation may lead to variation and fragmentation in evidence-based
decisions.93,94 One answer is to add to existing calls for CCGs to be supported to use evidence. We know,
however, that commissioning stakeholders are not always keen to use supports (e.g. CSUs), because they are
costly, and also because they often lack local knowledge and relationships (relative to practising clinicians).95
By identifying capabilities, in contrast, we show how evidence use can be enhanced from within the redesign
group and the commissioning organisation itself. Engaging the right experts (including patient groups) in
agenda formation, for example, is seen to ensure access to a wider range of evidences.11,23 It helps, also, to
ensure that stakeholders who will be affected by the change are represented in commissioning design work,
thereby increasing the likelihood that a change will be accepted and actually implemented. Collaborations
among experts need to be actively managed, however, and the evidence that they ‘bring to the table’ needs
to be judiciously evaluated.
Before considering implications for improving capabilities, there is one caveat to our findings. Our SSAP
has, quite rightly, advised that we consider how our research design may have influenced our findings.
We chose to study how CCGs redesign diabetes or MSK services. This design meant that our research
captured large-scale/-scope processes of change, where clinical need, cost, patient satisfaction and staff
satisfaction, as well as a host of other factors, have to be considered. With projects of this scope, a
multitude of evidences become relevant. If we had, instead, focused more narrowly (e.g. on the redesign
of a particular part of the patient pathway), a different pattern of evidence use may have been observed.
In this case, our SSAP suggested that universal evidence related to clinical guidance or best practice (e.g.
NICE) may have been at the forefront of decision-making. With this in mind, we situate our findings as an
overview of evidence use in redesign work, and encourage further, perhaps more targeted, investigations
of the topic in future research.
Capabilities to use evidence
The main purpose of our study was to understand capabilities that enable evidence use, that is, practices
and conditions that allowed decision-makers to have a solid evidence base for their decisions. Note that,
here, our focus was on capabilities to use evidence, in particular, not on capabilities to manage change
processes, in general. Although much is known about managing change in health care, including the
challenges of dealing with complex, so-called ‘wicked problems’, there has been little focus on specific
capabilities to use evidence.96 Evidence use is only one aspect of any change process, however, so links
between process outcomes and capabilities to use evidence are not direct and need to be treated
with caution.
This said, we identified five capabilities that appeared in our cases to encourage the use of different types
of evidence in decision-making: ‘sourcing and evaluating evidence’, ‘effective framing’, ‘engaging experts’,
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‘managing expert collaboration’ and ‘managing roles and expectations’. We have discussed the relevance
of each of these capabilities to evidence use, and also the interdependencies between them, in the
previous sections (e.g. see Chapter 6). To our knowledge, identifying and collating capabilities for evidence
use by commissioning groups conducting redesign work is a unique contribution of our work.
Interestingly, these capabilities reflect broader health-care management literature. Scholars have long
argued that evidence is contested, negotiated and socially legitimated.17 Far from being objective, evidence
use is a highly political, tense and anxious process.85 Reflecting this, we showed that managing expert
collaboration and expectations is an important capability for evidence use. Similarly, the literature suggests
that who presents evidence and how evidence is presented informs use.7,46 The perceived relevance of
evidence is also important.46 Our cases showed the importance of framing evidence to resonate with
stakeholders (e.g. the blank sheet approach). Overlap between our findings and the literature suggests
that these capabilities are an avenue through which more general improvements in health-care
management can be made, including enabling evidence-based decision-making.
Although our five capabilities were identified across cases, we do not claim to have created an exhaustive
list. It is likely that other capabilities for evidence use in CCGs exist, and we encourage further, larger-scale
studies to explore these. In addition to identifying new capabilities, more research to examine whether or
not those shown in the present study are generalisable to other situations of health-care management
would be beneficial, as would closer examination of the different ways in which capabilities can be
developed in practice. We showed, for example, that engaging experts is a capability for evidence use.
While commissioners made reference to the often informal ways in which engagement can be achieved
(e.g. ‘sticking your head round the door before every meeting’), going forward, researchers may want to
consider exactly how these capabilities can be developed.
Finally, research might also consider how capabilities vary across project contexts. We have already seen
that not all capabilities are always relevant, and we are conscious that our design will have influenced the
capabilities identified. CCG redesign work requires individuals to work across boundaries, and so it is not
surprising that capabilities related to engagement and collaboration management were so frequently
noted in our data. Had we chosen a less complex management situation (e.g. evidence use within a
homogenous professional group,97 it is possible that other capabilities would have been as important. That
said, existing literature tells us that health-care management problems are typically very complex, so our
choice of empirical setting should mean that the findings have broad relevance.
The cross-case comparisons allowed indicated that there does seem to be some relationship between
capabilities to use evidence and process outcomes, albeit indirect (as noted above). Put simply, we saw
that CCGs with the narrowest range of capabilities also had the worst outcomes. Importantly, however,
our data suggest that the frequency of capabilities was not directly proportional to successful outcomes.
Rather, applying capabilities as appropriate in context may have a more positive impact. Just as evidence
use may vary across CCG contexts, so too might conditions and practices that enable evidence use. This
suggests that, instead of a broad-brush, prescriptive approach to improving capabilities, it is more fruitful
to support commissioning groups in understanding their own capabilities for evidence use so that they can
consider whether or not the range of capabilities they are deploying is appropriate for their context, or
whether or not there are gaps. The ability, at the meta-level, to identify and apply capabilities when
needed is an important practical application of our findings. The toolkit we have begun to develop from
the findings is just one step in supporting CCGs to do just that.
A roadmap of capabilities for evidence use in Clinical Commissioning
Groups
Our research findings to this point attest to the highly iterative nature of the evidence journey in NHS
organisations and to the messy and fluid ways in which various forms of information come to be used as
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evidence. We have shown how multiple kinds of evidence are coupled together across different episodes
of the innovation process. This means that improving the ability of authoritative evidence (e.g. NICE
guidelines) to actually change practice necessarily means improving its use alongside other forms of
evidence in local contexts. These different forms of evidence are shown in our ‘roadmap’ for evidence use
in Figure 8. Although these evidences have definitive characteristics, they contribute to redesign decisions
when used in tandem.
We also sought to understand the capabilities (practices and organisational conditions) that enable evidence
to be deployed in context. Just like the evidence discussed in the previous section, capabilities also come
in many shapes and forms, and were often about managing and understanding social relationships and
politics among redesign stakeholders, reflecting the highly politicised nature of EBMgmt in health care. We
also observed interesting patterns in terms of the way in which these capabilities to use evidence mediated
outcomes of redesign work. At CCGs where fewer capabilities were recorded, worse outcomes were
also shown. However, it is not simply the case that more is always better. Rather, the importance of each
capability to successful outcomes depends on the context. In some of our cases redesigns were quite
successful, even though certain capabilities were not present. It can also be assumed there is a hierarchy,
or, at the very least, an interdependence, across capabilities. Framing, for example, would probably have
little impact on evidence-based redesign work without engaging experts.
We conclude that, although there is no ‘silver bullet’ for evidence-based commissioning, support to
improve awareness of different kinds of evidence and capabilities would be beneficial. In addition, we have
shown varied understandings of evidence use and users among those involved in producing and publishing
evidence-based products. These understandings are inscribed in the authoritative evidence produced by
these organisations and may also need fine-tuning in order to support the translation of evidence
in practice.
Figure 8 draws these findings together as a ‘roadmap for evidence use’. We construct this from our
original conceptual framework (drawn from existing literature) in order to show how our findings build on
Trans-local
Universal
Expertise-based
Local
Agenda 
formation
Solution
selection
Outcome  
(evidence used, 
stakeholder experiences,
objectives met)
Effective 
framing
Engaging 
experts
Managing 
roles and
expectations
Sourcing 
and evaluating 
evidence
Managing 
expert 
collaboration
FIGURE 8 Capabilities roadmap.
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the existing corpus of knowledge and how they developed through our research project. This roadmap
shows that:
l Multiple evidences are used alongside each other throughout the redesign process. No one evidence is
given precedence over another, but used together they aid commissioning groups in decision-making.
l There are challenges and barriers to evidence use in health care, but certain conditions and practices
across the organisation and team can enable commissioning organisations to make more evidence-based
decisions. Observations can also be made about the timing and relationships between capabilities.
Engaging experts and effective framing, for example, are particularly important during agenda formation
work. These capabilities have a mutual dependence, too, with expert engagement itself often increased
through effective framing, while framing efforts may be redundant if experts are not present.
l Importantly, the presence of these capabilities to use evidence appeared to mediate project outcomes.
Specifically, in commissioning groups where fewer capabilities were shown overall, worse outcomes
were reported.
To stay true to the nature of our findings, our roadmap, drawn schematically in Figure 8, is non-linear in
nature. Metaphorically, it is perhaps best understood not as a single road, but as a ‘spaghetti junction’,
where dynamic capabilities for evidence use are combined in practical settings.
Toolkit: improving capabilities to use evidence
We encourage the application of our findings in practice through the creation of a toolkit (see Chapter 7)
and will develop this into a user-friendly and accessible format after the completion of the current project.
Specifically, we have secured an Economic and Social Research Council Impact Acceleration Grant that will
enable us to create a user-friendly, online learning resource that incorporates the main findings, as well as
illustrative case stories, examples, links to other resources and the toolkit. We will consult further with key
stakeholders on this impact work, initially through our collaboration in the project with Health Education
England, and the West Midlands CLAHRC that is supporting us in this work. We will also be sure to avoid
the duplication of existing supports and networks, instead aiming to link to these to ensure that the toolkit
is as widely accessed as possible. The Economic and Social Research Council Impact Acceleration Grant is
an important outcome of this project, as it will help to ensure that our findings have the best chance of
actually impacting on practice.
Considerations and future directions
Although several important insights into EBMgmt in CCGs have been gained, there are of course further
considerations to be taken into account. We have already discussed some of these, including the need for
further research on the contextual factors shaping evidence use and evidence use in other health-care
management settings. It is important, also, to consider how we conceptualise ‘authoritative’ evidence. At
the outset of this project we defined guidance produced by NICE as a highly important, albeit not the only,
source of authoritative evidence for CCGs. Although NICE guidance was certainly used in our cases, it was
rarely given special acknowledgements or consideration. Instead, it was used in tandem with other, usually
considered less ‘authoritative’, kinds of evidence.
Whereas health-care research tends to assign authoritativeness according to the attributes of evidence
sources, the Oxford English Dictionary defines authoritative as ‘able to be trusted or reliable’.98 This latter
definition seems closer to the realities of health-care management, where authoritativeness is assigned
not through modes of creation, but through an ability to mobilise evidence in making judicious decisions
at the right time. Although we are not the first to notice, our observations reiterate the importance of
reconsidering our conceptualisation of ‘authoritative’ evidence so that the realities of evidence-based
health-care management are seriously noted.2,22
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Some other considerations arising from our findings relate to temporal aspects and generalisability of
findings. Throughout this report we have discussed innovation with regard to service redesign, in which we
expected to follow the use of evidence from inception through to changes in practice. Redesigns were,
however, often very slow, iterative and interrupted. Some cases did not make changes within the time frame
of our study, as they had anticipated. Other cases did implement changes, but re-evaluation for future work
was almost instantaneous. Rather than following a process with distinct starting and finishing points, our
research steps into an ongoing stream of redesign work. Unfortunately, the time required to implement
change and our study time frame did not coincide so certain episodes of work (e.g. ‘routinisation’) were not
captured. A longer study period may have enabled this, although our time frame of 30 months is already
quite considerable. Instead, future research might target certain episodes of work to understand evidence
use within them.
Another point to consider is the generalisability of our findings. We chose to sample eight CCGs in order to
maximise opportunities to explain variation, while attending to the contextual and processual dimensions of
redesign work. Doing so allowed us to achieve rich, qualitative insights into evidence-based redesign work.
Although we sampled CCGs operating in different parts of the country and serving different populations
(see Chapter 2), the generalisability of our findings is, of course, limited by our empirical setting. In future
work, generalisability could potentially be achieved by using a bigger sample and a more quantitative
approach. Doing so might enable us to understand statistically how outcomes vary according to evidence
use and capabilities.
Finally, fieldwork was conducted at a time of significant reorganisation of NHS commissioning. Given the
political context, more reorganisations are likely to occur in the future. This, of course, may raise questions
about whether or not, and to what extent, our findings will still be relevant. To answer these concerns, we
have focused on the process of commissioning, not on the specific organisation and governance of CCGs
per se. Given that evidence-based commissioning processes will always be required in the NHS, we believe
that our findings will be sustainable, even if further structural change takes place.
Summary of findings
We studied redesign processes in eight CCGs where four categories of evidence – local, universal,
expertise-based and trans-local – were used, often in tandem, to make sense of tasks. Evidence use was
often challenging, but certain practices and conditions were shown to be enabling, including sourcing and
evaluating evidence, effective framing, engaging experts, managing expert collaboration and managing
roles and expectations.
Implications for practice
Our findings showed clear implications for commissioning in practice, especially with regard to the use of
evidence, the importance of social capabilities and support for decision-makers. These can be summarised
as follows:
1. Findings show that evidence is not just accepted as relevant or reliable. Various pieces of information
are brought forward and contested or applied. There were issues of perceived relevance (universal
evidence), quality (local evidence), quantification and evaluation (expertise-based evidence) and access
(trans-local evidence). Support to understand and address these issues might enable better evidence use
in practice, which is important given the interdependence across the four categories that was shown in
our findings.
2. Although redesign projects are complex, certain social conditions and practices were shown to enable
evidence use. Although some capabilities identified in our study relate explicitly to evidence (e.g. sourcing
and evaluating evidence), many related much more to managing social interests, conflicts and interactions
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(e.g. engaging experts and managing expert collaborations). Rather than technical capabilities (e.g. data
searching and quality appraisals), our findings suggest that developing and supporting these social
capabilities is key to evidence-based CCG redesign work in practice.
3. Cross-case comparisons suggest that successful redesign projects – in terms of evidence use, stakeholder
satisfaction and meeting objectives – are informed by capabilities being in place as needed. Quantity,
however, is not a measure of quality, and not all capabilities are necessary in all contexts. Managing
collaborations may be less necessary, for example, when project teams have worked together and already
have established norms and role expectations. It is important, then, not only to support the development
of social capabilities but also to empower stakeholders to recognise when and where these are necessary.
4. Supporting health-care managers and commissioning staff to recognise, access and evaluate evidence
drawing on their own capabilities relevant to the particular task and context might be an effective way
of enabling evidence-based decisions. As NHS organisations are frequently restructured, this may be
more sustainable approach than one that prescribes that certain evidences or certain sets of capabilities
need to be utilised.
5. Much is to be gained if evidence providers consistently question themselves with regard to which model of
user they inscribe, intentionally or otherwise, in their guidelines and other products. The exploratory study
also suggests that potential benefits might be derived from a more explicit and broad engagement of
evidence producers with the practices and techniques of ‘customer-centric design’ and ‘design thinking’.
Research recommendations
1. First and foremost, our research ‘begins with the needs of knowledge users’ as recommended by
Jacobson et al.99 We documented journeys of evidence through realistic accounts of redesign work to
provide a detailed account that has been missing from the literature to this point. Although we see
these insights as critical to achieving evidence-based health care, they are not likely to be universal
across contexts. Further research is, therefore, needed to understand the nuances and caveats in
difference contexts so that commonalities and differences can be identified.
2. We expected universal evidence to be an antecedent of redesign work, given its place in the evidence
hierarchy and in studies of evidence-based health care to date.29 We found, however, that universal
evidence often set parameters around projects and is used in tandem with other types of evidence.
This finding demonstrates how evidence is actually treated in practice.2,22 It also builds on existing
knowledge by showing that certain types of evidence do not ‘trump’ others;1 instead, they are often
used in tandem in sense-making.
3. Much of the research on evidence-based health care has suggested structural or technological
improvements (e.g. knowledge management systems).26 We respond to work by scholars such as Ferlie
et al.,100 who called for a move, instead, towards ‘core competences’. We identified five capabilities that
seemed to support better evidence use. Future research might build on this to consider, for example,
how exactly capabilities come into existence and are maintained in commissioning settings. Future
research might also more systematically measure the extent to which they are present and the impact
of these on commissioning effectiveness. Our research provides a snapshot of this impact and should be
used as a foundation for more in-depth analysis.
4. Cross-case comparisons suggest that certain capabilities impact on evidence use, stakeholder satisfaction
and meeting objectives. Going forward, more nuanced insights might be gained from looking exactly at
what parts of the process impacted stakeholder appraisals, or if capabilities had more or less impact on
the ability of teams to meet certain objectives. Other outcomes could also be considered (e.g. timeliness
and patient experience).
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Appendix 1 Rutterford Clinical Commissioning
Group
Case study overview
We first contacted a GP professor in diabetes at Rutterford CCG. Through him, we met stakeholders who
had been involved in the diabetes redesign. We spoke with a diabetes nurse consultant and a CCG
transformation manager. We later followed up with the diabetes nurse consultant and interviewed the
chief accountable officer at the CCG. At the time of our visit, the CCG had spent the previous year
developing recommendations on ‘delivering the best possible care’. Increased numbers of patients with
diabetes, increased complications and increased spend were primary concerns in the CCG. The CCG had
secured some funding that could be used to buffer any upfront losses from changes to the diabetes
pathway. They also had a diabetes education programme in place for upskilling community staff. With
these resources in place, a transformation team was put in place. They faced some challenges, which
were mostly overcome by the creation of subgroups. These groups collected, evaluated and reported on
evidences related to their specific disciplines. Each group made recommendations about the pathway that
were then collated into one overall report. The team decided to improve care ‘downstream’, that is, at the
beginning of the pathway, in order to prevent complications, improve care and, ultimately, save money.
At our last point of contact, which was approximately 2 years after the first interviews, around one-third
of practices had attended the education programme, a specification for new services had been written,
and they were in the process of evaluating referral data to understand the impact of their redesign work.
Agenda formation
Stakeholders at Rutterford CCG broadly framed problems with care, capacity and cost using local and
universal evidences. The diabetes nurse consultant described how there had been a ‘spurt in chronic
diabetes’ that meant ‘to even offer basic care service in the future’ changes in the pathway were
necessary. Current services were seen as ‘very acute centric’, with the transformation manager describing
how they had ‘seven diabetology consultants and even if we appointed another 70 we still wouldn’t have
enough to . . . see absolutely everybody’. As a result, ‘11–12% of the NHS budget [was being spent] on
complications’ (report, 2013).
Duplication of work was also problematic because it contradicted the universal evidence. This violation
was understood in terms of local evidence that showed that they had ‘two foot clinics [that] both happen
on the same day’, which violates NICE guidance that patients should have ‘access to a multidisciplinary
team within 24 hours’. Local evidence also showed that there was variation in care across clinics, with one
operating in line with national guidance (around one patient in every six was seen again), while the other
had a ‘follow-up ratio of 1 to 10’ (transformation manager). Overall, these evidences suggested that
current services were a ‘poor use of resources, not great value for money and [having] not great outcomes
for patients’ (accountable officer).
Recognising these issues, the diabetes nurse described how they ‘formulat[ed] a transformation steering
group to understand actually who is likely to be able to make decisions to mobilise this plan [to address the
issues]’. She wanted this group to engage experts and offer them an ‘opportunity to . . . get together and
really think about what diabetes care in [the area] should look like’ (diabetes nurse). The transformation
manager saw the group as ensuring that ‘everybody had a voice . . . was listened to’ and that ‘all the right
. . . all of the stakeholders’ were involved. There was broad involvement in the group (there were upwards
of 35 in one meeting alone; diabetes nurse).
DOI: 10.3310/hsdr05180 HEALTH SERVICES AND DELIVERY RESEARCH 2017 VOL. 5 NO. 18
© Queen’s Printer and Controller of HMSO 2017. This work was produced by Swan et al. under the terms of a commissioning contract issued by the Secretary of State for Health.
This issue may be freely reproduced for the purposes of private research and study and extracts (or indeed, the full report) may be included in professional journals provided that
suitable acknowledgement is made and the reproduction is not associated with any form of advertising. Applications for commercial reproduction should be addressed to: NIHR
Journals Library, National Institute for Health Research, Evaluation, Trials and Studies Coordinating Centre, Alpha House, University of Southampton Science Park, Southampton
SO16 7NS, UK.
85
Selecting a solution
Having established the groups, the transformation manager endeavoured to develop a shared frame on
the search for a solution. The nurse commented that they wanted to bring ‘about change that people
agreed to and that actually happen, rather than people coming up with ideas but it never going
anywhere’. Stakeholders were asked to use expertise-based evidence take a ‘step back [and think] . . .
what would [the service] look like if we had a blank piece of paper’:
. . . we tried not to look at this is what we’ve got, this is how we need to change it because that keeps
you a bit stuck . . . so we did very much a ‘if we could do anything what would it look like?’ Obviously
you can’t do anything, there are restrictions in terms of finance and people and bodies. But in the
beginning, we did a lot of visioning and a lot of blue sky thinking and a lot of ‘what would we really
want it to look like?’
Diabetes nurse
The diabetes nurse commented that these discussions took place at a time when there was a lot of ‘talk
around the ‘left shift’, that is . . . moving non-acute services from the acute trusts back to primary care’. She
referred to the universal evidence, including NHS ‘Better Care Together’ (www.bettercaretogether.co.uk)
and Monitor’s ‘Care Closer To Home’ (www.gov.uk/guidance/moving-healthcare-closer-to-home). Each of
these documents focused on ‘the repatriation of people from secondary care into primary care, reducing
hospital admissions, length of stay’ (diabetes nurse). Because of this, the solution search used a blank sheet,
but it was not completely blank.
Two factors in the broader landscape were noted as critical to moving beyond agenda formation: funding
and education. A transformation fund to support service redesign planning was won from ‘a joint bid
between the CCGs and the [hospital]’ (report). They were awarded £1M to ‘do a full pathway review of
diabetes care in the region’ (transformation manager), which protected them against financial penalties.
Because of this, the work was ‘de-risked’:
The acute trust potentially [could] lose out on income which means that we had to be able to
financially compensate them for at least for year 1 . . . if they’re going to lose a couple of million
pounds it has a significant impact . . .
Transformation manager
The transformation fund was described as giving ‘extra impetus’ to an education programme for primary care
that had already been created in the CCG (transformation manager). Educating primary care stakeholders
was seen as vital to avoid putting patients in ‘a risk situation’ (transformation manager). Education was
spread ‘right from health-care assistants, right the way up to practice’ so that ‘they feel valued’ (diabetes
nurse). These supports meant the group was able to think about ‘how that change might be managed’
(diabetes nurse). The diabetes nurse saw education as a way to strengthen the redesign because:
. . . if people don’t feel competent and skilled to look after [a new way of providing care] it fails and it
doesn’t work . . . the people that are doing the caring have the skills and the expertise and competency
to do that. If you’ve got that it’s much more likely to succeed . . .
Three main ‘challenges . . . disagreements . . . debates’ arose. First, ‘change is frightening . . . it can make
you feel a bit insecure’ and so some stakeholders were hesitant to participate (diabetes nurse). Second,
stakeholders ‘at the beginning . . . [had] very fixed ideas about what they wanted to see at the end of the
project’. This limits the scope of the evidence search and precludes them from contributing fully to the
blank sheet (transformation manager). Last, professional boundaries were a challenge, with secondary care
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not convinced that primary care could take care of patients (diabetes nurse). Conversely, primary care saw
secondary care as ‘holding on’ to patients longer than necessary:
[Secondary care] feel that they are probably the only people who can look after anybody with a foot
ulcer. So they will hang on to that person . . . until such time as that ulcer is completely cured and
then … maybe we could just hang onto you a bit longer . . . patients essentially went into a foot clinic
and stayed there . . .
Diabetes nurse
Despite these challenges, the transformation manager described how she continued to push for the use of a
‘blank sheet’ because she felt that ‘unless we understand the whole way across the pathway then you can’t
deal with a particular part of the pathway unless you can see the whole picture’. A variety of approaches was
taken tomanage expert collaboration and overcome challenges. Among these, informal approaches
such as ‘having a chat, taking them out for a meal, having a walk with them’ (accountable officer) were
noted as useful. Another approach was to frame the problem so that ‘everybody start[ed] from the point of
view of the person with diabetes and what they needed and what would be best for them and how that
might be best provided’ (transformation manager).
The most impactful approach to managing expectations, however, was the formation of ‘task and finish’
subgroups. These subgroups were tasked with identifying ‘gaps in provision and making recommendations’
for improvement (report, 2013). They had to ‘map out exactly what everyone provided [bringing] . . .
everything onto the table’ (diabetes nurse). Each subgroup was to consider ‘what are we good at, what do
we do well, what aren’t we good at, what might be the reasons for that’. They had to look at local evidence
(e.g. patient numbers) and utilise expertise-based evidence to identify potential areas of improvement. The
groups were also asked ‘is there any evidence, is there any models of care elsewhere, are there any best
practice . . . that’s been published in the literature that we might want to adopt and change’ (i.e. universal
evidence; transformation manager). The following quotation illustrates an example of the work one subgroup:
We took antenatal care we looked at, you know, clinical outcomes, you know, what sort of levels of
care people had when they came into antenatal, were they referred early, were they referred late,
you know, were they planned pregnancies, unplanned pregnancies, what were their care during
pregnancy, what was their outcome.
Diabetes nurse
The creation of subgroups was a considerable step in managing expert collaboration because
stakeholders were asked to identify, evaluate and present evidence from within their field and alongside
their peers. Thus, issues around power and interprofessional working are removed so that work can
be completed.
Although evidence use seemed to benefit from subgroups, challenges remained. Subgroups had problems
with evidence quality. The diabetes nurse described that while ‘there has always been . . . a culture of
looking at our data and . . . auditing the service . . . local evidence . . . [was] the one thing that was
actually really, really difficult to get’.
Even when evidence could be accessed it was somewhat ambiguous and even outdated:
In secondary care diabetes was either [labelled] under diabetes, integrated medicine, specialty
medicine or diabetes and endocrinology. So the whole idea of untangling some of that was incredibly
difficult . . .
Diabetes nurse
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Working with data that was more than a year old so it wasn’t particularly helpful . . . we tried to do
was understand . . . what was the current activity, and then secondly what was our current spend. But
diabetes gets wrapped into other conditions. So even if we’re doing something like ‘what’s our drugs
spend?’ it became a best guess. Because . . . if the patient had diabetes they were likely to be on the
following combinations of therapies so do you count them or do you just count the diabetes ones?
Diabetes in the secondary care setting is, it’s just so tied up with loads of other things . . .
Transformation manager
Stakeholders also noted that there was ‘too much’ universal evidence, which often ‘became this minefield
because . . . how do you synthesise all this so that you’d end up with something that is succinct so that
you can deal with it?’ (transformation manager). Contextualising universal evidence was also problematic,
with the diabetes nurse describing it as ‘useful where it exists’, but:
. . . sometimes you get some clinical disagreement with the decisions that NICE has made and you get
some local needs that are very specific. So you need to provide something different . . . some areas of
the city have got a very young population so there are issues around type 1 diabetes . . . we’ve got lots
of Asian people where English isn’t the first language. So you have to, on top of all of that guidance,
you have to put in what is going on locally and what isn’t and you know, and what is available.
Because, sadly, the same resource isn’t available everywhere . . . so the model has to be realistic into
what is available.
Diabetes nurse
Despite these barriers, the transformation manager described how there was good engagement among
stakeholders. There was a kind of common-sense ‘buy in’ that meant that stakeholders persisted with their
work, even when there were difficulties. The transformation manager reflected that stakeholders
really wanted:
. . . to buy into this . . . they saw the vision we want to get to a foot clinic every single day of the
week, Monday to Friday . . . they knew fundamentally that was going to offer a better service . . .
Process outcomes
Each subgroup delivered a pathway, and these pathways were then merged into a larger pathway.
This new, larger pathway was presented to the overall transformation group. In the larger pathway,
stakeholders agreed on the aspects of diabetes care that would remain in the hospital and those that
would be moved to the community. The team released a report documenting the new pathway. They
also wrote a service specification and attained a firm commitment to a diabetes education programme.
As of December 2015, the diabetes nurse reported that the target set for attendance at the education
programme had been met with sustained interest and increasing numbers of practices in attendance.
It was felt that this programme had caused changes to how people worked by giving them more confidence
and knowledge. They had also identified ‘key performance indicators and objectives for the project’.
They had also got ‘a number of practices . . . up to enhanced level . . . we’ve got 23 of the 63 practices at
enhanced level’ (diabetes nurse), meaning that they would be competent to provide community-based
diabetes care. At this point statisticians at the CLAHRC were looking into referral data to establish the impact
of the redesign work.
Stakeholders also made reference to the issues of doing and continuing innovative redesign work in the
NHS more generally. One questioned the need to have separate diabetes projects across CCGs, suggesting
that ‘the NHS is very bad at leveraging best practice and taking what aids that and implement it. They’re
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more likely to say actually this is my patch and I’ll do it my way, go away type stuff’ (accountable officer),
In terms of sustaining innovation, the need for ongoing evaluation was highlighted:
Just because you’ve transformed a service doesn’t mean it’s OK . . . there should be a rolling program
of review . . . what we’re going to change this year, what is the long term planning in terms of year 1
. . . 2 . . . 3 . . . I don’t think that has been built in . . . And then things get stale don’t they, and then
you have to start again. Whereas I think it would be much better to . . . continually looking and
evaluating. But we have, you know, we look for other funding for things that happen.
Diabetes nurse
Summary of findings
Local and universal evidences were used to broadly frame problems with care, capacity and costs. Efforts were
made to engage multiple experts during the entire process and involvement in the group was broad. Redesign
leaders managed to develop a shared frame on the solution search by using a blank sheet approach. It is
important to note that this sheet was not completely blank because stakeholders had an idea that they wanted
to move care to the community based on universal evidence talk around the ‘left shift’. A variety of approaches
was taken to manage expert collaboration; the most impactful approach to tackling the barriers was the
formation of ‘task and finish’ subgroups. These groups looked at local evidence (e.g. patient numbers) and used
expertise-based evidence to identify potential areas of improvement. The groups were also asked to look at
universal evidence. Although they faced several barriers during the redesign, stakeholders managed to produce
a report as per their brief. Attendance at the education programme was sustained, meaning that many practices
were competent to provide community-based diabetes care. Statisticians are currently looking into referral data
to establish the impact of the redesign work. Overall, evidence use was problematic at Rutterford CCG, but it
overcame this to achieve its objectives. Stakeholders also seemed to be satisfied with the process. The redesign
process for this CCG is summarised in Figure 9. Guidance for reading process maps is shown in Figure 3.
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Appendix 2 Chelsea Clinical Commissioning
Group
Case study overview
Chelsea was one of four CCGs in a trust serving ‘a population of nearly a million’ (report). The trust
was concerned with diabetes care and decided that all four CCGs should improve their diabetes care.
Participants at Chelsea included a contracting manager, a diabetes consultant, a commissioning manager
and a patient representative from a leading charity. The consultant described how each CCG had ‘differing
ideas, differing needs. Population profile is entirely different in all four’ (diabetes consultant), but the trust
had embraced a model in which patients ‘who can be managed in the community will be sent off to the
community to be looked after by the community nurse and the GPs for whom support in various different
forms will be provided’ (diabetes consultant). Chelsea was the first of the four to have to ‘a reasonable
extent . . . done . . . gone to the first phase where we’re actually discharging people now’ (diabetes
consultant). During interviews, stakeholders described how knowing what the new pathway would look
like from the outset and so their work was about making evidence from elsewhere relevant to context.
The diabetes consultant and performance team were largely responsible for presenting evidence to a
steering group. Although it had some faced barriers around communication and finance, the CCG managed
to implement changes. At our last contact, the CCG planned to evaluate the impact of the redesign.
The remaining three CCGs were still in pre-contemplation stages of change.
Agenda formation
The trust in which Chelsea belongs chose to adopt a model that involved moving patients to the
community. This model had been developed at Seaport CCG and was seen as a means to improve care
provision by reducing demands on hospital capacity. The diabetes consultant described how ‘philosophy as
just the same [as Seaport CCG’s model]’ meaning that trans-local evidence was fundamental in agenda
formation. The consultant also had a role in bringing expertise-based evidence because he had worked
in a hospital where the ‘model been developed, delivered, evaluated’ and ‘seen first-hand how it works’.
He also brought universal evidence, describing, for example, to ‘a paper, I can’t remember where, but
there is a paper’ showing model efficacy. He also cited public health data showing ‘diabetes prevalence is
slightly higher than the England average’.
The performance team also had a role in bridging ‘the gap between information and the team, to allow
[them] to get the information . . . so that we’ve got the data that we can do things’. The performance
team was largely responsible for providing local evidence around ‘activity and finance . . . waiting list
data’, which was used to show how in ‘the existing system . . . patients are due an appointment in
9 months . . . were just seen just last month’ (diabetes consultant). This delay was caused by long waiting
lists, which, in turn, left complex patients needing emergency care. Their emergency care often overlapped
with scheduled visits, causing a duplication of work. In the new model, however, it was expected that ‘the
complex needs patients who actually need the most will get it on time’ (consultant).
Selecting a solution
Although a solution had been identified from the outset, experts were engaged in a steering group with
‘representation from CCGs, from the trust, from the intermediate care services’. The steering group met
‘every six weeks [to discuss] how we are going to deliver this, what is the next step and how will the
patients be discharged’. Over a relatively short period (18 months) the group agreed which diabetes
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services would be left in the hospital and which would be moved to the community. The services that were
left in the hospital were the same as those that were left in the hospital at Seaport, meaning that trans-
local evidence played a major role in this episode of work. Expertise-based and universal evidences
were also used in tandem during this episode. The contracting manager, for example, described how there
was an ‘assumption that the NICE guidelines and those sorts of things are being met and that it will be the
responsibility of the lead consultant to ensure that everything is being [met]’ (contracting manager).
Although trans-local evidence meant that stakeholders at this CCG were largely mimicking Seaport,
structural conditions acted as barriers to their progress. Communication was the first major barrier
mentioned in talk. The diabetes consultant described how the steering group had wanted to develop a
computer-based referral system so that he did not have to ‘free up an hour of [his] time for GPs to call . . .
[to talk about] discharged patients’. The computer-based communication was not feasible, however,
because ‘half of [the practices] are still on a system called System One and half of them are on IBIS and
they don’t talk to each other’. Other communication issues came to light when the team were trying to
get the trans-local evidence contracted into practice. The contracting manager described how she often
had: ‘no idea who I need to speak to, you know . . . it makes life very difficult because every trust is set out
differently as well so you never know who’s best to ring’.
Other barriers to implementing the trans-local evidence were financial in nature. Although the trust had
been provided ‘about four diabetes nurses’, the CCG still did not have the money to backfill them so that
they could go on upskilling days (as had been done in Seaport). Because of this, Chelsea was yet to develop
‘locally enhanced services’ (as Seaport and Rutterford CCGs had). Instead, much of the responsibility for
supporting community-based diabetes services was left with the consultant:
The CCG is funding the practice nurses who want to do it to do [education] modules . . . it’s all fully
funded [but] there has not been takers for those practices . . . Because they can’t release the people.
Because there is, yeah, somebody has to backfill them . . .
Diabetes consultant
Finance was also a challenge because consultants were ‘paid on the number of patients’ seen.
This arrangement meant that once the ‘numbers go down’ (as patients are referred to the community),
consultants would potentially be at a loss. At our meeting there had been no reassurances put in place,
but the diabetes consultant said that there was ‘plenty for him [and other consultants] to do’ and so he
was certain that the CCG would find the money to keep him employed. Despite this uncertainty,
the consultant had decided to take a risk and let support for the community-based model come ‘out of
[his] own time, I’ve just done it’.
Process outcomes
Relative to other CCGs, the redesign work at Chelsea was quite straightforward. It decided to move care
into the community, mimicking, almost exactly, the pathway that had been developed in Seaport. Chelsea
of course faced some challenges, particularly around finance and communication. Overall, however,
Chelsea had agreed a new pathway and had ‘gone to the first phase where we’re actually discharging
people’ (diabetes consultant). The consultant described how the steering group continued to hold a
discharge meeting in which he used expertise-based evidence while going through a ‘list to identify say
30 patients to be discharged . . . the panel will agree and then the patients will be discharged back to the
community with a letter to the GP, with a letter to the patient to say your care is going’.
An evaluation of the changed services was also planned and would be completed by ‘a separate quality
team [who have] have a quality review meeting on a quarterly basis with the commissioners . . . and the
support unit’ (contracting manager). The evaluation would be based largely on local evidence about
‘follow-ups . . . making sure that they are seen on time, time to first wait’. These evaluations would then
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be contrasted to outcome markers produced by creators of universal evidence (e.g. the Public Health
Observatory) using universal tools (e.g. the Dove Tool).
Overall, Chelsea CCG had met its objectives and stakeholders were largely satisfied. Perhaps because it
had decided to mimic Seaport CCG prior to our fieldwork, no major issues with evidence use were
recorded in our data either.
Chelsea summary of findings
Chelsea CCG was one of four CCGs in a trust that had been instructed to consider diabetes service
provision. Diabetes had been a concern for over 3 years in the area. Once it was given the go ahead, it
took just 18 months to implement a new model of diabetes care in practice. This model was based, almost
exclusively, on trans-local evidence from Seaport CCG. This meant that the problem and solution search
were framed quite narrowly, although role expectations about the redesign were quite clear from the
offset. There was a lot of work around expert engagement, especially with the steering group. The group
used local, universal and expertise-based evidence to frame issues around capacity for diabetes care during
agenda formation episodes. Indeed, the diabetes consultant and the performance team had very clear role
structures as actors who brought relevant evidence forward. Although they had faced barriers around
communication and finance, they pressed forward with the redesign. At our last point of contact, the CCG
had plans to evaluate the impact of its redesign using universal-evidence based tools alongside local
evidence about patient experiences of care (e.g. follow-ups, time to first wait). The redesign process for
this CCG is summarised in Figure 10. Guidance for reading process maps is shown in Figure 3.
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Appendix 3 Coalfield Clinical Commissioning
Group
Case study overview
We first contacted a senior commissioning manager at Coalfield CCG. This individual had played a
significant role in the redesign work. He also referred us to other stakeholders who had been involved,
including the clinical lead for MSK, the clinical director, the CCG chairperson and a support manager
patient engagement. At the time of our visit, this core group had been working together for several years
to incrementally change different parts of the MSK pathway (e.g. respite services). They had reached a
point, however, at which they felt that the only way ‘to move forward was through whole-scale
integration’ of services (senior commissioning manager), and so this is the focus of our case study. At the
time of our first meeting, Coalfield had designed and agreed a more integrated MSK pathway and it was
about to ‘go live’ (i.e. be implemented in practice). We followed up with the senior commissioning
manager on three additional occasions after these first interviews to capture implementation progress.
Although there were some challenges, the new pathway was implemented and, at our last contact,
stakeholders were working to evaluate its efficacy.
Agenda formation
The senior commissioning manager, the clinical lead for MSK and the clinical director drove the redesign
project at Coalfield. These stakeholders effectively framed a more integrated MSK pathway as a means
to improve patient care. The need for the new pathway was based on local evidence, with the senior
commissioning manager describing how patients were ‘going to the wrong ology at the wrong time’,
which meant that they were not getting the right care. He also provided a narrative example, describing
one patient who was employed as a steel-grinder, but was approaching retirement. This patient was
suffering joint pain and, in the current pathway, would be offered an operation. However, the operation
would mean a significant period of recovery that would ultimately jeopardise the patient’s employment.
In the new pathway, however, patient need would be the main concern and so, in the case of the
steel-grinder, services to maintain his condition (e.g. physiotherapy) would be offered first. Once the
patient reached retirement age, other treatment options could be considered, if necessary.
Local evidence pertaining to contracting arrangements was also used to frame the problem. The group
felt that the current ‘payment by results system’ was not good for ‘the outcomes of the patients’ (clinical
director). They wanted to adopt a form of contracting that recommended by the NHS (universal evidence)
known as the capitated outcomes-based incentivised care (COBIC) contract (www.cobic.co.uk). COBIC is a
block contract based on patient outcomes, rather than on the number of patients seen (clinical lead). The
group decided to pursue this contracting model because it means that ‘behaviour is focused on what’s
best for the patients’ (support manager).
The commissioning manager described ‘just trying to keep people out of hospital, lowest intervention,
less intensive interventions’ as a means to achieve better patient care. As mentioned in the previous cases,
community-based care is informed largely by universal evidence.
Selecting a solution
Work began on the redesign when the group ‘sat down and chewed it over . . . spoke to a few people
and mulled it about’ (commissioning manager). As in other CCGs, the group decided to frame the
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solution search in terms of a ‘blank sheet’ in order to engage stakeholders. Again, however, this sheet was
only partly blank given the focus on reducing hospital-based care. The clinical lead saw the blank sheet as
important because it engages stakeholders, allowing them to think that ‘actually I’m a bit more in control
of my own destiny here’.
Engagement was not straightforward, however, and the first meeting was described as ‘hilarious’ because
‘orthopods hated podiatrists, who hated the physios and they all sat with their back to each other . . . in
silence for about 5 minutes’. There was resistance between groups until:
. . . one of them said so what do you want us to do? I said I want you to deliver the best possible care
for my patients for the limited amount of money you’ve got. And they said how do you want us to
do it? I said I don’t care. I said if you want to get a bag of bones and shake them if that makes a
difference that’s fine. I said I just want the outcome . . .
Clinical lead
The commissioning manager was understanding of these issues, however, describing how stakeholders
‘didn’t know each other, they’d never met before . . . didn’t know what clinical skills and options the
others could provide’. He described efforts to manage engagement to ensure that they ‘came round
and started to have conversations’. First, he felt that because they had done ‘lots and lots of MSK
commissioning’ they would have ‘a lot of credibility [because stakeholders] knew [they had] done some big
things . . . knew [they’d] done commissioning that worked well’. Other efforts to manage engagement
included creating a project website, which the clinical lead saw as ‘something . . . that really pulls people
together’. Ultimately, expert engagement was seen as:
. . . the stuff that means your project survives when it gets to a rocky bit . . . a bit cold and a bit
difficult . . .
Clinical lead
Efforts to engage patient experts were also notable. Meetings were held with patients, carers and the
public so that pathways could be ‘coproduced’. The commissioning manager described how not having
‘local people who completely believe in what you’re trying to do [means] you can’t get anywhere’ The
clinical director described how patients can be used as experts, and also be used to manage expert
collaboration. As in other CCGs, patients can force stakeholders with divergent ideas or competing
interests to reach agreement:
The value of . . . involving the patients . . . right from the word go because they bring a sort of sense
of credibility is not the right word but it’s a sense of realism into it right from the outset that you can’t
argue with . . . Sometimes you get into little sort of power plays between specialists in the area but
actually if you have the view of the patients involved they cut through all that crap . . .
Commissioning manager
During this episode stakeholders sourced and evaluated a mix of universal and expertise-based
evidence. The commissioning manager described using universal evidence, including ‘national evidence
. . . international evidence’, especially NICE, in relation to ‘good practice, best practice’. This evidence gave
‘a bit of assurance that [stakeholders] are not going to do something whacky’ (clinical lead). Stakeholders
also described having to use expertise-base evidence to understand and evaluate universal evidence:
We’re working with expert clinicians . . . many of which have actually written the papers. So they really
can understand and make very clear to each other . . . and also argue the case with each other . . .
Senior commissioning manager
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Expertise-based evidence was not only important to interpret universal evidence, but also critical to
making changes. The clinical director described the MSK screening tool that they wanted to use. It had
been produced by academics, but had not been widely trialled before being selected for use at Coalfield.
As the clinical director described:
We actually started the changes before the evidence was published so we knew the evidence was
coming and you know, we did . . . so we were quite brave really. We sort of thought it’s the right
thing to do, let’s do it . . .
They also drew on local evidence to identify a solution. They discussed, for example, how they had a
number of facilities in the community (e.g. gyms and sports halls) that were currently underused. They
agreed that these spaces could be used for prevention services. So, for example, in these spaces ‘if you
need to have your hip replaced would you . . . do your pre-physio [and] your physio afterwards [to] get
yourself fit before you have the operation’.
Process outcomes
After several meetings, a new pathway was agreed among stakeholders. The senior commissioning
manager described how secondary care stakeholders were ‘saying this [the pathway] fantastic because this
is what we’re trained to do . . . We trained in medical school to look after, to help and support people.
They were all incredibly frustrated by the systems they currently work in, the silos, the fragmentation’. He
also described how the ‘finance director . . . the chief exec . . . the chairman . . . the medical director’ being
on board. Although stakeholders were happy with the pathway, the senior commissioning manager still
did a ‘lot of leg work’ to ensure expert engagement so that it would be actually implemented
in practice:
Before every board meeting I spoke to every board member . . . sticking my head round the door while
[saying] do you get it? Do you understand? Have you got any questions? Is there anything worrying
you? It’s literally simple as that. And they’d go that’s fine, get out, for God’s sake. In the end people
get bored, go away . . . we support you, we’re with you . . .
There were some barriers in implementing the pathway, especially resistance to change. The clinical lead
described how ‘the NHS doesn’t have the appetite for innovation that exists in the private sector because
the private sector have to make a profit’. Because of this, there was resistance to changing the current
pathway, even though it was not working well:
No one has bankrupted each other to be totally blunt. The system has managed. It’s been a
complicated way of doing it but . . . the health system as an economy has survived. So . . . to unpick
something they don’t like but on the other hand which is relatively low risk and they’ve learned to
manage . . . was hugely challenging.
Commissioning manager
To overcome resistance, the clinical lead described how they ‘threatened to stick [the new pathway] out
to tender to get [resistant parties] to play ball’. Forcing co-operation in this manner was complicated by
governance because it meant that they had:
. . . NHS England on [our] necks because we were ‘privatising’ . . . but once we said we want to work
with [local trusts] we had Monitor on our backs saying you’ve not put it out to tender . . . we had to
jump through lots of hoops to demonstrate why we weren’t putting out to tender . . . So it’s just a
system that doesn’t join up . . .
Clinical lead
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Despite challenges, the pathway went live several months after our initial interviews. During follow-ups,
stakeholders had a strong interest in evaluating the pathway with methods from other countries (trans-
local evidence). They were particularly interested in ‘clinical quality, safety . . . patient gain and patient
experience’ (clinical lead). The commissioning manager noted that:
The thing I think the NHS what I’ve seen does badly usually is we do the stakeholder bit really well, we
do the implementation planning, we kick off the implementation and then we just pull back. Do you
know what I mean? And we don’t do the crucial bit then of studying what happens and then making
changes . . . we’re always looking to sort of improve things and sort of make changes. But then as
soon as we made a change we’re onto the next thing . . .
Overall, the redesign work at Coalfield CCG was successful. It met its objectives and used a variety of
evidences, and stakeholders were satisfied.
Coalfield summary of findings
Stakeholders used local and universal evidences to frame problems with MSK services. They were largely
concerned with improving patient care experiences, but did also acknowledge costs. Experts were engaged
with the redesign from the offset (senior commissioning manager, clinical lead for MSK, clinical director,
CCG chairperson and support manager for patient engagement) but they did a lot of work to build and
manage further expert collaboration. In the search for a solution, for example, they adopted the blank
sheet approach to frame the search for a solution. Again, this sheet was not completely blank because
they had an idea that they wanted to move care to the community based on universal evidence. A variety
of approaches was taken to manage expert collaboration, including relying on the group’s credibility,
creating a website and focusing on the patients. Universal evidence informed many of their decisions in
terms of the selected solution, but this was usually understood in the light of local and expertise-based
evidences. Although there were some barriers (e.g. resistance to change), the stakeholders worked to
continue to engage experts at the implementation episode. When they were not successful, they used the
threat of external tender. The new pathway went live several months after our initial interviews, and
stakeholders showed a strong interest in evaluating its impact. The redesign process for this CCG is
summarised in Figure 11. Guidance for reading process maps is shown in Figure 3.
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Appendix 4 Shire Clinical Commissioning Group
Case study overview
We first contacted the commissioning manager and a GPwSI, who described how the MSK services
redesign had originated (approximately 10 years ago) with a GP who ‘a didn’t feel as if some of the
services that we were providing locally fitted [the] need’ (GPwSI). The original GP had since retired and the
GPwSI interviewed for our study essentially had taken over his role. She shared his feeling that they ‘could
do it so much better’. At our first meeting, the GPwSI and the commissioning manager described how
they began by inviting a small group of stakeholders. This group later developed into bigger working
groups. Between them they had designed a new pathway. Because of several challenges, they were forced
to put the pathway out to tender. Stakeholders who had been involved in the design of the pathway came
together in a consortium and bid for the tender so that external, private providers would not be able to
take their contracts. They were successful and, at our last interviews, had just implemented changes in
practice. Other stakeholders interviewed at Coalfield CCG included an external consultant GP, a service
manager, a clinical therapies lead and the deputy director of planning.
Agenda formation
The commissioning manager and the GPwSI drew on local and universal evidences to frame problems
with MSK services in terms of costs, care and capacity. The commissioning manager drew on local
evidence to describe how they did not have ‘the physical space . . . the staff and [were unable] to turn
[patients] around quickly enough’. She felt that patients were ‘floating around [secondary care] having
treatment which they could have had in the community’. Universal evidences from ‘Atlas of Variation’,
which is produced by the Department of Health, showed that Shire CCG was ‘outliers in terms of . . .
waiting lists [and] spent too much money’ (GPwSI). Both the commissioning manager and the GPwSI felt
that ‘a more integrated pathway’ was necessary that would mean that patients were not ‘bounced from
provider to provider’ (GPwSI). Addressing capacity issues was expected to improve patient experiences
of care.
Selecting a solution
The GPwSI and the commissioning manager began by engaging ‘probably about six or seven’ stakeholders
in a small group (commissioning manager). They decided to engage ‘about 20’ additional experts in ‘MSK
working groups’. Groups were tasked with sourcing and evaluating local and universal evidence on
‘the activity, the benchmarking’ (commissioning manager). A GP group was also engaged during this
episode of the redesign. The GP group was asked to look at local evidence on ‘the primary care pathway
side of things’ (commissioning manager). The GPs also used universal evidence from the ‘Map of
Medicine’ (commissioning manager). The Map of Medicine is a resource ‘of national pathways that can
then be adapted to local needs’ (GPwSI). The commissioning manager described having good engagement
in these groups, including ‘patient representatives . . . the acute trust . . . the community trust . . . physios
. . . consultants [and] commissioners’. As in other CCGs, however, there were the barriers that come with
multiple professionals working together. The commissioning manager describes how these groups
were when:
. . . the conversations got slightly, I wouldn’t say more tense, the conversations were never tense just
more difficult because we involved more people who all had a slightly different view of what we were
trying to do . . .
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In addition to the groups, the GPwSI was working with consultants ‘adapting each pathway [in the Map of
Medicine] to [the] local needs’. This adaption was informed by local evidence related to ‘what services you
had available locally’. Using local evidence they ‘just tweaked the pathway to say actually don’t send it
there, send it here instead, and things like that’. They designed a pathway in which more care would be
provided in the community setting, with only patients who needed secondary care getting to the consultants.
Universal evidence is also likely to have influenced the wish to have ‘secondary care consultants [to] work
in the community service and provide mentorship to the clinicians there and also to do sort of sessions every
so often’ (commissioning manager).
The GPwSI produced a new pathway and a service specification. The commissioning manager thought that
everybody agreed, noting that an onlooker would have ‘gone away going well, they’re all on board with
this. They all seem to get it’ She was ‘adamant that this was the right thing to do . . . and . . . to push
it forward’.
Despite her optimism, the commissioning manager described how they ‘just could not get all the different
parties to come together to do the one pathway’. In our interview she said she was not able to ‘quite put
[her] finger on why’ they could not move towards implementation. Throughout our conversation, however,
talk indicated several potential barriers. These were later reinforced in interviews with other stakeholders:
First, the GPwSI described risk averseness and unwillingness to change, noting stakeholders as ‘a bit
resistant and set in their ways’. She described how the proposed changes would have been ‘the first major
service redesign in the local health economy . . . it’s millions and millions and millions of pounds’. She felt
that the risks associated with such a big change were ‘at the back of people’s minds’, causing them to
have cold feet. However, in our interviews with clinicians (service manager and clinical therapies lead), a
different opinion was shared. These stakeholders described how the service specification that they had
been given was ‘very brief . . . with minimal information’. They found it very difficult to ‘understand the
commissioners’ wants and desires . . . from the information that was there’.
Second, they both commented that implementation may have been stalled by unclear roles. They said that
sometimes the ‘wrong’ people were around the table and ‘unless everybody understands why they’re there
and understands what their role is, then potentially you’re not going to get further forward’ (commissioning
manager). Some stakeholders involved in the solution selection were seen as not particularly ‘engaged in
doing that piece of work . . . and just turning up and being there because they’ve been asked to be’ (GPwSI).
Last, they listed finance as a barrier. In the new pathway, patients would be released to community
services and ‘people were scared of losing patients’ (commissioning manager). The acute trust were ‘seeing
some of their physio coming out, some of their pain coming out, some of their anaesthetics coming out
. . . and not getting over that’ (commissioning manager). Although the commissioning manager tried to
manage discussions during expert collaboration, she felt stakeholders could not see ‘that there is a
different way of maintaining their income’. She described trying to make them understand the new way
would be more effective because specialists would not be ‘seeing so many people who . . . have got a sore
toe, [they would be] seeing people who need a hip replacement’.
Contrasting this, clinicians commented that the service specification showed an ‘extreme lack of
knowledge about what was happening . . . in the current services and . . . going forward . . . [It didn’t
have] an activity schedule and . . . a financial schedule’ (service manager).
Several meetings and discussions were held ‘once every 4–6 weeks for easily 2 years, probably longer’ to try
to reach agreement about these barriers (GPwSI). They were unsuccessful, however, and the commissioning
manager described how she felt ‘enough is enough’ and ‘made the decision that they were going to go to
tender for part of the pathway’ that they could not agree on. Tendering was not seen as an ideal for two
reasons. First, it ‘costs both providers and commissioners a lot of time and resource . . . the amount of hours
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that have been put into the tender is ridiculous, absolutely ridiculous’ (commissioning manager). Second, it
is not always reliable and ‘in other places [private providers] had a big contract and they failed to provide on
that’ (GPwSI).
After ‘to-ing and fro-ing [about] the wording of [tendering] documents . . . it eventually went out and [there
were] . . . three main bidders’ (commissioning manager). Two were private and one was a consortium of health
providers that had been involved in the redesign process. The consortium recognised that ‘no one current
organisation could actually bid on their own’ (clinical service manager). The consortium agreed ‘no one trust
would disadvantage another trust’, which made the tender ‘incredibly difficult to deliver . . . [because] If you
want to do a true service redesign . . . organisations have to be disadvantaged’ (clinical service manager). They
used local evidence to inform agreement, describing for example that the contract was ‘worth roundabout
1.4 million pounds’ to them (deputy director). They also felt that local providers offer the service would
‘improve patient care . . . people [will be] seen in the right way and having a better journey’ (deputy
director). The consortium was the successful bidder for the contract.
Process outcomes
Although they reached agreement and won the bid for the new service, the new group still faced barriers.
Recruitment of staff to provide the new pathway was difficult because it is NHS policy not to recruit ‘at
risk’. This meant that they were not allowed to recruit new staff until the service was up and running.
Because of this they ‘had to start by begging and borrowing people from lots of other services’ (clinical
therapies lead). Both the clinical therapies lead and the clinical service manager noted that although, on
paper, the NHS encourages competiveness, issues like this undermine progress in ways that you would not
find ‘in the private sector at all’.
Despite the hurdles, the objectives were met and a new service was opened. In some cases, however,
stakeholders were not satisfied. The clinical service manager described how they ‘ended up in a situation
where we all still deliver what we were delivering with bits added on but through different contracting
arrangements’. At the time of our meeting the service had been live for just 2 weeks, which meant that
they were ‘fire fighting and ironing out the crinkles’. They did say that this was ‘less and less every day’
and that they were ‘getting there’. They also seemed optimistic, with ‘lots of great ideas about what we’ll
want to do and how we want to deliver it’ (clinical service manager).
Shire summary of findings
Shire CCG’s redesign was against years of work trying to improve MSK services. Problems were framed
in terms of costs, care and capacity. Universal and local evidence were used with the understanding that
too much care was in the hospital. The commissioning manager and the GPwSI recruited small groups,
which were later expanded to working expert groups. These groups were tasked with looking at various
evidences (universal, local) about a solution. The GPwSI was also working up a new pathway, external to,
but informed by, the groups. Several challenges were presented and discussed at meetings, until they to
went for tender. Providers formed a consortium, which eventually won the tender. After the tender was
won, several additional barriers were faced, including recruitment and their inability to ‘disadvantage’ each
other. The redesign process for this CCG is shown in Figure 12. Guidance for reading process maps is
shown in Figure 3.
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Appendix 5 Toolkit
Work practices
This section of the toolkit is aimed at understanding and improving work practices around commissioning
teams’ use of evidence.
Understanding how ready your project team is to use evidence
(Target user: lead/members of redesign projects.)
Preamble Successful service redesign projects are those that develop effective, realistic and well-thought
proposals/solutions for changing the commissioning of health-care services at a local level. Service redesign
teams are more likely to develop such solutions when their decision making processes are well managed
and well informed, that is, backed up with evidence, local knowledge and insights of various experts. In our
research, we found that decisions need to be based on different kinds of evidence (universal, trans-local,
local, expertise-based). We also identified specific capabilities that can contribute to improving the use of
evidence in service redesign decision processes. These are summarised in the attached sheet. The following
questionnaire aims to help you assess these capabilities in your own setting so that you can identify areas
where your project may be more, or less, ready to use evidence to inform effective redesign solutions.
Area 1: sourcing and evaluating evidence
This set of questions is about how the project team gathers and uses different types of evidence in
decision-making.
1a. We have thought about the different types of evidence (local, trans-local, universal and expertise-
based) that might be relevant, given the objectives and scope of this project.
1 2 3 4 5
Strongly disagree ⦿ ⦿ ⦿ ⦿ ⦿ Strongly agree
1b. The project team knows how to identify and gather new evidence to inform its decision-making process.
1 2 3 4 5
Strongly disagree ⦿ ⦿ ⦿ ⦿ ⦿ Strongly agree
1c. The project team has explicit criteria (e.g. relevance, applicability) to assess evidence.
1 2 3 4 5
Strongly disagree ⦿ ⦿ ⦿ ⦿ ⦿ Strongly agree
1d. The project team gets together to discuss, debate and assess available evidence.
1 2 3 4 5
Strongly disagree ⦿ ⦿ ⦿ ⦿ ⦿ Strongly agree
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Area 2: engaging experts
This set of questions is about the makeup of project teams.
2a. Given the aims and objective of our redesign project, we have carefully considered all possible
stakeholders that may be affected by project outcomes.
1 2 3 4 5
Strongly disagree ⦿ ⦿ ⦿ ⦿ ⦿ Strongly agree
2b. Given the aims and objective of this project, we have identified all individuals who might have relevant
insights, information and expertise to inform our decisions.
1 2 3 4 5
Strongly disagree ⦿ ⦿ ⦿ ⦿ ⦿ Strongly agree
2c. We have carefully considered when and how individuals with relevant insights, information and
expertise will be asked to offer their input and feedback.
1 2 3 4 5
Strongly disagree ⦿ ⦿ ⦿ ⦿ ⦿ Strongly agree
Area 3: effective framing
This set of questions is about the HOW the project team makes sense of, or ‘frames’, their problem and
search for solutions.
3a. The aims and objectives of this project reflect a balanced mix of different priorities (e.g. to improve
quality of patient care, cost-effectiveness, capacity to delivery health care).
1 2 3 4 5
Strongly disagree ⦿ ⦿ ⦿ ⦿ ⦿ Strongly agree
3b. Given the project objectives, we have gathered evidence on the benefits and drawbacks of different
solutions (e.g. adapting what we do now, copying what others do or starting from scratch).
1 2 3 4 5
Strongly disagree ⦿ ⦿ ⦿ ⦿ ⦿ Strongly agree
3c. Available resources for this project might affect our problem-solving efforts.
1 2 3 4 5
Strongly disagree ⦿ ⦿ ⦿ ⦿ ⦿ Strongly agree
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Area 4: managing roles and expectations
This set of questions is about roles and role expectations within the project team.
4a. Given the project objectives, it is critical that everyone knows what is expected of them.
1 2 3 4 5
Strongly disagree ⦿ ⦿ ⦿ ⦿ ⦿ Strongly agree
4b. Every member of the project team understands that bringing new evidence and information to the
team’s attention is part of their role.
1 2 3 4 5
Strongly disagree ⦿ ⦿ ⦿ ⦿ ⦿ Strongly agree
4c. We have carefully considered a range of different roles for participants; for example, some may offer
expertise, others may offer real-world experience.
1 2 3 4 5
Strongly disagree ⦿ ⦿ ⦿ ⦿ ⦿ Strongly agree
4d. Every member of the project team received feedback on the new evidence and information they
present that seems relevant to the project.
1 2 3 4 5
Strongly disagree ⦿ ⦿ ⦿ ⦿ ⦿ Strongly agree
Area 5: managing expert collaboration
This set of questions is about how well different experts may work together to achieve the
project’s objectives.
5a. Project members have different goals and objectives for this project.
1 2 3 4 5
Strongly disagree ⦿ ⦿ ⦿ ⦿ ⦿ Strongly agree
5b. It is important for all members to declare any conflicts of interest.
1 2 3 4 5
Strongly disagree ⦿ ⦿ ⦿ ⦿ ⦿ Strongly agree
DOI: 10.3310/hsdr05180 HEALTH SERVICES AND DELIVERY RESEARCH 2017 VOL. 5 NO. 18
© Queen’s Printer and Controller of HMSO 2017. This work was produced by Swan et al. under the terms of a commissioning contract issued by the Secretary of State for Health.
This issue may be freely reproduced for the purposes of private research and study and extracts (or indeed, the full report) may be included in professional journals provided that
suitable acknowledgement is made and the reproduction is not associated with any form of advertising. Applications for commercial reproduction should be addressed to: NIHR
Journals Library, National Institute for Health Research, Evaluation, Trials and Studies Coordinating Centre, Alpha House, University of Southampton Science Park, Southampton
SO16 7NS, UK.
107
5c. We have considered how we can get key experts (including patients) to share relevant information with
one another, even if it might be politically sensitive.
1 2 3 4 5
Strongly disagree ⦿ ⦿ ⦿ ⦿ ⦿ Strongly agree
5d. We can recognise and handle a situation in which a project team member seeks to influence the
decision-making process to serve their specific vested interest.
1 2 3 4 5
Strongly disagree ⦿ ⦿ ⦿ ⦿ ⦿ Strongly agree
Participant answers to the above questions can then be used to generate a radar plot, an example of
which is shown in Figure 13.
Organisational conditions
The management literature, as well as feedback from our national workshop, emphasised the importance
of noting that redesign projects do not take place in a vacuum.101,102 Organisational context (e.g. resources
available, organisational culture) may also influence evidence use. Redesign projects are often initiated as a
result of boards appraising and approving a business case because it meets organisational objectives (e.g.
savings). Organisational context might also impact on sourcing and evaluating evidence. There are often
numerous attempts to improve the organisation of health services. Organisations (CCGs) often have a
weak memory for these so that learning is not often transferred from old projects. That is, evidence of
‘what worked’ and ‘what didn’t’ at a local level may not be mobilised as a result of poor organisational
memory. Such evidence might be important given the local nature of projects. In addition to organisational
memory, organisational culture may play an important role in deciding what and how evidence is used.
Prior research suggests that organisations are ‘cultural universes’, which place emphasis on, for example,
certain values and philosophies.103 Some organisations value evidence-based decision-making more than
others, and so it can be assumed that employees in this type of organisation will be more likely to pay
attention to evidence. It is important, then, to also consider the readiness of the organisation for evidence
use. We have developed the following items for our toolkit.
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FIGURE 13 Example of radar plot for team capabilities to use evidence.
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Assessing how favourable the organisational context is for
using evidence
(Target user: director/associate director of commissioning organisation.)
Preamble Using evidence effectively to inform decisions is a very localised skill. Middle-level managers,
project teams and other stakeholders involved in commissioning need to take specific actions to find and
use evidence in decision-making. In our research, we found that specific practices (e.g. identifying and
engaging the right experts) enhance the use of evidence in the design and commissioning of health-care
services. At the same time, we found that the organisational environment influences commissioning
groups’ efforts to use evidence. The following questionnaire aims to help senior managers, such as you,
identify areas in which your organisation may provide a more or less favourable context for the use of
evidence in commissioning decision-making.
Area 1: central support for using evidence
1a. My organisation has clear processes in place to meet its various needs for information and evidence
throughout the commissioning cycle.
1 2 3 4 5
Strongly disagree ⦿ ⦿ ⦿ ⦿ ⦿ Strongly agree
1b. My organisation has produced a structured framework (e.g., internal guidance or policy), which
specifies how it should meet its various needs for information and evidence throughout the
commissioning cycle.
1 2 3 4 5
Strongly disagree ⦿ ⦿ ⦿ ⦿ ⦿ Strongly agree
1c. My organisation has allocated a budget to serve its needs for information and evidence through the
provision of specialised services and/or roles (e.g. library services, chief knowledge officer).
1 2 3 4 5
Strongly disagree ⦿ ⦿ ⦿ ⦿ ⦿ Strongly agree
Area 2: culture for using evidence
2a. In my organisation, before making important decisions, we value spending a lot of time gathering
relevant data, information and evidence.
1 2 3 4 5
Strongly disagree ⦿ ⦿ ⦿ ⦿ ⦿ Strongly agree
2b. In my organisation, we believe that it is crucial that we understand and evaluate the evidence behind
the problems we face.
1 2 3 4 5
Strongly disagree ⦿ ⦿ ⦿ ⦿ ⦿ Strongly agree
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2c. In my organisation, before making important decisions, we believe that it is crucial that we understand
and evaluate the evidence when considering alternative solutions.
1 2 3 4 5
Strongly disagree ⦿ ⦿ ⦿ ⦿ ⦿ Strongly agree
2d. In my organisation, we value the input of different internal and external experts (e.g. patients,
researchers, clinicians) when making important commissioning decisions.
1 2 3 4 5
Strongly disagree ⦿ ⦿ ⦿ ⦿ ⦿ Strongly agree
Area 3: organisational memory
3a. My organisation has clear processes in place to capture evidence and learning from past projects.
1 2 3 4 5
Strongly disagree ⦿ ⦿ ⦿ ⦿ ⦿ Strongly agree
3b. In my organisation, before making important decisions, we almost always check how related or similar
decisions in the past were taken here and/or check how other organisations have tackled the problem.
1 2 3 4 5
Strongly disagree ⦿ ⦿ ⦿ ⦿ ⦿ Strongly agree
3c. My organisation maintains repositories, which include information about past projects, project outputs
and project participants and these are easily accessible.
1 2 3 4 5
Strongly disagree ⦿ ⦿ ⦿ ⦿ ⦿ Strongly agree
Participant answers to the above questions can then be used to generate a radar plot, an example of
which is shown in Figure 14.
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FIGURE 14 Example of radar plot for organisational preparedness to use evidence.
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